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As the global population heads toward 9 billion by 2050, 
decisions made today will lock countries into growth patterns 
that may or may not be sustainable in the future.  Care must be 
taken to ensure that cities and roads, factories and farms are 
designed, managed, and regulated as efficiently as possible 
to wisely use natural resources while supporting the robust 
growth developing countries still need. Economic development 
during the next two decades cannot mirror the previous two: 
poverty reduction remains urgent but growth and equity can 
be pursued without relying on policies and practices that foul 
the air, water, and land.
Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable 
Development makes the case that greening growth is 
necessary, efficient, and affordable. Yet spurring growth 
without ensuring equity will thwart efforts to reduce poverty 
and improve access to health, education, and infrastructure 
services. Countries must make strategic investments and 
farsighted policy changes that acknowledge natural resource 
constraints and enable the world’s poorest and most vulner-
able to benefit from efficient, clean, and resilient growth. Like 
other forms of capital, natural assets are limited and require 
accounting, investment, and maintenance in order to be 
properly harnessed and deployed. By maximizing co-benefits 
and avoiding lock-in, by promoting smarter decisions in 
industry and society, and by developing innovative financing 
tools for green investment, we can afford to do the things  
we must. 
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Foreword
Inclusive green growth is the pathway to sus-
tainable development.
Over the past 20 years economic growth 
has lifted more than 660 million people out 
of poverty and has raised the income levels 
of millions more, but growth has too often 
come at the expense of the environment. A 
variety of market, policy, and institutional 
failures mean that the earth’s natural capital 
tends to be used in ways that are economi-
cally inefficient and wasteful, without suf-
fi cient reckoning of the true social costs of 
resource depletion and without adequate 
reinvestment in other forms of wealth. These 
failures threaten the long-term sustainabil-
ity of growth and progress made on social 
welfare. Moreover, despite the gains from 
growth, 1.3 billion people still do not have 
access to electricity, 2.6 billion still have no 
access to sanitation, and 900 million lack 
safe, clean drinking water. Growth has not 
been inclusive enough.
This report argues that sustained growth 
is necessary to achieve the urgent develop-
ment needs of the world’s poor and that there 
is substantial scope for growing cleaner with-
out growing slower. Green growth is neces-
sary, effi cient, and affordable. It is the only 
way to reconcile the rapid growth required 
to bring developing countries to the level 
of prosperity to which they aspire with the 
needs of the more than 1 billion people still 
living in poverty and the imperative of a bet-
ter managed environment. 
Indeed, green growth is a vital tool for 
achieving sustainable development. But sus-
tainable development has three pillars: eco-
nomic, environmental, and social sustainabil-
ity. We cannot presume that green growth is 
inherently inclusive. Green growth policies 
must be carefully designed to maximize ben-
efi ts for, and minimize costs to, the poor and 
most vulnerable, and policies and actions 
with irreversible negative impacts must be 
avoided. 
Green growth also requires improved indi-
cators to monitor economic performance. 
National accounting indicators like GDP 
measure only short-term economic growth, 
whereas indicators like comprehensive 
wealth—including natural capital—help us 
determine if growth is sustainable in the long 
run. 
The Conference on Environment and 
Development, held in Rio in 1992, focused 
on inclusion and the environment but failed 
to mention growth. In the lead up to Rio+20, 
we are reminded that, in 1987, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, then Prime Minister of Norway, 
framed the call for governments to change 
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their approach to growth: “What is needed 
now is a new era of economic growth—
growth that is forceful and at the same time 
socially and environmentally sustainable.”
Today, more than ever, we must pay 
attention to the triple bottom line. Inclusive 
growth must be green. Green growth must be 
inclusive.
Rachel Kyte
Vice President
Sustainable Development Network
The World Bank
GG_i-xiv.indd   xii 5/8/12   1:02:12 PM
  xiii
Acknowledgments
This report was written by a team led by Marianne Fay and Stéphane Halle-gatte and composed of Marjorie-Anne 
Bromhead, Alex Bowen, Michael Chaitkin, 
Mark Dutz, Atsushi Iimi, Urvashi Narain, 
and David Tréguer. Signifi cant contributions 
were made by Antonio Estache, Adrian Foz-
zard, Kirk Hamilton, Tim Kelly, Masami 
Kojima, Andreas Kopp, Somik Lall, Eduardo 
Ley, Marcelino Madrigal, Diego Rodriguez, 
Siddharth Sharma, and Adrien Vogt-Schilb.
Geoffrey Heal acted as adviser to the 
report, in addition to being a key contributor 
to developing the analytical framework.  
This report benefi ted from extensive dis-
cussions with Milan Brahmbhatt. We grate-
fully acknowledge the comments and advice 
provided by our peer reviewers: Rosina Bier-
baum, Richard Damania, Uwe Deichmann, 
Vivien Foster, Jean-Charles Hourcade, Mike 
Toman, David Popp, Thomas Sterner, Jeff 
Vincent, and Zhang Yongsheng. Other use-
ful inputs and suggestions were provided by 
Zoubida Allaoua, Edward Andersen, Jock 
Anderson, Ruben Bibas, Dan Biller, James 
Brumby, Christophe Crepin, Jacqueline 
Devine, Casper Edmonds, Louis-Gaëtan 
Giraudet, Céline Guivarch, Bernard Hoek-
man, Guy Hutton, Vijay Jagannathan, Nalin 
Kishor, Franck Lecocq, Robert Lempert, 
Robin Mearns, Aurélie Méjean, Christopher 
Neal, Junko Narimatsu, Elisa Portale, Val-
entin Przyluski, Riikka Rajalahti, Apurva 
Sanghi, Randeep Sudan, Nancy Vandycke, 
Xiaodong Wang, and Monika Weber-Fahr.
Finally, the report drew on background 
papers produced for the inaugural con ference 
of the Green Growth Knowledge Plat-
form (available at http://www.greengrowth 
 knowledge.org) by Brian Copeland; Stefan 
Dercon; Jaime de Melo; Tony Gomez-Ibañez; 
Winston Harrington, Richard Morgenstern, 
and Daniel Velez-Lopez; Larry Karp and 
Megan Stevenson; Howard Kunreuther and 
Erwann Michel-Kerjan; David Popp; Guido 
Porto; Andreas Schäfer; Sjak Smulders and 
Cees Withagen; Jeff Vincent; and Elke Weber 
and Eric Johnson.  
The report was edited by Barbara Karni 
and Laura Wallace.  
This report was sponsored by the Sustain-
able Development Network  of the World 
Bank under the leadership of Inger Andersen 
and Rachel Kyte.  
GG_i-xiv.indd   xiii 5/8/12   1:02:12 PM
GG_i-xiv.indd   xiv 5/8/12   1:02:12 PM
  xv
Abbreviations
$ US$ unless otherwise indicated
AMMA African Monsoon Multidisciplinary Analyses
ANS adjusted net savings
CO2 carbon dioxide
CO2-eq carbon dioxide equivalent
COMTRADE Commodity Trade Statistics database
ESCO energy service company
ESTD early-stage technology development
ETS Emissions Trading System
EU European Union
GDP gross domestic product
GGKP Green Growth Knowledge Platform
GRP Green Rating Project (India)
Gt gigatons
HPS Husk Power Systems
IEUA Inland Empire Utility Agency
IFI international fi nancial institution
ITQ individual transferable quota
ITS Intelligent Transport Systems
MCA4Climate Multi-Criteria Analysis for Climate
MDG Millennium Development Goal
NOx nitrogen oxides
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PES payments for environmental services
PERP performance evaluation and ratings program
PM10 particulate matter up to 10 kilometers in size
GG_i-xiv.indd   xv 5/8/12   1:02:12 PM
x v i   A B B R E V I A T I O N S  
PNK Putri Naga Komodo (Indonesia)
ppm parts per million
PPP purchasing power parity
PROPER Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating (Indonesia)
PV photovoltaic
R&D research and development
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RSPO Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
SME small and medium enterprise
SO2 sulfur dioxide 
TAC total allowable catch
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UWMP Regional Urban Water Management Plan
VC venture capital
WAVES Wealth Accounting and Valuing Ecosystem Services
GG_i-xiv.indd   xvi 5/8/12   1:02:12 PM
Overview
  1
Our current growth patterns are not just unsustainable; they are also deeply ineffi cient. As a result, they 
stand in the way of sustainable development 
and its objectives of social, environmental, 
and economic sustainability (fi gure O.1). The 
past 20 years have shown that the economic 
and social goals are not only highly compat-
ible, but also largely complementary. Growth 
drives poverty reduction (though the extent 
to which it does so depends on the degree of 
inequality). And improved social outcomes, 
such as better health and education and 
greater equality of opportunity, are good 
Key Messages
 Greening growth is necessary, effi-• 
cient, and affordable. It is critical to 
achieving sustainable development 
and mostly amounts to good growth 
policies.  
 Obstacles to greening growth are polit-• 
ical and behavioral inertia and a lack 
of fi nancing instruments—not the cost 
of green policies as commonly thought. 
 Green growth should focus on what • 
needs to be done in the next five to 
10 years to avoid getting locked into 
unsustainable paths and to generate 
immediate, local benefi ts.
 The way forward requires a blend of • 
economics, political science, and social 
psychology—smart solutions to tackle 
political economy constraints, over-
come deeply entrenched behaviors and 
social norms, and develop the needed 
fi nancing tools.
 There is no single green growth model. • 
Green growth strategies will vary 
across countries, refl ecting local con-
texts and preferences—but all coun-
tries, rich and poor, have opportuni-
ties to make their growth greener and 
more inclusive without slowing it. 
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for growth. Not so with the economic and 
environmental pillars: for the past 250 years, 
growth has come largely at the expense of the 
environment. And environmental damages 
are reaching a scale at which they are begin-
ning to threaten both growth prospects and 
the progress achieved in social indicators. 
What can be done to turn this situation 
around? We argue that what is needed is 
green growth—that is, growth that is effi -
cient in its use of natural resources, clean in 
that it minimizes pollution and environmen-
tal impacts, and resilient in that it accounts 
for natural hazards and the role of envi-
ronmental management and natural capital 
in preventing physical disasters. And this 
growth needs to be inclusive.
Inclusive green growth is not a new para-
digm. Rather, it aims to operationalize sus-
tainable development by reconciling develop-
ing countries’ urgent need for rapid growth 
and poverty alleviation with the need to 
avoid irreversible and costly environmental 
damage. As such, efforts to foster green 
growth must focus on what is required in 
the next five to 10 years to sustain robust 
growth, while avoiding locking economies 
into unsustainable patterns, preventing irre-
versible environmental damage, and reducing 
the potential for regret. 
Moreover, rapid action is needed to keep 
the costs of greening growth manageable and 
avoid irreversible losses. This urgency applies 
to developing and developed countries alike:
 Developing countries—which will account • 
for the vast majority of global growth in 
income, infrastructure, and population 
in the coming decades—need to choose 
whether to build right or risk facing costly 
policy reversals in the future.
 High-income countries—which, with 16 • 
percent of world population, still account 
for more than 75 percent of global con-
sumption and 41 percent of global emis-
sions of carbon dioxide (CO2)—must act 
according to their responsibility. Most 
important are changes in the patterns of 
consumption and production that boost 
demand for green technologies. This is 
essential to stimulate technological innova-
tion and the scale of production necessary 
for prices to drop and green technologies 
to become competitive. Thus, Germany’s 
aggressive solar feed-in tariff was criti-
cal in boosting global demand for solar 
 panels, thereby reducing their cost. 
As to how to make growth greener, text-
books going back at least to the 1950s offer 
the basic instruments, with environmental 
taxation, norms, and regulations being the 
main tools of a green growth strategy. Today, 
technology is making it easier to implement 
these measures and monitor their impacts. 
However, making these measures work 
is complex in real-world settings plagued 
by governance failures, market failures, 
and entrenched interests and behaviors. It 
requires complementary policies, including 
public investments, innovation and indus-
trial policies, education and training, labor 
market reforms, and communication. Mak-
ing matters worse is the urgency with which 
Social
sustainability
Environmental
sustainability
Sustainable
development
Economic
sustainability
FIGURE O.1 The three pillars of sustainable development
Note: Economic and social sustainability, on the one hand, and social and environmental sustain-
ability, on the other, have been found to be not only compatible, but also largely complementary. 
Not so with economic and environmental sustainability, as growth has come largely at the expense 
of the environment—hence, the dotted line on this fi gure—which is why green growth aims to 
ensure that economic and environmental sustainability are compatible. 
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these policies must be designed and imple-
mented, especially in the face of enormous 
uncertainty about the future climate and 
technology. 
Although we have much theoretical and 
empirical knowledge to draw on, green 
growth raises challenging questions, espe-
cially when it comes to the developing world. 
For example, how can developing countries 
avoid locking in unsustainable and ineffi cient 
socioeconomic systems? Will technology 
allow developing countries to pursue a less 
environmentally damaging development path 
than industrial countries did? What is the 
best way to manage growth with scarce fi scal 
resources and limited planning and technical 
know-how? Is green growth just an aspira-
tional goal—desirable from an environmen-
tal and ethical point of view, but unattain-
able given competing economic needs?
At heart, these are questions of economics, 
which is why the report takes an economic 
approach—using the standard tools of main-
stream growth and environmental econom-
ics—with some forays into what social psy-
chology can tell us about the determinants 
of human behavior. Chapter 1 examines 
whether green growth is, in fact, feasible and 
the implications for welfare—the ultimate 
goal of economic policy. It argues that our 
current system is ineffi cient, thereby offering 
opportunities for cleaner (and not necessarily 
slower) growth. And it identifi es the fl aws in 
the “grow now, clean up later” argument.
The next two chapters tackle the cross-
cutting issues of market and governance fail-
ures. Chapter 2 looks at the range of tools 
that can be marshaled to change behavior 
with respect to environmental and natural 
resources—tools that aim to improve social 
welfare through greener growth. These 
include effective market signals, properly 
framed and judiciously used information, 
and rules and regulations. Chapter 3 explores 
the need to navigate between market and 
governance failures through the careful use 
of innovation and industrial policies, such as 
research and development (R&D) subsidies 
for drought-resistant crops, national strate-
gies for electric cars, and efforts to create 
new green industries (such as China’s promo-
tion of solar photovoltaic production). 
The subsequent three chapters focus on 
human, natural, and physical capital and 
their roles in a greener production function. 
Chapter 4 tackles the debate on whether 
green growth will create jobs, with political 
leaders keen to promote the idea of green jobs 
to reduce high unemployment levels. It fi nds 
that, while there is surely potential to create 
green jobs, the net impact is what matters, 
and that will depend largely on the nature 
of the policy chosen and the soundness of 
labor markets and the business environment. 
Importantly, evidence on past regulation sug-
gests that fears about massive job losses are 
misplaced. 
Chapter 5 reviews what we know about 
managing natural capital. Depending on the 
type of resource (such as extractable or cul-
tivated renewable), the tools include defi ning 
property rights, helping fi rms to move up the 
value chain, managing trade-offs between 
higher growth and greener outcomes, and 
incorporating the economic values of services 
in policy decisions. 
Chapter 6 explores why infrastructure is 
at the core of inclusive green growth poli-
cies, underscoring the high potential for both 
regret (given the tremendous inertia built 
into infrastructure investments) and benefi ts 
(given the need for massive increases in infra-
structure services in developing countries). 
Chapter 7 fi lters the key lessons through a 
political economy lens and provides a frame-
work for building an inclusive green growth 
strategy—in light of the technical tools avail-
able, the need to maximize local and immedi-
ate benefi ts while minimizing lock-in, and the 
uncertainties about the future climate and 
technologies. 
What are the overall messages of the 
report? 
First, inclusive green growth is neces-
sary, efficient, and affordable. It is neces-
sary because sustainable development cannot 
be achieved without it. It is effi cient in that 
addressing the market and governance fail-
ures that plague our economic systems will 
create plenty of scope for growing cleaner 
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without necessarily growing slower. The best 
example is the $1 trillion to $1.2 trillion cur-
rently being spent on environmentally harm-
ful subsidies for fossil fuel, agriculture, water, 
and fisheries. Green growth is affordable 
because many green policies pay for them-
selves directly, and the others make economic 
sense once externalities are priced and eco-
system services are valued.
Second, greening growth is constrained by 
social and political inertia and by a lack of 
fi nancing instruments—not affordability, as 
is commonly believed. Entrenched behavior, 
special interests, and the complicated politi-
cal economy of reform explain why measures 
that amount to good growth policies have 
not yet been implemented. Also, many green 
growth measures require increased up-front 
capital. Yet the debate on fi nancing remains 
focused on who pays what, rather than 
on how to finance economically (let alone 
socially) profi table investments. 
Third, greening growth should be care-
fully sequenced—not occur in one fell 
swoop—with priority going to what needs 
to be done in the next 5 to 10 years, both 
to avoid getting locked into unsustainable 
paths and to offer immediate, local benefi ts. 
Those benefi ts will help to reduce the cost 
of the transition and facilitate the political 
economy of reform. Urban forms that are 
created today will affect city structures and 
housing and transport options for decades 
or even centuries. With urban populations 
in developing countries set to increase by 1.5 
billion over the next 20 years, there is a win-
dow of opportunity to affect urban patterns 
at low cost.
Fourth, the search for solutions needs 
to shift from a search for more financial 
resources (diffi cult anyway amid today’s fi s-
cal woes) to “getting smart”: 
 Smart about learning the lessons of com-• 
plex reforms to tackle difficult political 
economy questions, given that many green 
policies trade immediate costs for later ben-
efi ts or redistribute benefi ts from one group 
to another. Notable successes include trade 
reforms across the world, reform of fi sh-
eries in Namibia, reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the European Union 
(EU), and progress on fossil fuel subsidies 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where care 
was taken to manage the losers and publi-
cize the benefi ts. 
 Smart about changing the behavior of con-• 
sumers and fi rms and the view of societies 
about what constitutes social success and 
acceptable behavior. This entails combin-
ing economic incentives with well-framed 
information and the marketing techniques 
that public health specialists (or car sales-
men) commonly use.  
 Smart about developing the appropriate • 
fi nancing tools for the private sector, espe-
cially small firms, for local governments 
(China’s cities are developing in a sprawl-
ing fashion in part because land sales at 
their peripheries are an important source of 
revenue for city governments; World Bank 
and DRC 2012), and for national govern-
ments, which are sometimes so fiscally 
constrained that they have to choose the 
investment with the lowest up-front cost 
(such as a thermal power plant) over one 
that may be less expensive in the medium 
term (such as a hydroelectric plant in a 
country with abundant water resources). 
Fifth, there is no single green growth 
model. Inclusive green growth strategies 
will vary across countries, refl ecting local 
contexts, preferences, and resources, but 
all countries—rich and poor—have oppor-
tunities to green their growth without 
slowing it.  
Greening growth is necessary, 
effi  cient, and aff ordable 
Necessary: Making development 
sustainable requires inclusive green 
growth 
Growth—even measured with such an 
imperfect metric as gross domestic product 
(GDP)—is now recognized as a critical driver 
of poverty reduction (figure O.2, panel a; 
Ferreira and Ravallion 2009). It has resulted 
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in an 80 percent increase in GDP per capita 
in developing countries over the past 20 years, 
despite substantial increases in population. 
Living standards have improved for many 
(fi gure O.2, panels b and c), with more than 
660 million rising out of poverty and remark-
able progress being made in literacy, educa-
tion, life expectancy, malnutrition, and infant, 
child, and maternal mortality. And while 
China drove much of global poverty reduc-
tion, other countries that experienced growth 
also saw poverty decline rapidly. Ghana, for 
example, grew much faster than the African 
average and managed to reduce its poverty 
rate from 51 to 30 percent between 1990 and 
2005 (World Bank 2011c). 
Moreover, growth need not cause income 
inequality. The famous Kuznets curve argu-
ment, which posits that inequality first 
increases and then decreases with income, is 
not supported by the evidence. Inequality has 
increased substantially in recent decades in 
China, but also in the United States and most 
of Europe. And it has declined in much of 
Latin America (Milanovic 2010). Some coun-
tries reduce inequality as they grow; others 
let it increase. Policies matter.
Thus, the links between the economic and 
social pillars of sustainable development are 
generally self-reinforcing. But the story is 
not so simple when it comes to the economic 
and environmental pillars. Economic growth 
causes environmental degradation—or has 
for much of the past 250 years—driven by 
market failures and inefficient policies. As 
with inequality, overall environmental per-
formance does not fi rst get worse and then 
improve with income—no Kuznets curve 
here either. Of course, some local and vis-
ible environmental public goods do worsen at 
fi rst and eventually improve with income—
typically local air quality. But this is not true 
of local pollutants with invisible or long-term 
impacts (such as the accumulation of pesti-
cides and toxic chemicals in land and water) 
or global pollutants (such as greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere). These often get worse 
with higher income (fi gure O.3).
Against this backdrop, some observers, 
mostly in high-income countries, have argued 
FIGURE O.2 As incomes increase . . .
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against the need for more growth, suggesting 
that what is needed instead is a redistribution 
of wealth (Marglin 2010; Victor 2008). They 
point to the happiness literature, which sug-
gests that above a country average of $10,000 
to $15,000 per capita, further growth does 
not translate into greater well-being (Easter-
lin 1995; Layard 2005). 
While this argument has value, it remains 
more relevant for high-income countries, 
where average annual incomes hover around 
$36,000. Developing countries—with aver-
age income of around $3,500 per capita—are 
still far from the point at which more wealth 
will bring decreasing returns to well-being. In 
fact, in low-income countries, average income 
is only about $500 (World Bank 2011c).1 A 
redistribution of world income across rich 
and poor countries—even if it were politically 
feasible—would leave all with an income of 
about $8,000 per person per year. 
Further, even after the rapid growth of the 
past decade, some 1.3 billion people do not 
have access to electricity, 900 million do not 
have access to clean water, 2.6 billion lack 
access to improved sanitation, and around 
800 million rural dwellers do not have access 
to an all-weather road and are cut off from 
the world in the rainy season (Fay and others 
2010; IEA 2011). Even with the rapid decline 
in the share of people living in poverty, close 
to 1 billion could still be living on $1.25 per 
day in 2015. With continued growth at about 
the same speed as during the past 20 years, 
developing countries would account for about 
half of the world’s income and consumption 
(but close to 90 percent of the world popula-
tion) by 2050. 
Continued rapid population growth in 
several developing regions further compli-
cates matters. Current projections are that 
the world will reach some 9 billion people 
by 2050. This implies that even more rapid 
growth is needed to tackle poverty, and more 
aggressive social policies are needed to ensure 
that children, especially girls, and mothers 
receive the care, nutrition, schooling, and 
employment opportunities they need. And, of 
course, this demographic challenge puts fur-
ther stresses on the environment, particularly 
because much of the rapid population growth 
is happening in environmentally fragile loca-
tions, notably in Africa. 
Thus, growth is a necessary, legitimate, and 
appropriate pursuit for the developing world, 
but so is a clean and safe environment. With-
out ambitious policies, growth will continue to 
degrade the environment and deplete resources 
critical to the welfare of current and future 
generations. And what about the argument 
that ambitious policies would be too costly 
and destroy jobs? The evidence reviewed in 
this report suggests that there is plenty of room 
to green growth without slowing it. 
FIGURE O.3 As incomes increase . . .
Source: For both panels, World Bank 2011c.
GDP per capita (2005 $, PPP)
a.  . . . Local and visible pollutants tend to decline (PM10 concentration
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Effi  cient: Current patterns of growth 
are not only unsustainable, but also 
wasteful
There is mounting evidence that our patterns 
of growth and consumption are unsustain-
able at the scale required by our current and 
projected population. Much of this, however, 
is owing to ineffi cient production and con-
sumption and poor management of natural 
resources. 
Unsustainable
Population and income growth and the 
resulting increase in demand for food have 
driven the expansion of agricultural pro-
duction around the world.2 Intensification 
and productivity increases have helped to 
limit ecosystem loss in many countries, but 
poorly managed intensifi cation has also exac-
erbated agrochemical and water pollution, 
soil exhaustion, and salinity. Extensive farm-
ing, driven by large-scale expansion in some 
regions and poverty-level subsistence agricul-
ture in others, has contributed to land degra-
dation and deforestation; forest losses aver-
aged 5.2 million hectares annually between 
2000 and 2010, mostly in tropical—and, 
hence, more intensely biologically diverse—
regions (FAO 2010). By 2008 one quarter of 
the world’s land surface was degraded as a 
result of soil erosion, salinization, nutrient 
depletion, and desertifi cation (Bai and others 
2008).
Income and population growth have also 
stretched water supplies. Water withdrawals 
have tripled in the past 50 years, leading to 
water scarcity and groundwater depletion 
(World Bank 2007b). Withdrawals are pro-
jected to increase in developing countries by 
another 50 percent by 2025, by which time 
roughly 5.5 billion people—two thirds of 
the projected global population—will live in 
areas facing moderate-to-severe water stress 
(UNESCO and WWAP 2006).
Growth has similarly strained ecosystems, 
with roughly 60 percent of ecosystem ser-
vices now of lower quality than 50 years ago 
(MEA 2005). Additionally, the current rate 
of species extinction, stemming mainly from 
habitat loss and degradation, is 100 to 1,000 
times higher than before humans walked the 
planet (Pimm and others 1995). In 2008, 
875 species became extinct, and more than 
17,000 others are at high risk (IUCN 2009).
Carbon dioxide emissions are accumulat-
ing in the atmosphere, approaching a level that 
will make it impossible to maintain global 
mean temperature below 2°C in excess of 
the preindustrial level, even though the prob-
ability of irreversible environmental changes 
is increasing with temperature (for example, 
rapid ice loss in Greenland and forest die-
back in the Amazon). Carbon dioxide is also 
affecting the world’s oceans. Because of global 
warming, we have already committed to high 
probabilities of coral bleaching and mortal-
ity by the late twenty-fi rst century, which will 
significantly harm reef ecosystems (World 
Bank 2010d). The concurrent acidifi cation of 
oceans, which absorb about one quarter of 
the excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
is threatening marine food webs and could 
undermine the global fishing industry and 
food security (Laffoley and Baxter 2009).
Lastly, energy prices are likely to be high 
in the future, because oil resources that are 
easy and cheap to extract and use have already 
been extracted, and the world is now turning 
toward fossil fuels that are more expensive—
and more damaging to the environment—such 
as shale gas, tar sands, oil from deep offshore 
wells, or even liquefi ed coal. Without signifi -
cant changes in energy policy, the amount 
of resources the world economy will have to 
dedicate to fossil fuel extraction and energy 
production is likely to increase substantially, 
making higher energy efficiency even more 
desirable in the future than it is today. 
Wasteful
The environment can be thought of as natu-
ral capital that is often ineffi ciently man-
aged, with many precious resources wasted. 
Investing in natural capital—just like 
investing in human or physical capital—is 
therefore good growth policy. The value 
of the services provided by well-managed 
ecosystems is illustrated by the impact of 
reforestation and watershed restoration 
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programs. In China’s Loess plateau, such 
programs were associated with a near dou-
bling of household incomes as a result of 
higher-value agricultural production as 
well as reduced frequency of landslides and 
fl ooding and increased resilience to drought 
(fi gure O.4; World Bank 2005b). 
This ineffi ciency stems partly from the 
fact that many natural resources are com-
mon property, so consumption by one per-
son precludes consumption by another, and 
it is hard to exclude potential users. Open-
access regimes for common property cre-
ate incentives to use up such resources as 
quickly as possible. Open access fi sheries are 
a classic example in which catch per fi sher 
and per vessel has been declining steadily 
because of overfi shing, and continued deple-
tion threatens the livelihood of more than 
100 million people and the food security of 
many more.
Subsidies exacerbate common property 
problems, yet substantial resources are allo-
cated to environmentally harmful price sup-
port schemes (box O.1). Global subsidies 
to fisheries are estimated at $10 billion to 
$30 billion and are partly to blame for the 
sixfold increase in the fleet capacity index 
between 1970 and 2005 (World Bank and 
FAO 2009).3 In Mexico, subsidies for energy 
used in irrigation, amounting to around 1 
percent of GDP, are exacerbating excessive 
groundwater withdrawals and the depletion 
of key aquifers. India suffers from the same 
problem in addition to spending some 2 per-
cent of GDP on a fertilizer subsidy overly 
weighted in favor of nitrogen; the resulting 
use of fertilizer is causing serious pollution 
problems. 
Production and consumption processes 
are often wasteful, too. This is particularly 
obvious in the energy sector. Existing energy 
efficiency technologies can cost-effectively 
reduce energy use in new buildings by at least 
30 percent. In fact, making new buildings in 
China more energy efficient would reduce 
energy costs by more than 50 percent, while 
increasing construction costs by only 10 per-
cent. Waste also plagues food production. 
Some 15 to 30 percent of food produced in 
developing countries is lost before it reaches 
the market due to poor storage and transport 
facilities. In high-income countries, mean-
while, one third of food is wasted through 
losses in supermarkets and homes and “plate-
waste” (Foresight 2011). 
The possibility of solving market and 
governance failures opens the way to poli-
cies that have both economic and environ-
mental benefi ts and is at the heart of green 
growth strategies. (In that respect, greening 
growth is fi rst and foremost based on good 
growth policies.) These market and gover-
nance failures have long been understood, 
FIGURE O.4 The Loess plateau, before and after the watershed restoration program
Source: For the left-hand image, Till Niermann, March 25, 1987, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Loess_landscape_china.jpg; for the right-hand image, 
http://digitalmedia.worldbank .org/slideshows/china1005/.
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and their persistence suggests that the dif-
ficulty of correcting them should not be 
underestimated. 
Aff ordable: Much of green growth 
pays for itself, and an innovative 
private sector keeps costs in check
Environmental policies should, in principle, 
improve social welfare and economic effi-
ciency by reducing excessive pollution and 
other environmental bads. Nevertheless, such 
policies clearly have costs. They can hit tax-
payers who have to pay the bill (for subsidies 
to renewable energy or public spending on 
green R&D) or producers and consumers if 
the policies mandate the use of more expen-
sive or less productive technologies (such as 
renewable energy resources that are more 
costly than fossil fuel). Environmental poli-
cies alter relative prices and therefore change 
the structure of demand, requiring costly 
adjustments in the structure of production. 
Demand may decrease in sectors that have 
high capacity (coal production) and increase 
in sectors that have limited capacity (public 
transport). As a result, effi ciency may fall, at 
least during an adjustment phase, jobs may 
be lost, and the poor may suffer if compensa-
tory measures are not adopted. 
Moreover, the up-front capital require-
ments are high. The energy investments 
needed globally to achieve greenhouse gas 
concentration of 450 parts per million (ppm) 
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-eq; the level 
needed to maintain a 50 percent chance of 
not exceeding global warming of 2°C above 
preindustrial temperatures) could amount to 
BOX O.1 What is the aggregate economic support to the (over)use of natural capital? $1 
trillion to $1.2 trillion annually
A compilation of estimates by international organi-
zations of aggregate support for the use of natural 
capital suggests an approximate total of $1 trillion 
to $1.2 trillion, consistent with McKinsey’s estimate 
of $1.1 trillion (McKinsey and Company 2011). This 
support includes the following: 
Fossil fuel subsidies: $455 billion–$485 billion. • This 
includes subsidies to fossil fuel production or use 
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries ($45 billion to $75 
billion a year between 2005 and 2010) and con-
sumption in developing economies ($409 billion in 
2010; IEA 2011). 
Water subsidies: $200 billion–$300 billion. • This 
represents subsidies to groundwater extraction or 
irrigation infrastructure—estimated as the differ-
ence between the market value of water and the 
part of costs covered by tariffs. Limited data are 
available, but Myers and Kent (2001) estimate 
water sector subsidies at $230 billion in 2000 and 
McKinsey (2011) cites estimates of $200 billion to 
$300 billion. 
Fishery subsidies: $10 billion to $30 billion. • This 
encompasses a wide variety of instruments such as 
fuel price supports, grants, concessional credit and 
insurance, and direct payments to industry. Esti-
mates range from $10 billion per year (World Bank 
and FAO 2009) to $27 billion per year (UNEP 
2011).
Transfers to agriculture: $370 billion. • This rep-
resents total support to the agriculture sector in 
OECD countries (OECD 2011a) and includes dif-
ferent types of instruments, some environmentally 
harmful, such as market price supports, but some 
not, such as payments decoupled from production 
levels.
While these estimates suffer from errors of inclu-
sion (some of the OECD countries’ agricultural sub-
sidies that were included are not environmentally 
harmful) and exclusion (they do not include develop-
ing countries’ subsidies to agriculture, estimated by 
the OECD at about $200 billion for the few emerg-
ing economies for which data were available) and 
are therefore neither precise nor exhaustive, they do 
suggest that substantial resources go to environmen-
tally harmful subsidies. 
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between $350 billion and $1.1 trillion per 
year by 2030 (figure O.5). A 550 ppm tar-
get appears much easier to achieve, requiring 
some $50 billion–$200 billion of additional 
investments per year, but an additional $75 
billion to $100 billion would still be needed to 
adapt to climate change (World Bank 2010d). 
Adding needed investments in water and land 
to energy, annual investments of $900 bil-
lion to $1,700 billion could be needed over 
and above business-as-usual requirements 
 (McKinsey and Company 2011). 
But many of these capital investments will 
be recouped through subsequent savings, so 
the net financial costs will be much lower. 
For example, the high capital cost of wind 
and solar energy or hydropower is offset by 
their low operating costs. Globally $1 spent 
on energy effi ciency saves $2 through invest-
ments in new supply, with the savings even 
greater in developing countries (World Bank 
2010d). As a result, the World Bank estimates 
that more than half the measures needed to 
decarbonize the energy systems of develop-
ing countries would eventually pay for them-
selves, bringing the fi nancial costs down to 
between $140 billion and $175 billion per 
year in 2030 or perhaps half a percentage 
point of developing countries’ GDP (World 
Bank 2010d). In East Asia, the estimated 
additional net fi nancing required for a sus-
tainable energy path is $80 billion, not much 
more than the $70 billion the region cur-
rently spends on fossil fuel subsidies (Wang 
and others 2010; IEA 2008). 
Furthermore, determining affordability is 
about more than a fi nancial ledger. Green pol-
icies can contribute to growth (box O.2) and 
boost a nation’s overall wealth. And they help 
to reduce the damage done by environmen-
tal degradation, which is costly for an econ-
omy: equivalent to 8 percent of GDP across a 
sample of countries representing 40 percent 
of the developing world’s population (fi gure 
O.6). As a result, benefi ts may well outweigh 
the costs (implying a negative net economic 
cost). $900 billion to $1,700 billion of green 
investments in land, water, and energy could 
yield economic returns of around $3 trillion 
per year, rising to $3.7 trillion with carbon 
at $30 per ton and no energy, agricultural, 
or water subsidies (McKinsey and Company 
2011). 
Thanks to such benefits, the net costs 
of greening growth appear manageable, 
although affordability will, of course, depend 
on the speed and ambition of the greening (as 
illustrated by the difference between the 450 
ppm and 550 ppm targets) and on the design 
of policies. But the worse the environmental 
degradation and existing inefficiency, the 
greater the potential benefi ts to be obtained 
from green policies.
At the fi rm level, the cost of environmental 
regulation to fi rms is typically modest, with 
costs lower than expected thanks to the abil-
ity of fi rms to adapt and innovate (chapter 3). 
As a result, there is no evidence that environ-
mental regulation systematically hurts prof-
itability. While studies from the 1980s and 
1990s found negative impacts, more recent 
papers find more positive results, partly 
because they allow a few years for fi rms to 
adapt and partly perhaps because we have 
become better at designing environmental 
regulations that promote efficiency gains 
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FIGURE O.5 Up-front investment costs for energy supply and 
energy effi  ciency could be substantial
(additional investment needed in the energy sector, both in energy supply and 
demand, in 2030 to reach a 450 ppm and a 550 ppm CO2-eq objective, according to 
four global models)
Source: More information on these models can be found in the following sources: on MESSAGE, van 
Vliet and others 2012; on ReMIND, Luderer and others 2012; on TIAM-WORLD, Loulou and Labriet 
2008; on IEA, IEA 2011. 
Note: IEA (2011) does not provide estimates for a 550 ppm scenario.
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(Ambec and others 2011). Further, where rev-
enues from environmental taxes are used to 
reduce taxes on labor and income, the impact 
on GDP is likely to be neutral or positive, as 
found in an analysis of seven EU countries 
(Andersen and others 2007, cited in Ambec 
and others 2011).
Other ex-post analyses confi rm this con-
clusion. The EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem has no negative impact on net imports 
in the aluminum, steel, and cement sectors 
(Ellerman and others 2010; Quirion 2011; 
Sartor 2012) or on the performance of Ger-
man fi rms in general (Anger and Oberndor-
fer 2008). Meanwhile, the climate levy on 
U.K. fi rms seems to affect energy effi ciency, 
but not economic performance and fi rm exit 
(Martin and others 2009). 
Refineries located in Los Angeles sig-
nificantly increased productivity in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, a time of 
dramatically expanded regulation in Cali-
fornia and decreasing refi nery productivity 
in the rest of the United States. Interviews 
with plant managers suggest productiv-
ity increases resulted from a careful rede-
sign of production processes to comply 
with the new regulations (Berman and Bui 
2001 and others). Similarly, the productiv-
ity of the Mexican food-processing indus-
try increased with stronger environmental 
regulations (Alpay and others 2002, cited in 
Ambec and others 2011). 
Moreover, there is no evidence that envi-
ronmental policies have led to an exodus of 
fi rms to “pollution havens” (locations with 
lax environmental policies). Tighter environ-
mental regulation may cause fi rms to relo-
cate, but they will choose locations that are 
more attractive overall, as pollution abate-
ment costs represent a small share of pro-
duction costs for most industries (Copeland 
BOX O.2 The many ways in which green policies can contribute to growth
Green policies and practices can contribute to growth 
through three channels (see chapter 1). First, they 
can help to increase the amount of natural, physical, 
and human capital available:  Better-managed soil is 
more productive. Well-managed natural risks result 
in lower capital losses from natural disasters (Hal-
legatte 2011). Healthier environments result in more 
productive workers: a recent California study shows 
a strong impact of air quality on the productivity of 
farm workers (Graff Zivin and Neidell 2011).
Second, they can promote effi ciency. For instance, 
imposing environmental taxes (taxing “bads”) and 
removing distortionary subsidies creates fi scal space 
for governments to lower labor taxes or subsidize 
green public “goods” such as public transport or 
renewable energy. In London, congestion taxes, 
besides reducing traffic, helped to finance invest-
ments in the aging public transport system, thereby 
increasing effectiveness of the price signal by reduc-
ing the costs or “disutility” associated with switch-
ing from single-car use to public transport (Trans-
port for London 2008). And many fi rms—including 
large multinationals such as Hewlett Packard, Cisco, 
Clorox, and FedEx—are fi nding that embracing sus-
tainability has improved the bottom line in part by 
promoting greater effi ciency (Nidumolu and others 
2009).
Third, green policies stimulate innovation. Study 
after study reports that well-designed environmen-
tal regulations stimulate innovation by firms, as 
measured by R&D spending or patents (see chapter 
3). Surveys of fi rms in the European Union identify 
existing or future environmental regulation as the 
main driver for the adoption of incremental inno-
vations. Similarly, international sustainability stan-
dards can help local fi rms to upgrade their environ-
mental practices, a form of catch-up innovation. In 
developing countries, green policies can also encour-
age the adaptation and adoption of greener technol-
ogies that have been developed elsewhere. 
Finally, green policies also accrue non-growth 
gains to welfare. They can reduce inequality through 
job creation and poverty alleviation, and they can 
reduce output volatility by increasing resilience to 
environmental and economic shocks, like natural 
disasters or spikes in commodity prices. A model-
ing exercise suggests that half of the cost of climate 
policies to limit greenhouse gas concentration at 550 
ppm could be paid for by less vulnerability to oil 
scarcity (Rozenberg and others 2010).
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2012). Factors such as availability of capital, 
labor abundance, location, institutions, and 
agglomeration effects are more important 
than environmental policy in determining 
the location choice and competitiveness of 
fi rms. 
But obstacles are plentiful, and 
green growth is no substitute for 
good inclusive growth policies
If green growth is necessary, efficient, and 
affordable, what is impeding it? Across 
countries and income levels, a mix of gover-
nance and market failures, complex political 
economy, entrenched interests and behav-
iors, and fi nancing constraints are signifi cant 
obstacles. Further, despite much rhetoric to 
the effect, green growth is no panacea and 
will not substitute for a good business envi-
ronment and the reforms that are needed to 
promote growth and protect the poor. 
When fi rst-best recommendations meet 
second-best situations
Much of green growth is about good growth 
policies—addressing market failures and 
“getting the price right” by introducing envi-
ronmental taxation, pricing environmental 
externalities (such as carbon pricing), cre-
ating tradable property rights, and reduc-
ing inappropriate subsidies. These measures 
are critical for enabling the private sector to 
undertake needed investments and innova-
tions and for getting consumers to internalize 
the true costs of their behavior. But as with 
all good economic policy making, textbook 
policy recommendations, however appropri-
ate, must be applied with insights into behav-
iors, political economy, and governance and 
market failures. This is an enormous chal-
lenge for a variety of reasons. 
First, getting prices right may be diffi cult 
because of political or social acceptability 
issues. The benefi ts are usually diffuse and 
uncertain, while the costs (the burden of the 
price increase) are immediate, visible, and 
often concentrated on a vocal minority. This 
is why price changes can be achieved only 
when political economy issues are managed 
with appropriate complementary policies. 
Second, getting prices right may not be 
sufficient because other market imperfec-
tions can prevent prices from being the silver 
bullet of environmental policies. These mar-
ket imperfections include the following: 
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FIGURE O.6 Reducing environmental degradation would provide 
substantial economic benefi ts
(cost of enviromental degradation expressed as percentage of GDP equivalent)
Source: World Bank 2004, 2005a, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, World Bank and DRC 2012.
WB_354_GG_Overview.indd   12 5/7/12   8:32:07 PM
 O V E R V I E W   1 3
 Low price elasticity.•  The ability of prices 
to trigger changes in behavior and technol-
ogy is sometimes limited by substitution 
possibilities: the responsiveness of drivers 
to higher fuel prices is low in the absence 
of alternative means of transportation. The 
ability of fi rms in the renewable energy sec-
tor to respond to incentives will depend 
on whether transmission lines are built 
between centers of consumption and pro-
duction. In these cases, price-based policies 
may have to be complemented with direct 
infrastructure investments (such as public 
transportation and transmission lines) and 
other policy actions, like changes in urban 
planning or in norms and regulations. But 
if substitution capacity is limited by alter-
natives, their provision may increase the 
economy’s effi ciency and boost income or 
promote economic growth, making the 
price increase more politically acceptable. 
 Missing markets or institutions. • Specifi c 
institutional measures may be required to 
transform the “right price” into the right 
incentive. Where tenants are paying energy 
bills, for instance, owners and developers 
have little incentive to “build right” or to 
invest in more energy-effi cient appliances 
unless they can recoup their investments 
through higher rents or sales price. This 
“principal-agent” problem can be tackled 
through information (such as energy effi -
ciency labels for homes), specifi c schemes 
to fi nance investments in energy effi ciency, 
or norms (such as compulsory retrofi t when 
homes are sold). 
 Lack of credibility and predictability of • 
price signals. Governments cannot com-
mit to maintaining environmental price 
instruments over the long term, which 
puts them in a poor position to encourage 
fi rms to undertake long-term, risky invest-
ments (notably in R&D and long-lived 
infrastructure). 
 Coordination failures and knowledge exter-• 
nalities. Prices are ill-suited to address the 
“classic” market failures usually invoked to 
justify innovation and industrial policies. 
Think about electric cars whose develop-
ment requires coordination between elec-
tricity providers, city planners, battery pro-
ducers, and car manufacturers. 
Third, inertia and biases in behavior are 
such that many efficiency measures that 
might pay for themselves are not imple-
mented. Household responses to higher 
energy prices are often disappointing, and 
fi rms do not always exploit all opportunities 
to improve effi ciency (Gillingham and oth-
ers 2009; Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). 
Energy savings of 20–25 percent could be 
achieved through improved industrial pro-
cesses in high-income and emerging econo-
mies (World Bank 2010d). 
Fourth, fi nancing tools to tackle up-front 
investments are inadequate. Take the case of 
solar, wind, or hydroelectric energy, which 
is characterized by much higher capital 
costs than fossil-based energy, but extremely 
low operating costs, or energy efficiency 
that requires up-front investments in new 
equipment or add-ons whose costs are then 
recouped over time through energy savings. 
Even with agriculture or fi sheries, a shift to 
more sustainable practices typically results 
in lower returns and investments in early 
years that are then offset by higher returns in 
the future. The need for up-front fi nancing 
can be a binding constraint for developing-
country governments (especially local ones 
with limited access to capital markets and a 
small tax base) and the private sector (espe-
cially small and medium enterprises). Few 
countries have a well-developed banking sec-
tor, let alone energy service companies that 
specialize in fi nancing investments in energy 
effi ciency. 
No substitute for good growth policy: 
The private sector needs an enabling 
environment 
Green growth strategies are growth strategies 
with the additional goal of fostering a better 
environment. As such, they cannot substi-
tute for good growth policies: environmen-
tal measures are unlikely to offset distorted 
labor markets, illiquid fi nancial systems, or 
poor business environments.
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A case in point is “green jobs,” a topic that 
has attracted substantial attention following 
the recent global fi nancial crisis. Advocates 
stress that, in a situation of high unemploy-
ment, a green fi scal stimulus could effectively 
address recession-induced unemployment and 
set the stage for cleaner post-recession growth 
patterns. The argument is attractive: although 
green projects may not be the most labor 
intensive or “shovel ready,” they have the 
added advantage of carrying environmental 
benefi ts. That said, a fi scal stimulus—green 
or not—is effective only if unemployment is 
linked to insuffi cient demand rather than to 
structural issues (such as lack of skilled work-
ers or a poor investment climate). 
Beyond stimulus effects, some countries—
including Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and Morocco—are look-
ing at green growth as a potential source of 
longer-term growth through which to cre-
ate new markets. And even though not every 
country can become the world leader in solar 
panels or wind turbines, developing countries 
may have substantial unexploited potential 
in green exports (fi gure O.7). Many develop-
ing countries have natural endowments that 
create a potential comparative advantage 
in green activities (such as water resources 
and hydropower potential or insolation and 
solar power potential). Realizing this poten-
tial could generate jobs and exports, thereby 
boosting growth and output. 
But green policies cannot address struc-
tural constraints to growth and employment 
creation, at least if deployed alone. They will 
not be effective at creating green jobs where 
labor markets are distorted and regulations 
discourage small business development. They 
will not offset an unattractive business envi-
ronment. And where the labor force’s skills 
are inappropriate for developing a competi-
tive manufacturing sector, environmental 
policies can hardly replace education. Thus, 
a recent study of South Africa concludes that, 
while the idea of developing green industries 
(such as solar power) is appealing, it has 
little chance of succeeding unless structural 
problems such as regulatory obstacles to the 
creation of small enterprises and the lack of 
skilled workers are addressed (World Bank 
2011b). 
Skill shortages already appear to be 
impeding the greening of growth. In China 
and India, rural electrifi cation programs are 
suffering from a lack of skilled workers. Rea-
sons for these shortages include a scarcity 
of scientists and engineers, the poor reputa-
tion and limited attractiveness of some sec-
tors important for the green transition such 
as waste management, and a limited number 
of teachers and trainers in environmental ser-
vices (ILO and CEDEFOP 2011). 
In countries where the business environ-
ment is not conducive to investment and 
growth, better economic policies must be the 
fi rst step. Lessons from trade liberalization 
are telling: where labor mobility is limited 
by skills and regulations and where invest-
ments in the sectors that benefi t from trade 
liberalization are impaired by inappropriate 
policies, both workers and the private sector 
take longer to adjust. The benefi ts from more 
trade take longer to materialize, and adjust-
ment costs are much higher. Similarly, eco-
nomic benefi ts from green policies are more 
likely to be large and immediate if economic 
%
 o
f t
ot
al
 e
xp
or
ts
fr
om
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s
0
2
4
6
8
10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 201 0
green exports close-to-green exports
FIGURE O.7 Developing countries may have substantial 
unexploited potential in green exports
(green and close-to-green exports as a share of total exports from developing 
countries, 2000–10)
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012, based on data from the Commodity Trade Statistics database 
 (COMTRADE) and a six-digit proximity matrix based on COMTRADE.
Note: Close-to-green exports are exports of goods that are not “green” but require similar skills—in 
the way growing apples requires the same set of skills as growing pears so that a country that is 
good at the former is likely to be good at the latter.
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policies are conducive to change and favor 
the development of more environmentally 
friendly and more productive activities.
The poor and vulnerable need 
social protection
While there is a general presumption that the 
poor suffer most from environmental degra-
dation and its impact, this need not imply that 
they would benefi t automatically from green 
growth policies. For example, removing fossil 
fuel subsidies would clearly reduce the poor’s 
purchasing power unless compensated for by 
other measures.
But subsidies are often regressive and can 
be replaced by better-targeted transfers at a 
fraction of the cost (fi gure O.8). By one esti-
mate, the cost to the budget of transferring 
$1 to the poorest 20 percent of the popula-
tion via gasoline subsidies is $33 (Arze del 
Granado and others 2010). Similarly, con-
sumption subsidies for water and electricity 
can usefully be replaced by connection subsi-
dies that are invariably better targeted, as the 
poor account for the majority of those with-
out access to basic services.
In sum, hopes that green growth will single-
handedly solve countries’ employment, com-
petitiveness, or poverty problems are probably 
as unfounded as the fear that environmen-
tal policies will lead to massive loss of jobs 
or competitiveness. Adjustment costs may 
vary across industries because some sectors 
are inherently more innovative than others 
and tend to adapt better. Better regulation—
particularly if supported by training, R&D 
support, and the recycling of environmental 
taxes into other tax cuts—will help to mini-
mize these adjustment costs and maximize 
benefi ts. Also needed are steps to protect the 
poor from the potential downsides of green 
policies and to ensure that they benefi t fully 
from the likely upsides. 
The way forward: Good and 
inclusive growth policies tailored 
to real-world challenges
So greening growth requires good growth 
policies adapted to political economy realities 
and entrenched behaviors. It entails reforms 
in the patterns of pricing, regulation, and 
public investment that trigger resistance. It 
requires complex changes in behaviors and 
social norms because, even with efficiency 
gains and new technology, it is unlikely that 
middle-class consumers (whether in rich or in 
poor countries) can stick to current consump-
tion patterns. And it requires knowing when 
to go for the politically expedient rather than 
the economically optimal, carefully deploy-
ing social marketing tools and making fi nan-
cial tools available. 
Complicating matters is the fact that 
opportunities to green growth at a manage-
able cost are not evenly distributed over time. 
This creates urgency for some, though not all, 
green policies and is one of several arguments 
for why “grow dirty and clean up later” is 
not a good option even for poor countries 
(box O.3). 
What follows is a three-prong strategy for 
tackling entrenched interests and behaviors, 
fi nancing constraints, and the risk of lock-in.
bottom quintile
7%
Q4
11%
Q3
16%
Q2
23%
top
quintile
43%
FIGURE O.8 Fossil fuel subsidies benefi t 
primarily the rich
(fossil fuel subsidy allocation, by income quintile, average across 
20 countries, various years)
Source: Arze del Granado and others 2010.
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Prong 1: Tailored strategies that 
maximize local and immediate benefi ts 
and avoid lock-in
Green growth policies require governments 
to do a better job of managing both market 
and governance failures. This is obvious in 
any discussion of green innovation or indus-
trial policies, but also of the regulatory and 
market (“good growth”) reforms that are 
needed, some of which are complex. Even 
sophisticated administrations may struggle 
with market-based instruments, as experi-
ence with the European Trading System has 
demonstrated (Betz and Sato 2006). Opti-
mal solutions will differ across countries 
with varying degrees of institutional capac-
ity, transparency, accountability, and civil 
society capacity. Therefore, green growth 
strategies need to be tailored to a country’s 
circumstances, and “best practices” should 
be imported with caution.
Maximize local and immediate benefi ts. In 
addition to being tailored to local circum-
stances, strategies need to address the politi-
cal economy of reform. Green growth strate-
gies should aim to minimize transition costs 
by offsetting them to the extent possible, with 
visible and immediate benefi ts. This implies 
designing policies to maximize short-term, 
local benefits, such as increased efficiency 
and productivity, safety and resilience, job 
creation, and poverty alleviation. 
Avoid lock-in. Governments cannot make 
all of the changes needed at once: they have 
limited resources and limited implementation 
capacity to devote to complex problems; they 
also have limited political capital to defend 
BOX O.3 Why “grow dirty and clean up later” is misleading
Many argue that poor countries should focus on sat-
isfying human needs before attending to nature, espe-
cially given their relatively small environmental foot-
print. This argument is misleading for several reasons.
First, not all environmental goods are superior 
goods whose share in total consumption increases 
with income. Individuals who struggle to feed and 
house themselves may not see biodiversity protection 
and climate change mitigation as priorities, but local 
environmental goods affect their daily lives, with 
signifi cant impact on income and welfare. The lack 
of solid waste disposal, for example, is not merely an 
environmental issue. By clogging drains, it leads to 
health hazards and fl ooding, with serious economic 
and human consequences:
In Haiti, poor solid waste disposal is to blame for • 
the resurgence of diseases such as dengue and for 
vulnerability to storms. 
In India, better solid waste disposal systems were • 
a principal recommendation of the fact-finding 
committee established to investigate the causes of 
the 2005 Mumbai floods, which caused almost 
$2 billion in damages and killed an estimated 500 
people. 
Similarly, mismanaging water resources impairs 
people’s ability to grow crops and feed their fami-
lies. Where natural assets like soil quality, water, 
and standing forests serve as critical inputs into 
economic production, good environmental policies 
enhance income generation and poverty alleviation. 
Second, it may be impossible or prohibitively 
expensive to clean up later. The loss of many envi-
ronmental assets—most obviously biodiversity—is 
irreversible. This is also the case with climate. 
Because greenhouse gases reside in the atmosphere 
for a long time, each emitted molecule will infl uence 
the climate over decades (for methane), centuries 
(for CO2), or longer. Irreversibility may also occur 
because of economic and technological lock-in. A lot 
of infrastructure is long lived, and today’s choices 
will be hard to reverse. Urban forms are largely 
determined when city populations are increasing 
rapidly and most buildings and transport systems 
are being built. The consequences of development 
based on a low-density, individual-vehicle transpor-
tation model are largely irreversible, as evidenced by 
the current struggles of U.S. urban planners to den-
sify and develop public transport systems. 
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policies against interest groups and politi-
cal opposition. A focus on the sectors and 
interventions that are most urgent—that is, 
those that can help to prevent irreversibility 
or reduce inertia—is thus called for.
Table O.1 illustrates the implications for pri-
ority setting of emphasizing local and immedi-
ate benefi ts and urgency. While lower-carbon 
energy from renewable sources is highly desir-
able, it is easier to build renewable plants later 
(even if this requires retiring thermal power 
plants) than to try and reverse poor land-use 
planning that has resulted in sprawling cit-
ies. Good land-use planning and urban public 
transport can provide short-term benefi ts—for 
instance, by reducing congestion and exposure 
to disasters and by favoring denser and more 
energy-effi cient development. Table O.1 pro-
vides general statements on a few green poli-
cies; this analysis needs to be carried out at 
regional, national, and local scales to take into 
account specifi c contexts (see, for instance, an 
application to the Mediterranean countries in 
CMI 2012).
Developing countries (especially low-
income countries) should prioritize policies 
that (a) have a negative or zero economic cost 
thanks to synergies with development (such 
as developing hydropower where appropriate, 
implementing effective urban plans, or scaling 
up family planning policies to manage popu-
lation pressures and improve health and edu-
cation outcomes), (b) have a positive economic 
cost but large direct welfare impacts (that is, 
when they target local environmental goods 
such as local air pollution or natural risks), 
or (c) are fi nanced from external resources 
(including through carbon trading). 
Actively manage the political economy of 
reform. Managing the political economy of 
reform also entails measures that target those 
segments of the population that would other-
wise oppose reforms. For example, in 2010 
the Islamic Republic of Iran increased domes-
tic energy prices by up to 20 times, reducing 
fossil fuel subsidies by some $50 billion–$60 
billion. It offset them with $30 billion in cash 
transfers that benefi ted 80 percent of its popu-
lation, thereby addressing the fact that oppo-
sition to the reform of such subsidies usually 
comes from the middle class. The combina-
tion of cash transfers with a well-orchestrated 
public relations campaign was critical to the 
success of the reform (Guillaume and others 
2011). 
Understanding the sources of resistance to 
a reform helps to design the reform process 
in a way that minimizes this resistance (box 
O.4). Sound information about winners and 
TABLE O.1 Some guiding principles for establishing green growth strategies
Local and immediate benefi ts
LOWER
(Trade-off s exist between short-and 
long-term or local and global benefi ts)
HIGHER
(Policies provide local 
and immediate benefi ts)
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LOWER
(action is less urgent)
• Lower-carbon, higher-cost energy 
supply
• Carbon pricing
• Stricter wastewater regulation 
• Drinking water and sanitation, solid waste 
management
• Lower-carbon, lower-cost energy supply
• Loss reduction in electricity supply
• Energy demand management 
• Small-scale multipurpose water reservoirs
HIGHER
(action is urgent) • Reduced deforestation
• Coastal zone and natural area 
protection 
• Fisheries catch management
• Land use planning
• Public urban transport
• Family planning
• Sustainable intensiﬁ cation in agriculture
• Large-scale multipurpose water reservoirs
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losers enables an information campaign to be 
tailored to potential critics.
One way of improving public decisions 
and determining priorities is to inform deci-
sion makers of the value of the services pro-
vided by natural ecosystems, so that this 
value can be compared directly with the eco-
nomic costs and benefi ts of their decisions. 
Indeed, most environmental assets do not 
have widely accepted prices either for their 
intrinsic value or for the services they pro-
vide (such as fl ood protection). As a result, 
decisions that involve a trade-off between 
economic interests and natural assets (such 
as building a road through a rain forest) are 
diffi cult to assess. 
Green accounting extends beyond the 
valuation of natural assets and focuses on a 
country’s stock of natural and other assets 
(its wealth) rather than on a flow measure 
like GDP. By doing so, it helps to identify 
situations in which economic growth does 
not create wealth (because natural assets are 
consumed more rapidly than other assets are 
created) and is not sustainable. For instance, 
a green accounting exercise suggests that 
China’s growth would be much lower than 
its offi cial GDP growth of nearly 10 percent a 
year if environmental depletion and degrada-
tion were included. Indeed, calculations put 
China’s adjusted net national income growth 
at about 5.5 percent a year (World Bank and 
DRC 2012). 
Prong 2: Measures that promote and 
incentivize smart decision making
Even though the information provided by 
green accounting can help inform and bal-
ance the debates on political choices and 
BOX O.4 Morocco: The importance of political economy
A sound understanding of the winners and losers of 
possible green growth strategies helps policy makers 
fi nd ways to address tough economic reforms—as 
Morocco has recently learned in its quest to overhaul 
a universal subsidy system that rewards fossil fuel 
consumption. By gaining insights into the political 
economy of reform, Morocco is now poised to reform 
its energy subsidy, which would sharply reduce fi scal 
costs and facilitate a greener growth path.  
The problems with the energy subsidy are multi-
ple. Its fiscal impact reached 5.5 percent of GDP 
in 2011, absorbing roughly 17 percent of the total 
investment budget. It undercuts Morocco’s ambi-
tious mitigation goals by keeping the price of fossil-
based energy products low, thus making renewable 
and effi ciency investments less competitive. And it is 
regressive, with the wealthy benefi tting the most.
So why has Morocco hesitated to reform the 
subsidy? A big reason is that the subsidy reform 
was believed to be unpopular, although the govern-
ment had never done a survey to ascertain just how 
unpopular, among which segments of society, and 
whether alternatives could motivate changes. For 
that reason, the World Bank offered to conduct such 
a poll in 2010 using a nationally representative sam-
ple of 1,600 households.
The results are astonishing: more than 70 percent 
of the population was unaware of the existence of 
energy subsidies. Thus, the vast majority of buyers 
of 12 liter cooking gas bottles—a product as wide-
spread as bread—did not know that the real market 
price was more than DH 100 ($14) instead of the 
standard retail price of DH 40 ($5.6). In addition, 
a large majority opposed the idea of reducing subsi-
dies—although this majority decreased once offered 
a well-targeted social program, and fell even further 
when the program was explained in detail. In the 
end, it was the wealthy that remained the group 
most opposed to reform.  
This simple exercise in revealing political 
awareness and preferences helped the previous 
government develop a communication strategy 
over the medium term, starting from informing 
the population of the existence of the subsidy sys-
tem and explaining its disadvantages. A commu-
nication campaign ensued in the fi rst months of 
2011, and the government elected in November 
2011 now has energy subsidy reform at the top of 
its agenda. 
Box text contributed by Andrea Liverani.
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public investments, it does not constitute an 
incentive for fi rms and individuals. To infl u-
ence their behavior, additional measures are 
required, and it is here that governments can 
play a critical role by ensuring that market 
incentives promote green behavior on the 
part of fi rms and individuals. 
Getting the prices right will influence 
consumer demand as well as firms’ choice 
of production processes (for example, higher 
energy prices will make fi rms use more ener-
gy-efficient technologies to minimize their 
production costs) and products (to respond to 
consumer demand that changes with relative 
prices). But it will also make them innovate, 
develop, and implement new technologies 
and processes. 
Getting prices right also has a central role 
in shaping the built-up structure of cities. 
Land developers respond to price signals so 
that higher land prices lead to higher densi-
ty—enhancing productivity spillovers and 
the supply of affordable housing and manag-
ing demand for transport. When “offi cial” 
land prices do not reflect demand and are 
depressed at the urban periphery, sprawl or 
suburbanization likely will be excessive. 
But market incentives will not suffi ce. For 
green policies to succeed, governments will 
need all of the arrows in the public policy 
quiver. 
Informing and nudging to infl uence 
individuals and address behavioral biases 
Behavioral biases limit the impact of mar-
ket incentives and complicate the design of 
environmental policies. For example, one 
explanation for the large unexploited poten-
tial that exists in energy efficiency springs 
from the “cognitive myopia” that prevents 
individuals from accurately weighing future 
benefi ts against immediate costs. Also, indi-
viduals measure gains and losses with respect 
to a reference point and weigh losses more 
than gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1992); 
as a result, they tend to consider the cost of 
new environmental policy as a loss and to 
disregard environmental damages avoided. 
People are biased toward the status quo, tend 
to choose the default option, and have an 
aversion to ambiguity, resulting in a tendency 
to delay decision making related to complex 
problems such as climate change (Tversky 
and Shafi r 1992). At the same time, people 
like to “do the right thing” and are heavily 
infl uenced by social norms. 
As a result, how messages are framed, what 
values are appealed to, and how the needed 
efforts are presented are critical. When given 
the choice of voluntarily paying for a carbon 
offset for an airline ticket, some 60 percent 
of Americans will do so regardless of politi-
cal affi liation. When the offset is referred to 
as a carbon tax, support falls from 60 to 25 
percent among Republicans (Hardisty and 
others 2010). More generally, framing green 
policies as a way to reach an ambitious and 
positive social goal (such as becoming carbon 
neutral by 2050 or becoming a leader in solar 
technologies) makes them more acceptable 
(and less prone to reversal at the next change 
of government) than if they are perceived as a 
constraint to economic development. 
Another approach showing promising 
results is tweaking “choice architectures” to 
“nudge” people to make better decisions for 
the environment or other desirable outcomes 
without restricting their freedom of choice 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008). To count as 
a nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap, but not constitute a mandate. Chang-
ing the default options—without changing 
the options themselves—can be an effi cient 
way to promote greener behaviors. In two 
cases where the default option offered by the 
electricity provider was a cleaner but more 
expensive one, fewer than 5 percent of cus-
tomers requested a shift to a cheaper, but 
less green, source of electricity (Picherta and 
Katsikopoulos 2008). 
Policies that unleash the power of the 
private sector
Firms have a major role to play in provid-
ing solutions to green growth. Through their 
capacity to innovate and adjust their produc-
tion processes, fi rms are key to keeping the 
cost of green policy in check. This means that 
governments need to infl uence the behavior 
of fi rms by providing appropriate incentives 
and regulations in addition to the right eco-
nomic incentives.
WB_354_GG_Overview.indd   19 5/7/12   8:32:09 PM
2 0   I N C L U S I V E  G R E E N  G R O W T H :  T H E  P A T H W A Y  T O  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  
Use information. Besides prices, firms are 
subject to pressures from their customers, 
stakeholders, and investors, and this pressure 
can be used to green their behavior. Promot-
ing transparency and access to information 
on environmental impacts can create social 
pressure to reduce these impacts. A 1996 
amendment to the U.S. Safe Drinking Water 
Act requiring community drinking water sys-
tems to report regulatory violations publicly 
has been suffi cient to reduce the incidence of 
subsequent violations, even in the absence of 
additional fi nancial incentives. 
In China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam, performance evaluation and ratings 
programs that reported emissions data and 
assessed plants’ environmental performance 
helped a large number of plants initially rated 
as “noncompliant” to rise to “compliant” (in 
contrast, plants rated as “fl agrant violators” 
and “compliant” stayed in those categories). 
One reason these programs work is that they 
provide the information needed for civil soci-
ety and legal and political systems to act to 
reduce pollution. But it also works because 
they attract the attention of managers to effi -
ciency-increasing opportunities, which can 
be implemented at low or even negative cost. 
Impose where it makes sense. Market and 
price instruments are sometimes diffi cult to 
implement or to enforce, they lack predict-
ability and credibility over the long term, 
and they may be ineffi cient when economic 
actors do not take them fully into account, 
such as not fully valuing fuel economy when 
buying a car (Greene 2010). This is why it is 
sometimes easier to implement norms and 
regulations, as is done by Australia, Canada, 
China, the European Union, Japan, Korea, 
and the United States for car fuel effi ciency 
standards (An and others 2007). 
Use innovation and industrial policy, but 
with caution. Prices are notoriously limited 
instruments for transforming economies or 
triggering investments with long-term or 
uncertain payoffs. Since they depend on gov-
ernment actions, they have long-term cred-
ibility and predictability issues. They also 
cannot address the “classic” market failures 
that are usually invoked to justify innovation 
or industrial policies: increasing returns and 
knowledge externalities in new industries, 
information asymmetries, capital market 
imperfections, and the coordination needed 
across different sectors to permit a techno-
logical transition. As a result, most countries 
resort to some form of innovation and indus-
trial policies in their growth strategies. 
Such policies need to be used with care 
and tailored to the country context. Today, 
frontier innovation and basic R&D are highly 
concentrated in high-income countries and a 
few large emerging economies. High-income 
countries have a critical responsibility to step 
up their efforts on green innovation and its 
deployment as well as to take new technolo-
gies to scale through demand-side policies. 
Failure to do so will severely compromise 
the ability of developing countries to pursue 
green growth. 
In lower-income countries, capacity is often 
not suffi cient for frontier innovation; what is 
needed are policies to support the adapta-
tion and dissemination of existing technolo-
gies. These technologies have been developed 
and tested in richer countries, making their 
support through trade, dissemination, and 
industrial policies less risky than the develop-
ment of new technologies. The best way to 
accelerate technology diffusion is to reduce 
trade barriers. In China, photovoltaic panel 
fabrication technologies were introduced 
mainly through the import of manufactur-
ing equipment from Europe. Also critical are 
policies to increase adaptation and adoption 
capacity through education and training as 
well as trade and industrial policies (such as 
local content requirements).
Moreover, several developing countries 
are pursuing green industrial policies—bio-
fuels in Brazil and solar energy in China and 
Morocco. Lessons from past successes and 
failures of standard industrial policies are 
clear: governments should subject firms to 
competition, have clear sunset clauses, and 
focus on well-identifi ed market failures, spill-
over, or latent comparative advantages (for 
example, solar potential in North Africa). But 
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most green industries will require some type 
of policy support, making a market test more 
complex to design (is a technology not com-
petitive because the government is not pricing 
the externality correctly or because the tech-
nology is not the most competitive available?) 
and making it even more imperative for gov-
ernment to navigate carefully the twin risks of 
policy and market failures. Typically, environ-
mental policy (such as a carbon tax) should 
address the environmental externality, while 
the standard tools of innovation and indus-
trial policies are used to address knowledge 
externalities and other market failures such as 
economies of scale and coordination failures. 
Prong 3: Innovative fi nancing tools that 
tackle higher up-front fi nancing needs 
Even when environmental or green infra-
structure policies and investments pay for 
themselves, they can involve signifi cant up-
front costs and require specifi c fi nancial tools. 
Innovative financing is therefore urgently 
needed, especially where gains from better 
environmental management cannot immedi-
ately be monetized. 
Resources are available but remain small 
relative to need, so they need to be leveraged. 
With respect to climate change mitigation, 
recent estimates suggest that a package of 
public sources (including a redirection of sub-
sidies currently destined for fossil fuels), mul-
tilateral development bank fl ows, and carbon 
offset fl ows could leverage some $200 billion 
to $400 billion in 2020 in additional private 
flows (MDB Working Group on Climate 
Finance 2011). This is close to the expected 
investment needed to reach a 550 ppm CO2-
eq target, but about half of what is needed to 
reach a 450 ppm CO2-eq target. As for the 
biodiversity market, offset and compensation 
programs offi cially amount to some $2.4 bil-
lion to $4 billion per year, but may be much 
bigger, given that most of the existing mar-
kets are not transparent or analyzed enough 
to estimate their size (Madsen and others 
2011).
Increasing the role of the private sector 
is critical. Many of the needed investments 
could benefit from public-private partner-
ships. Private participation in infrastructure 
has grown at a steady pace (13 percent a 
year) over the past 20 years but remains con-
centrated in a few middle-income countries 
and a few sectors, namely, telecom and, to a 
lesser extent, energy (World Bank and PPIAF 
2012). New investments in renewable energy 
are largely private (some $143 billion of the 
$211 billion invested in renewables in 2010), 
but 82 percent of private renewable energy 
investments that take place in developing 
countries occur in Brazil, China, and India 
(UNEP and Bloomberg  New Energy Finance 
2011). Yet the need for innovation, effi ciency, 
and “smart investments” (smart grids, smart 
transportation, and smart houses) makes the 
role of the private sector even more critical 
in green growth policies than it already is in 
traditional infrastructure fi nance. 
Three weaknesses hold back private fi nanc-
ing of infrastructure—green or not (MDB 
Working Group on Infrastructure 2011):
 • The scarcity of resources to prepare proj-
ects and bring them to a stage at which 
they are “bankable” (that is, attractive to 
private sectors). Developing-country gov-
ernments—at least those with limited expe-
rience with public-private partnerships—
are often reluctant to borrow to prepare 
uncertain projects, while private investors 
are unwilling to invest in preparing a proj-
ect they may have to bid for and not win.
 The mismatch between the tenor of the • 
funds available, with the preference of 
investors for short-term funds and the 
needs of infrastructure for long-term funds 
(15–25 years). Few countries have well-de-
veloped capital markets or banking institu-
tions able to transform short-term deposits 
into long-term products, and not enough 
refi nancing tool options are available. 
 The challenge of cost recovery. The ability • 
to charge at full cost is behind the mas-
sive expansion in telecom services, but few 
other infrastructure sectors are able to do 
so, although where they have, investors 
have come, as they did in Colombia’s water 
sector. Solutions include measures to price 
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infrastructure services close to cost recov-
ery, while ensuring affordability for low-
income households. 
Another weakness springs from the addi-
tional policy risk created by the fact that 
the profitability of green investments is 
often dependent on public policies (such as 
feed-in tariffs or environmental taxation). 
Thus, Spain’s retroactive reductions in solar 
feed-in tariffs, Germany’s and France’s deci-
sions to reduce the amount of support for 
future projects, and the lack of progress on 
a U.S. energy bill all combined to depress 
the private sector’s appetite for renewable 
energy investments in 2010. As a result, 
clean energy share prices dipped, refl ecting 
investor concerns, despite continued strong 
government support for renewable energy in 
China (UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance 2011). 
Renewable energy and energy efficiency 
illustrate the need for innovative public 
financing instruments (World Bank forth-
coming b). Renewable energy is capital inten-
sive with a long payback period and may face 
the technology risks associated with emerging 
technologies (such as concentrated solar) or 
unique resource risks (drilling for geother-
mal). Energy effi ciency suffers from the fact 
that most local banks rely on balance sheet 
fi nancing, rather than project-based fi nancing 
that is based on the cash fl ow generated by the 
investments. The result is that the customers 
most in need of fi nancing (small businesses 
and households) are typically deemed not 
creditworthy. And energy efficiency invest-
ments tend to be small, with high transaction 
costs, so that banks may not fi nd them attrac-
tive in the absence of dedicated credit lines to 
increase confi dence and capacity and instru-
ments to aggregate small deals.  
Furthermore, access to fi nancing is par-
ticularly problematic for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), which account for a large 
share (60 percent in many countries) of pol-
lution and resource use. Some 65 to 72 per-
cent of all SMEs (between 240 million and 
315 million fi rms) lack access to credit, with 
a particularly daunting picture in Asia and 
Africa (Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion 2011). Even in the more sophis-
ticated markets, most fi rms fi nd it tough to 
get credit for investments aimed at business 
activities other than expansion. 
How can these obstacles to green invest-
ments be overcome? The public sector, inter-
national financial institutions (IFIs), and 
bilateral donors can help by providing funds 
for project preparation as well as conces-
sional elements for pioneer investments. Such 
support can go a long way toward changing 
risk-return profi les and giving investors more 
confi dence in the long-term viability of their 
projects. 
More generally, well-designed public 
fi nance mechanisms help to mobilize private 
investments in energy effi ciency and renew-
able energy (World Bank forthcoming b). In 
the case of renewable energy and energy effi -
ciency, the following tends to have the great-
est leverage: 
 Credit lines or guarantee instruments to • 
engage private banks. The experience of 
the International Finance Corporation is 
telling: between 1997 and 2011 some $65 
million in concessional funding, primar-
ily for risk-sharing facilities, generated 
$680 million in sustainable energy fi nance 
investments (IFC 2011). 
 “Fund of funds” under which the govern-• 
ment invests a relatively small amount of 
long-term capital in a range of private, pro-
fessionally managed funds that then invest 
in clean energy or energy effi ciency
 Public funds to reduce interest rates for • 
consumer financing, typically through 
fi nancial institutions or utilities.  
In addition, energy service companies 
(ESCOs), which provide clients with energy 
auditing, propose energy-savings mea-
sures, and fi nancing, can help consolidate 
multiple small transactions. ESCOs as an 
industry often require public support to 
establish: in China, it took more than a 
decade of support by the government and 
the World Bank before the ESCOs grew to 
a $1 billion industry in 2007 (World Bank 
2010d).
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Overall, the relevant mix of financing 
instruments will depend on the market barri-
ers (access to credit, transaction cost, or per-
ception of risk), market segments (SMEs, large 
developers, or polluters), and local context 
(such as the maturity of the local fi nancial sec-
tor) in which they seek to operate (table O.2). 
In addition, payments for environmental 
services (PES)—whereby farmers and land-
owners are compensated for maintaining 
their land’s ability to provide ecosystem ser-
vices (such as the regulation of water fl ows, 
water purification, control of soil erosion, 
and habitats for wildlife)—are promising, but 
underutilized. Fortunately, efforts to develop 
REDD+ are helping to develop PES schemes.4 
In addition, in developing countries, policy 
makers have tried to design PES programs to 
benefi t the poor. But whether these schemes 
in fact benefi t the poor depends on the nature 
of the scheme. Brazil appears to have been 
successful in this regard, building on its 
experience in developing social safety nets for 
the poor (box O.5).
Conclusions
In sum, this report approaches green growth 
from a pragmatic point of view. The current 
model is not just unsustainable, it is ineffi -
cient. Improving it is good economics, so let’s 
fi x market failures, internalize externalities, 
assign property rights, improve governance, 
and infl uence behaviors. But making green 
growth happen and ensuring it is inclusive 
will also require an acute understanding of 
political economy and social psychology. 
As such, this report speaks primarily to 
those who fear that greening growth may 
be too expensive, may be too ambitious at 
an early stage of development, or should 
concern only high-income countries. To 
them, the report makes a clear case that 
greening growth is neither unaffordable nor 
technically out of reach, there are plenty of 
TABLE O.2 Financing mechanisms need to be tailored to the maturity of the local fi nancial sector
(context-dependent ﬁ nancing tools for clean energy in East Asia and the Paciﬁ c)
Level of fi nancial sector development
Indicator Low Medium High
Country income level Low income (e.g., Lao PDR) Middle income 
(e.g., Thailand)
Upper middle income 
(e.g., Malaysia)
Banking services Basic banks Full-range banks Universal banks
Non-bank ﬁ nancial services None • Government bonds
• Equity
•  Government and 
corporate bonds
• Equity
•  Alternatives (private equity, 
venture capital)
Interest rate Administrative setting Largely market based Fully market based
Access to ﬁ nance for SMEs Limited Partial Readily available
Availability of long-term 
ﬁ nancing
Limited (up to 1 year) Partial (up to 7 years) Full (up to 15 years)
Risk management Weak Adequate Robust
Appropriate clean 
energy fi nancing 
instruments
•  Lines of credit 
(liquidity support)
• Concessional fi nancing
• Dedicated debt funds
•  Lines of credit 
(demonstration)
• Partial risk guarantee
•  Lines of credit 
(demonstration)
•  Partial risk guarantee
• Equity funds
• Consumer fi nancing
Source: World Bank forthcoming b.
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BOX O.6 Joining forces: A common platform to move forward on greening our 
economies and growth processes
How does the World Bank’s defi nition of green growth 
as economic growth that is environmentally sustain-
able compare to those advocated in recent major 
reports on green growth? The OECD defi nes green 
growth as “fostering economic growth and develop-
ment, while ensuring that natural assets continue 
to provide the resources and environmental services 
on which our well-being relies” (OECD 2011b). The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
defines a green economy as “one that results in 
improved human well-being and social equity, while 
signifi cantly reducing environmental risks and ecolog-
ical scarcities” (UNEP 2011). Like the approach pro-
moted in this report, these defi nitions are consistent 
with sustainable development as an ultimate objec-
tive and with green growth or a green economy as a 
means to reconcile its economic and environmental 
pillars, without ignoring social aspects. 
So while the three reports differ in their focus 
and target audience, they are fully consistent in 
their broad vision and policy advice. This common 
vision is being developed further in the context of 
the Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP), a 
partnership of the three institutions and the Global 
Green Growth Institute. The GGKP—launched in 
January 2012—is a global network of researchers 
and development experts seeking to identify and 
address major knowledge gaps in green growth the-
ory and practice. Through widespread consultation 
and world-class research, the GGKP aims to provide 
practitioners and policy makers with better tools to 
foster economic growth and implement sustainable 
development (http://www.greengrowthknowledge 
.org).
BOX O.5 “Green” cash transfers are helping poor communities in the Brazilian Amazon
An innovative addition to the Brazilian Bolsa Famí-
lia (family allowance) conditional cash transfer 
program—the world’s largest and one of the best 
regarded in terms of coverage and targeting—is 
being implemented for communities living inside 
protected areas in the Amazon region. 
The Bolsa Floresta (forest allowance) rewards tra-
ditional communities for their commitment to stop 
deforestation by distributing payments for ecosystem 
services to families, communities, and family asso-
ciations. In order to be eligible to receive the grants, 
families must enroll their children in school, sign a 
zero deforestation commitment, and attend a two-
day training program on environmental awareness. 
Each eligible family receives a monthly stipend of 
R$50 ($30), paid to the mother. Community associa-
tions can also be eligible to receive payments of up 
to R$4,000 ($2,500) to support sustainable income 
generation activities, such as honey production, fi sh 
farming, and sustainable forest management.
Investments for administrative support to com-
munity associations make up 10 percent of the total 
paid to families during the year. Bolsa Floresta is 
being implemented by the State Government of 
Amazonas and the Fundação Amazônia Sustentável 
(Sustainable Amazonia Foundation). The funds are 
generated by the interest on an endowment initially 
established with contributions from the state govern-
ment and private donors. Deforestation is monitored 
on a yearly basis by the Amazonas State Secretariat 
for the Environment and Sustainable Development 
through satellite imagery analyzed by independent 
institutions. The program currently benefi ts 7,614 
families in 15 protected areas, covering around 10 
million hectares of forests. The State of Amazonas 
has succeeded in halving the deforestation rate over 
the past fi ve years. 
Box text contributed by Adriana Moreira.
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immediate benefi ts and a poor country can 
reap economic benefi t from better environ-
mental management. And although high-
income countries, which still account for 75 
percent of global consumption and a dispro-
portionate share of environmental degrada-
tion, absolutely have to implement ambitious 
environmental measures, all countries will 
gain from starting early. 
Greening growth need not entail slower 
growth and is affordable. However, achieving 
a green economy overnight probably is not. 
The costs of greening growth will depend 
on the degree of ambition. Rapidly and 
dramatically decreasing our impact on the 
planet would be quite costly. So, too, would 
delaying action for too long. Dramatic shifts 
would entail much slower growth at least in 
the medium run, and avoiding a brutal tran-
sition is the main incentive to start acting as 
early as possible.
This report adds to the chorus started by 
the Organisation for Economic Co- operation 
and Development and United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) in recent reports 
supporting the idea that inclusive green growth 
is good economics and good development pol-
icy (box O.6). While we are still far from being 
able to price ecosystem services properly, they 
clearly are valuable. As such, neglecting natu-
ral capital, like neglecting human and physical 
capital, is simply bad management, bad eco-
nomics, and bad for growth. 
Notes
1.  The equivalent amount using purchasing power 
parity (PPP) that allows for better cross-country 
comparisons of purchasing power is $6,000 PPP 
for all developing countries and $1,300 PPP in 
low-income countries. 
2.  This section is based on World Bank (forth-
coming a). 
3.  The fl eet capacity index is the relationship 
between the capacity of a fi shing fl eet to catch 
a particular quantity of fi sh and the quantity of 
fi sh that it actually catches.
4.  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD) is an effort to cre-
ate a fi nancial value for the carbon stored in 
forests, offering incentives for developing coun-
tries to reduce emissions from forested lands 
and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable 
development. REDD+ goes beyond deforesta-
tion and forest degradation and includes the 
role of conservation, sustainable management 
of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (http://www.un-redd.org/). 
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Key Messages
• It is ineffi cient either to pursue growth and 
only later worry about its environmental con-
sequences, or to promote environmental sus-
tainability and subsequently worry about its 
growth implications.
• The analytical case for green growth is strong: 
green policies can indeed contribute to eco-
nomic growth over the short term, if they are 
designed in an appropriate framework.
• Green policies can contribute to growth 
through four effects: an input effect (increas-
ing production factors), an efficiency effect 
(bringing production closer to the production 
frontier), a stimulus effect (stimulating the 
economy in times of crisis), and an innova-
tion effect (accelerating development and 
adoption of technologies).
• Green policies can also contribute to wel-
fare through direct environmental benefi ts, 
through distributional effects (including 
poverty reduction and job creation), and 
through increased resilience to shocks 
(including natural disasters and commod-
ity price volatility). Welfare impacts will be 
greater if efforts are made to make green 
policies inclusive.
China grew at about 10 percent a year over the past 30 years, transform-ing it from a poor country to the 
world’s second-largest economy. Yet, the 
Chinese government is now reconsidering 
the strategy that permitted this economic 
miracle in the hope of greening its develop-
ment process (World Bank and DRC 2012). 
Two factors motivate this possible change in 
approach. First, the cost of environmental 
degradation, estimated at 9 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), is threatening both 
economic competitiveness and welfare. As 
a result, China’s population is demanding 
a cleaner and safer environment. Second, 
China is looking for new sources of growth, 
supported by innovation and higher value 
added production, and wants to be an early 
This chapter is based on Hallegatte and  others (2011).
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mover in the race toward greener production 
processes and products.
China is not the only such country. 
Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, and 
Tunisia are greening their growth process or 
looking to use green industries as sources of 
growth. Ethiopia is developing a green growth 
strategy. Kenya is investing heavily in geo-
thermal power. And many other countries are 
hoping to better balance the environment and 
the economic imperative of rapid growth.
The reality is that the world needs green 
growth, and it needs it now. But what exactly 
does “green growth” mean? Green growth 
can be thought of as economic growth that 
is environmentally sustainable. More spe-
cifi cally, it aims to operationalize sustainable 
development by enabling developing countries 
to achieve robust growth without locking 
themselves into unsustainable patterns. The 
World Bank’s environmental strategy defi nes 
green growth as growth that is effi cient, clean, 
and resilient—effi cient in its use of natural 
resources, clean in that it minimizes pollution 
and environmental impacts, and resilient in 
that it accounts for natural hazards and the 
role of environmental management and natu-
ral capital in preventing physical disasters.
Importantly, green growth is not inher-
ently inclusive. Its outcome will likely be good 
for the poor, but specifi c policies are needed 
to ensure that the poor are not excluded from 
benefi ts and are not harmed in the transition. 
The welfare impacts of green policies will be 
greater if efforts are made to make the poli-
cies inclusive.
Greening growth is essential to achieving 
sustainable development and its objectives 
of social, economic, and environmental sus-
tainability (fi gure 1.1). Economic growth and 
social achievements are widely recognized 
as complementary, but growth and environ-
mental sustainability are often perceived as 
antithetical. Greening growth would recon-
cile the need for environmental sustainabil-
ity with that for economic growth and social 
improvement.
Fortunately, many policies provide both 
environmental and economic benefits. 
Informal settlements can pose economic, 
environmental, and social problems. Utili-
ties often refuse to serve them and insecure 
property rights discourage residents from 
investing in establishing connections to water 
or electricity networks. Creating functioning 
land markets with secure land tenure helps 
informal settlers access solid waste removal, 
sanitation and drainage, and drinking water. 
It also increases welfare and labor produc-
tivity, both directly and indirectly, by giving 
such settlers greater access to credit and by 
allowing them to invest in small businesses, 
thereby increasing aggregate output. One 
example of the environmental benefits of 
a green growth policy is the World Bank–
fi nanced water quality and pollution control 
project around the Lake of Guarapiranga 
in Brazil. Urban renewal and slum upgrad-
ing were critical to improving water quality, 
which in turn provided a reliable water sup-
ply source for the city of São Paulo.
Most green growth policies are environ-
mental policies in the sense that their primary 
objective is to preserve the environment. But 
not all of them are. Policies that improve 
energy security or reduce urban congestion, 
for example, may yield substantial environ-
mental benefi ts even if doing so is not their 
primary objective.
Many observers have argued that environ-
mental issues will “solve themselves” with 
economic development. This chapter exam-
ines the flaws in the “grow now, clean up 
later” argument and discusses what growth 
theory and evidence reveal about the com-
patibility of environmentally sustainable 
policies and growth. It investigates whether 
green growth is in fact feasible—beginning 
with the analytical case for green growth 
before reviewing the implications for welfare, 
the ultimate goal of economic policy—and 
explores how to identify trade-offs and syn-
ergies implied by a green growth strategy.
Why not grow now and clean 
up later?
The “grow now, clean up later” argument 
is based on the idea that environmental 
quality first deteriorates with growth and 
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then improves—an environmental Kuz-
nets curve.1 In this framework, the envi-
ronment eventually improves as national 
income rises because the environment is a 
“superior good” (a good whose consump-
tion increases more than proportionately 
with income).2 The framework implies that 
poor people care less about the environment 
than wealthier people, give priority to con-
sumption over environmental quality, and 
act upon these preferences. Once basic needs 
have been met, this argument goes, people 
place greater weight on the environment, 
leading to investments in environmental 
protection and clean-up that increase envi-
ronmental quality, assuming appropriate 
collective action proves possible. Economic 
growth will therefore automatically lead 
countries to environmental protection.
There are serious fl aws in this argument. 
First, a distinction needs to be made between 
environmental impacts that affect welfare 
through income and consumption and those 
that affect welfare through the amenity value 
of environmental assets. In urban areas, poor 
households that struggle to feed and house 
themselves will indeed place a lower prior-
ity on the amenities provided by a park than 
wealthier households might. However, they 
care deeply about the absence of solid waste 
management and its results—dengue epidem-
ics, clogged urban drains, and the destruction 
of their homes and small businesses by fl oods. 
In rural areas, protecting forests to prevent the 
extinction of rare animals may not be a prior-
ity for households that struggle to feed them-
selves (unless of course the poor can share in 
the benefi ts from wildlife protection). But the 
same households are likely to care about pro-
tecting soil quality and managing water fl ows, 
which allow them to grow crops.
Second, even when poor communities care 
about the environment, they may not have 
the “voice” to make their concerns heard. 
Policies implemented in developing coun-
tries may be more representative of the pref-
erences of the elite than of the poor or may 
refl ect institutional constraints, such as those 
imposed by poorly defi ned property rights (as 
in open access resources).
Third, it is difficult to infer preferences 
about collective goods from individual behav-
ior. Cities offer many more jobs and opportu-
nities than rural areas but also much higher 
levels of local pollution. The fact that people 
move from rural areas to cities does not mean 
they would not prefer slightly fewer opportu-
nities and higher environmental quality. Their 
preferences are not completely revealed by 
the binary choice of “moving or not moving 
to the city,” because they do not have a con-
tinuum of choices of increasing opportunities 
and decreasing environmental quality.
Fourth, because the infl uence of environ-
mental quality and welfare is often indirect, 
people may not link environmental problems 
(such as water or soil quality) to the health 
problems they confront.3 Better informa-
tion, not just higher incomes, may be needed 
if individuals are to demand higher envi-
ronmental quality at earlier stages of devel-
opment. Even developed countries are only 
beginning to address the complex issue of 
Social
sustainability
Environmental
sustainability
Sustainable
development
Economic
sustainability
FIGURE 1.1 The three pillars of sustainable development
Note: Economic and social sustainability, on the one hand, and social and environmental sustainability, 
on the other, have been found to be not only compatible, but also largely complementary. Not so 
with economic and environmental sustainability, as growth has come largely at the expense of the 
environment—hence, the dotted line on this fi gure—which is why green growth aims to ensure that 
economic and environmental sustainability are compatible.
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the environmental damages of pesticides and 
chemicals.
Fifth, although some dimensions of envi-
ronmental quality improve with average 
income, many others do not. Local environ-
mental issues with short-term, highly visible 
manifestations (such as local air and some 
types of water pollution) are usually resolved 
spontaneously as countries develop. In con-
trast, global public goods with long-term 
consequences (such as climate change or bio-
diversity) and local environmental issues with 
complex and less visible consequences can keep 
getting worse (box 1.1).
The case of Costa Rica illustrates the 
contrast between local, visible pollutants 
and global ones. In 1978, when per capita 
GDP was about $2,200, emissions of nitro-
gen oxides (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
peaked, before leveling off and then declin-
ing slightly. Over the same period, however, 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions continued to 
rise (fi gure 1.2).
Delaying action can be costly
Making the “grow now and clean up later” 
argument even less palatable is the fact 
that it may simply be too costly to do so. 
Indeed, it may be more economical to 
reduce or prevent pollution at an early stage 
of growth than to incur the higher clean-up 
costs at later stages, even when future costs 
and benefi ts are discounted. Acting early is 
critical when the choice of technology and 
infrastructure can “lock in” high-carbon 
or polluting lifestyles or economic struc-
tures. This issue is particularly relevant in 
developing countries, where most of the 
infrastructure will be built in the next few 
decades.
As for climate change, a variety of 
experts have studied the optimal timing of 
action (Nordhaus 1992; Wigley and others 
1996). Prematurely depreciating investments 
can be costly if climate change turns out 
to be less threatening than expected or if 
the discount rate used to calculate future 
losses is too low. But early action may well 
result in savings. Lecocq and others (1998) 
fi nd that in the absence of perfect foresight, 
specifi c policies regarding green infrastruc-
ture and long-lived capital must be adopted 
early to achieve mitigation objectives at a 
lower cost. Jaccard and Rivers (2007) show 
that early action is preferable in long-lived 
BOX 1.1 Persistent concerns about local pollution in high-income countries
Complex and “invisible” local environmental issues 
do not necessarily improve with income. In countries 
like France, efforts to understand the transfer of 
pesticides to the environment (mostly water bodies) 
began only some 20 years ago, under the pressure 
of a European Union Directive regulating drinking 
water (Aubertot and others 2005). Soil contami-
nation is harder to monitor and can lead to severe 
long-term environmental and health hazards, as the 
example of the insecticide chlordecone illustrates.
Chlordecone, which was banned only recently, 
was used extensively in the French West Indies 
for more than 30 years, exposing the population 
to severe health hazards (Multignier and others 
2010). The chemical remains in the soil for decades, 
polluting water and agricultural productions, and 
 contains known carcinogenics (Aubertot and others 
2005;  Multignier and others 2010).
In the United States, the Safe Drinking Water Act 
regulates only 91 contaminants, despite the fact that 
more than 60,000 chemicals are used within the 
country’s borders. Scientists have examined many of 
these chemicals and have identifi ed hundreds associ-
ated with a risk of cancer and other diseases at small 
concentrations in drinking water, according to an 
analysis of government records by the New York 
Times (Duhigg 2009). The implication is that mil-
lions of Americans are exposed to water that does 
not meet safety standards meant to protect against 
cancer or other serious diseases.
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FIGURE 1.2 Global pollutants and local, visible 
ones follow diff erent paths 
(relationship between GDP and emissions in Costa Rica, 
1970–2009)
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capital sectors, such as infrastructure and 
urbanization, even if marginal costs are 
higher there. Denser cities have lower CO2 
emissions from transportation (fi gure 1.3). 
But Gusdorf and others (2008) find that 
infl uencing the shape and density of cities 
(“changing urban forms”) to make them 
less energy consuming is extremely costly. 
Developing countries would therefore do 
well to prevent their cities from growing in 
a low-density manner dependent on auto-
mobiles if their target for the end of the 
21st century is to have high-density, energy-
effi cient cities.
One measure of the importance of early 
action is provided by Davis and others (2010), 
who estimate that without early scrapping, 
existing energy infrastructure commits us 
to warming of about 1.3°C above preindus-
trial temperatures. Introducing other types of 
infrastructure (including the capital that con-
strains the demand for transport, such as dis-
tant suburbs) and non-CO2 gases, Guivarch 
and Hallegatte (2011) estimate this “com-
mitment” at 1.7°C. These results imply that 
keeping the increase in global warming below 
2°C (the internationally recognized objec-
tive of climate policies [World Bank 2009]) 
requires that almost all new infrastructure 
be designed with climate change in mind 
and that urgent action be taken on long-lived 
infrastructure. In the absence of such action, 
physical capital will have to be replaced ear-
lier, at great cost.
Another argument for early action has to 
do with the fact that the needed technolo-
gies will not become affordable unless there 
is suffi cient demand to deploy them to scale. 
Countries or fi rms may be tempted to wait 
for better and less expensive technologies to 
become available. But these technologies will 
be developed only if serious commitments to 
pollution reduction are made (Goulder and 
Mathai 2000; Manne and Richels 2004; Sue 
Wing 2006). Early action is thus justifi ed by 
the technological changes that action would 
induce. Developing these technologies is a 
critical role of high-income countries and the 
main reason why they need to act quickly on 
issues such as climate change.
And even worse, some damages cannot be 
reversed. In such cases, investments in envi-
ronmental quality protection can be neces-
sary in the short term. In Kenya, for exam-
ple, traditional forests are being destroyed. 
Replanting can restore the country’s water 
tower and other functions, but most biodiver-
sity losses are probably irreversible (Chapin 
and others 2000).
Climate change itself may be irreversible. 
This irreversibility is a clear incentive for early 
action, as the consequences of warming exceed-
ing 2°C are highly uncertain and potentially 
severe (Ambrosi and others 2003;  Ha-Duong 
and others 1997; World Bank 2009). The 2°C 
objective, for example, is achievable only if sig-
nifi cant emission reductions can be made before 
2030 (Meinshausen and others 2009; O’Neill 
and others 2009). 
If growing dirty now and cleaning up later 
is not an option, then what is needed are joint 
green and growth policies. It is inefficient 
to pursue growth and then worry about its 
environmental consequences or to promote 
environmental sustainability and then worry 
about its growth implications. But the pos-
sibility to green growth has been questioned. 
The next section provides a framework to 
investigate the potential for greening growth 
without slowing it.
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Is green growth really possible? 
The analytical basis
Modern growth theory dates back to 
1956, when Robert Solow put forward a 
formal model that suggested that growth 
in output—GDP—comes from increases 
in physical capital, labor, and productiv-
ity (box 1.2). In this model, physical capi-
tal increases thanks to investment. Labor 
increases as a result of population growth, 
greater labor force participation, and bet-
ter health and education. And productivity 
increases thanks to technological change—
which can stem from investments in educa-
tion and research and development (R&D), 
economies of scale, and learning by doing.
What is missing in this model, however, is 
the notion that economic production depends 
directly on the stock of natural resources 
and the quality of the environment—that 
is, that the environment is a factor in the 
production function. This notion has been 
around at least since Malthus ([1798] 1965), 
but it was not until the early 1970s that 
classical growth theory was modified to 
embrace the environment— referred to as 
“natural capital”—as a factor of production 
(Dasgupta and Heal 1974; Nordhaus 1974; 
Solow 1974).4 If the environment is consid-
ered as productive capital, it makes sense to 
invest in it, and environmental policies can be 
considered as investment.
In this “greener” framework, environmen-
tal policies increase economic output directly 
by improving environmental conditions (for 
example, better forestry management reduces 
soil erosion, leading to more productive agri-
culture). Failure to manage the environment 
results in the depreciation and destruction of 
natural capital, with direct adverse impacts 
on output. Cleaning up the environment 
also increases human well-being directly, by 
improving air and water quality and reducing 
exposure to natural hazards, although these 
benefi ts are not necessarily captured by con-
ventional (GDP) statistics.
Whether investing in the environment 
increases only the level of production or also 
its rate of growth is likely to depend on the 
context in which the investment is made. 
Where credit constraints limit output growth, 
investing in the environment will accelerate 
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BOX 1.2 An economic framework for green growth
Classical growth theory (Solow 1956) assumes that 
output (Y) is produced using technology (A), physi-
cal capital (K), and labor (L). The relationship can 
be written as follows:
Y = f (A, K, L).
Growth in output results from increases in pro-
duction factors (physical capital and labor) and 
productivity, which rises as a result of technologi-
cal change, including changes in organization and 
practices. In this approach, the environment plays no 
productive role.
The idea that economic production depends 
directly on the stock of natural resources and 
the quality of the environment—that is, that the 
environment is an argument in the production 
function—has been around at least since Malthus 
(1798). It was further developed in the environmen-
tal economics literature that took off in the early 
1970s. In this approach, the environment becomes 
“natural capital,” an input in economic production 
and growth. The production function can thus be 
rewritten as follows:
Y = f (A, K, L, E),
where E represents the environment (natural 
capital).
To analyze the effect of green growth policies, 
however, growth models need to be modified to 
incorporate market failures and the fact that the 
economy is not at its optimal equilibrium. A fi rst 
modifi cation replaces the production function with 
the production frontier—the maximum production 
level possible with the available technology, physi-
cal capital, labor, and environment, assuming maxi-
mum effi ciency. Actual production is given by
Y = y f (A, K, L, E),
where y (a value between 0 and 1) measures the effi -
ciency of the production process.
A second modifi cation introduces PE, which can 
be thought of as the effort dedicated to environmen-
tal policies:
Y = y (PE) f [A (PE), K (PE), L (PE), E (PE)].
In this case, environmental policies can create syn-
ergies with economic output by increasing productive 
capital (K, L, and E), improving effi ciency y , and 
accelerating technological change by increasing A.
Ultimately, it is welfare that matters, not output. 
This means that the model needs to account for the 
impact of output on welfare (or utility, U). As invest-
ment does not increase welfare directly, utility can 
be modeled as depending only on the current level 
of consumption, C, plus the direct effect of the envi-
ronment, E:
U = u (C, E).
In practice, environmental policies can affect 
utility directly (positively or negatively), with effects 
that are not mediated by aggregate consumption or 
the state of the environment such as distributional 
impacts or increased resilience. The utility function 
can thus be written as follows:
U = u (C, E, PE).
Distribution (how total consumption is distrib-
uted across individuals) and volatility (how total 
consumption is distributed over time) affect welfare 
and can be influenced directly by environmental 
policies. Everything else equal, many people favor 
stable consumption patterns and lower consumption 
inequality; the utility function can thus include an 
aversion for risk and inequality.
Sources: Hallegatte and others 2011 and World Bank.
growth, because a higher production level 
increases income and savings. Where growth 
is limited by investment opportunities, it will 
fail to boost growth, because institutions are 
not in place to allow investors to benefi t from 
their investment revenues. Where people are 
engaged in low-return activities, a limited 
increase in the production level may improve 
welfare but will not spur economic growth, 
because these economic activities do not gen-
erate suffi cient returns to allow households to 
save and accumulate assets.
A key question in this framework is the 
extent to which production factors are com-
plements or substitutes. If they are comple-
ments (or weak substitutes), protecting the 
environment is necessary to maintain eco-
nomic production. If they are substitutes, in 
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principle, increased investment in physical 
or human capital or technological change 
can compensate for damage to the environ-
ment. In fact, the ability to do so appears 
limited.5 Food production requires soil and 
water, even if technology and increased labor 
intensity can reduce the quantities needed. 
The low elasticity of substitution between 
natural capital and other inputs implies that 
a small percentage increase in natural capital 
can free large percentage quantities of other 
inputs.6
While direct economic benefi ts from envi-
ronmental policies occur mainly over the 
long term, green policies can also contribute 
to short-term economic growth because the 
world’s economies perform far from their 
optimum levels. Indeed, many market fail-
ures hurt both the environment (by reducing 
the effective supply of natural capital) and 
the economy (by causing an extremely inef-
fi cient use of natural resources). Correcting 
these market failures, although sometimes 
costly, can increase efficiency and yield 
benefits that go beyond the environment. 
An example is urban congestion, which not 
only causes air pollution but also reduces 
the productivity and economies of scope 
cities provide. The reality is that the use 
and management of “natural capital” are 
plagued by extensive market failures, such 
as unpriced externalities and poorly defi ned 
property rights.
The problem for analysts is that models 
of economic growth usually fail to cap-
ture environmental contributions, partly 
because they generally ignore the role of 
natural capital and partly because they 
assume a world with no market failures. As 
the potential for green policies to accelerate 
income growth arises from market failures, 
such models cannot be used to assess the 
impact of such policies.
A real-world framework for 
green growth
To be useful for analyzing the effect of 
green growth policies, a broader framework 
is needed that is modified to account for 
market failures and other suboptimalities, 
such as the following:
• Knowledge spillovers and economies 
of scale that lead to underinvestment in 
R&D
• Underutilization of physical capital or 
labor, for temporary (crisis) or structural 
reasons
• Behavioral biases, such as the inability 
to make decisions about low-probability 
events (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989; 
Tversky and Shafi r 1992)
• Other market failures, such as principal-
agent issues, information asymmetry in 
capital markets, and coordination failures.
Actual economic output depends on the 
“production frontier” (the maximum pro-
duction level possible with the available 
technology, physical capital, labor, and envi-
ronment, assuming maximum efficiency) 
and on effi ciency (how close the real-world 
production system actually is to the produc-
tion frontier).
Green growth policies can thus be seen as 
policies that move the economy away from 
suboptimalities and increase effi ciency—and 
hence contribute to short-term growth—
while protecting the environment. Subop-
timalities often persist because removing 
them is complex or requires large upfront 
investments. Assessing the possibility to cor-
rect these market failures requires devoting 
attention to their causes, to institutional and 
political obstacles, and to transaction costs.
How do environmental policies increase 
conventionally measured GDP? They do 
so through four channels linked to input, 
effi ciency, stimulus, and innovation effects. 
Figure 1.4 illustrates each of these effects.
Input eff ect
The input channel works by increasing the 
quantity of natural, human (labor), and phys-
ical capital (arrow i in fi gure 1.4). Specifi cally, 
green policies can achieve the following:
• Increase natural capital through better 
management of scarce resources. Individual 
transferable fi shing quotas, for example, 
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help maintain and even increase fi sher-
ies and thus the economic activity that 
depends on them (box 1.3).
• Increase labor by improving health 
(Hanna 2011). Better environmental poli-
cies can decrease atmospheric pollution in 
cities, reduce the severity and incidence of 
respiratory diseases, increase labor effec-
tiveness, and reduce days lost to illness. A 
study on the link between air pollution and 
labor productivity on farms in California 
shows that a decrease in ozone concentra-
tions of 10 parts per billion (for an aver-
age value of 50 parts per billion) increased 
worker productivity by 4.2 percent (Graff 
Zivin and Neidell 2011).
• Increase physical capital by better man-
aging natural risks, which in turn leads 
to lower capital losses from natural 
disasters (Hallegatte and others 2007). 
Protecting mangroves, for instance, not 
only protects biodiversity, it can also 
improve the resilience of coastal zones 
to hurricanes and storm surges, thereby 
reducing economic losses caused by 
coastal fl oods.
Effi  ciency eff ect
The efficiency channel works by increas-
ing productivity, through correcting mar-
ket failures and infl uencing behaviors, and 
by enhancing the effi ciency of resource use 
(arrow ii in figure 1.4). One example is 
energy efficiency. Many firms and house-
holds fail to make cost-effective energy-
efficiency investments—probably because 
of market failures and behavioral biases 
(Gillingham and others 2009). Improving 
the insulation of new buildings is often cost-
effective, but firms and households often 
fail to do so because of a lack of informa-
tion and the fact that building and housing 
prices do not adequately refl ect differences 
in heating costs. Environmental policies 
that aim to reduce energy consumption and 
carbon emissions may correct these market 
output
production frontier 
suboptimal production
Z
maximum 
output
actual 
output
(i)
shifted production frontier 
(iii)
(ii)
enhanced eﬃciency
Z = composite of human (labor), physical,
and natural capital 
Note: Arrow (i) represents increase in factors of production. Arrow (ii) represents enhanced effi  ciency and stimulus eff ect. Arrow (iii) represents shift in 
 production frontier.
FIGURE 1.4 Green policies hold the potential to sharply boost output
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BOX 1.3 Using individual transferable quotas to revitalize fi sheries
Lack of property rights in the sea has led to over-
fi shing—in some cases with devastating results. The 
use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can cor-
rect this market failure, increasing both output and 
employment in the fi shing industry.
ITQs operate by setting a cap on the total allow-
able catch (TAC). The cap is set at a level that is 
consistent with the long-term survival of the species 
(that is, less than the rate of growth of the fi sh stock). 
Once a TAC is set, it is divided into individual quo-
tas, the amounts that particular boats or skippers 
can catch. Only quota owners are allowed to fi sh. 
If the TAC changes from year to year, the number 
of tons represented by the quota also changes, but 
the fraction of the TAC assigned to individuals does 
not. These quotas are transferable: they can be sold, 
given, or bequeathed to others. (A related approach 
is that of “catch shares,” under which each boat or 
owner is entitled to a share of the TAC but the shares 
are not transferable.)
The value of the ITQ depends on the productiv-
ity of a fi shery—1 percent of a thriving and produc-
tive fi shery with large fi sh stocks is worth far more 
than 1 percent of an almost-extinct fi shery. The ITQ 
system thus provides an incentive for quota own-
ers (fi shers) to invest in the long-run health of their 
fi shery. The quotas generally represent a substantial 
share of fi shers’ wealth; if they overexploit the fi sh-
ery, they thus risk impoverishing themselves. Under 
this system, they have an incentive to leave fi sh in the 
water to breed and generate future catch, an incen-
tive they otherwise lack. ITQs align the interests of 
fi shers and the fi shery, generally improving both the 
health of the fi shery and the profi ts of the men and 
women who depend on it.
Are ITQs making a difference? In studies of more 
than 11,000 fi sheries, 121 of which had instituted 
ITQs, Costello and others (2008) and Heal and 
Schlenker (2008) fi nd a substantial increase in catch 
within a few years of the implementation of ITQs 
and a signifi cant decrease in the chance of a fi shery 
collapsing once it is managed as an ITQ. On average, 
within 17 years of implementing an ITQ, the catch 
at fi sheries with ITQs rose by a factor of fi ve, with 
yields of some fi sheries rising by a factor of 200. The 
institution of ITQs allows fi sheries to prosper, gen-
erating better livelihoods for the people who work in 
them and more food for the world as a whole.
failures or infl uence these behaviors, lead-
ing to less environmental damage and to 
a more efficient economy, with a higher 
growth potential.
Stimulus eff ect
The stimulus channel can occur during an 
economic recession, when capacity utiliza-
tion and employment are low (also arrow 
ii in fi gure 1.4). Large investments in green 
infrastructure increase demand, poten-
tially increasing employment over the short 
term (Zenghelis 2011). Underemployment 
is not always related to demand, however; 
it can be structural, especially in devel-
oping countries.7 In this case, a stimulus 
may prove costly and do little to increase 
employment.
Innovation eff ect
Environmental policies can shift the pro-
duction frontier (increasing the potential 
output the economy can produce) by accel-
erating the development and dissemina-
tion of innovation and creating knowledge 
spillovers (arrow iii in figure 1.4).8 Given 
that investments in knowledge tend to 
be lower than desirable in the absence of 
public intervention, policies that encour-
age green technologies can thus usefully 
increase R&D (Acemoglu and others 2012; 
 Fischer and Newell 2008; Gerlagh 2006; 
Otto and Reilly 2008).9 (The opposite effect 
is also possible, as research on green tech-
nologies could crowd out research on other 
productivity-increasing technologies [Popp 
and others 2009].) The innovation effect is 
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illustrated by investments in R&D on pho-
tovoltaic power motivated by the desire to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Success 
could make photovoltaics competitive with 
fossil fuels, increase the supply of electric 
power, and reduce the cost of providing 
electric power to remote off-grid communi-
ties (see chapter 6).
At the same time, the costs associated 
with environmental efforts create a trade-off 
between environmental protection and eco-
nomic production. For example, environmen-
tal efforts may have the following effects:
• Reduced productivity, by causing pro-
ducers to use more expensive or less pro-
ductive technologies or by crowding out 
R&D in nonenvironmental domains.
• Early retirement of physical capital 
based on polluting technologies (Grubb 
and others 1995; Jaccard and Rivers 
2007). This effect can be represented as 
a decrease in capital or an increase in 
capital depreciation. In addition to the 
direct cost, the increase in investment 
needed to replace retired capital reduces 
consumption—and thus welfare—at 
least over the short term.
• Increases in the pricing of some goods 
and services, altering relative prices. 
By changing the structure of demand, 
environmental policies may reduce the 
ability of the structure of production to 
meet demand. For example, policies may 
reduce demand in some sectors that have 
a high production capacity (such as road 
transport) and may increase demand in 
sectors that have more limited produc-
tion capacity (such as public transpor-
tation). This effect can be measured as 
lower effi ciency.
These costs, and their assessment, 
depend on the defi nition of economic out-
put. In a green accounting framework that 
includes valuation of ecosystem services, a 
reduction in economic productivity because 
of environmental regulations can be more 
than compensated for by a reduction in 
externalities—through, for example, the 
preservation of ecosystem services (a topic 
explored in chapter 2).
What about welfare?
Ultimately, however, what matters is wel-
fare, not output. The next step, therefore, 
is to broaden the framework to take into 
account the impact of the environment on 
welfare (or utility), which can be positive or 
negative. Welfare can be assessed by view-
ing utility as depending on the current level 
of consumption and the direct effect of the 
environment (through its health effects and 
amenity value).
Welfare also depends on income distribu-
tion and employment. As such, analysts must 
take into account the fact that environmental 
policies may affect different social groups or 
regions differently. These policies may cre-
ate jobs for some types of workers in some 
regions and eliminate jobs for other types 
of workers in other regions. Because women 
tend to be more dependent on common prop-
erty resources and more vulnerable to the 
impacts of natural resource degradation than 
men (Foa 2009), environmental protection 
and green policies can also help improve gen-
der equality, with many economic and social 
co-benefits. These distributive effects have 
both social and political economy implica-
tions that may require the implementation 
of complementary policies to compensate 
losers (see chapter 2). If compensatory fi nan-
cial transfers are possible at zero cost and 
labor markets are perfect, efficiency can 
be separated from equity. If such transfers 
are impossible or costly and labor markets 
are imperfect, it is necessary to pursue effi -
ciency and equity simultaneously, which may 
require setting more modest goals (Goulder 
and Parry 2008).
Analysts must also factor in the fact 
that environmental policies can increase 
or decrease volatility. These policies can 
create shocks in the economy and can 
distort intertemporal trade-offs. But they 
can also reduce potential risks to growth 
by increasing resilience to environmental 
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shocks (such as natural disasters) or eco-
nomic shocks (such as oil shocks or spikes 
in commodity prices) (box 1.4).10 In so 
doing, they can stabilize output and con-
sumption, increasing welfare if risk aver-
sion is accounted for.
Trade-off s and synergies 
between green policies and 
growth
Armed with this framework for green growth, 
how do policy makers weigh the trade-offs 
between the costs (possible reductions in 
investments, income, and consumption) and 
benefi ts (possible improvements on the envi-
ronmental, social, and economic fronts)? 
Given that the net impact varies depending 
on the policy considered, the context, and 
the time horizon,11 a start is classifying the 
potential benefi ts of green growth policies, as 
done in table 1.1. In a green growth context, 
any new policy should be examined for ways 
to maximize the potential for short-term ben-
efi ts while minimizing the costs.
Measuring the net impacts of green growth 
policies also requires capturing suboptimal 
conditions caused by market or government 
failures or nonrational behaviors. Models 
based on fi rst-best assumptions (perfect mar-
kets, rational expectations, and so forth) can 
assess the costs of these policies in a perfect 
world; they cannot be used to estimate their 
benefi ts.
The balance between costs and benefits 
will be affected by how they are defi ned. In 
a narrow economic framework, a policy to 
protect a mangrove forest has an economic 
opportunity cost (because it prevents shrimp 
farming or tourism development, for exam-
ple) and no direct benefi t. In contrast, in a 
framework that includes the valuation of 
ecosystem services, the policy also has eco-
nomic benefi ts, including protection against 
coastal storms, the creation or maintenance 
of a breeding ground for fisheries, and the 
availability of wood for the local community. 
The “green accounting” approach incorpo-
rates the valuation of ecosystem services into 
national accounts, thereby providing a much 
BOX 1.4 Reducing vulnerability to oil shocks by increasing energy effi  ciency
The vulnerability of the world economy to oil shocks 
has diminished since the 1970s (Nordhaus 2007). 
Possible explanations for this decline include the 
decrease in the average oil intensity of world GDP; 
the increased flexibility of labor markets (in par-
ticular wages), so that pass-through infl ation is less 
likely for a given monetary policy; a change in the 
nature of oil shocks (the 1973 and 1979 shocks fol-
lowed supply disruptions; the 2008 shock resulted 
from increased demand from emerging markets); and 
improved confi dence in monetary policy, which sta-
bilized infl ationary expectations as a result of nearly 
three decades of low and stable infl ation (Blanchard 
and Gali 2010; Gregorio and others 2007).
Specifi c energy security policies drove the decrease 
in GDP oil intensity. In some countries, higher taxes 
on gasoline consumption reduced oil consumption. 
In others, norms and regulations reduced energy 
consumption by cars, industries, and the residential 
sector.
Over the longer term, climate policies may have 
similar results: by driving technological change and 
investment away from oil-intensive patterns, these 
policies reduce oil consumption and vulnerability 
to oil shocks (Rozenberg and others 2010). Climate 
policies can thus reduce vulnerability to oil scar-
city and uncertainty over oil reserves. In particu-
lar, such policies might reduce the obsolescence of 
capital in case of large changes in energy prices. 
Cities that are denser, less dependent on individual 
vehicles, and less energy consuming are also less 
vulnerable to volatility in oil prices (Gusdorf and 
Hallegatte 2007). Climate policies and other poli-
cies aiming at higher effi ciency in the use of natural 
resources can thus increase the security and resil-
ience of the economy.
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better measure of trade-offs than traditional 
national income accounting. As such, it is 
central to green growth strategies.
In sum, although many observers fear that 
green policies require incurring large costs 
now for benefi ts that will materialize only in 
the long term, the reality is that many of the 
benefi ts can occur in the short and medium 
term. Moreover, green policies can contribute 
to growth. Action therefore needs to be taken 
now—at least on issues that carry a risk of 
lock-in and irreversibility—to minimize 
regret and avoid costly policy reversals. In 
the next two chapters, we look at the cross-
cutting issues of market and governance, 
beginning with the range of tools that can be 
marshaled to change behavior with respect to 
environmental and natural resources—tools 
that aim to improve social welfare through 
greener growth.
Notes
 1.  Kuznets argued that as a country devel-
ops and national income rises, inequality 
increases, but once a certain national income 
level is reached, inequality then declines. His 
now disproved theory was extended to the 
environment, where it has also been rejected 
(Andreoni and Levinson 2001; Barbier 1997; 
Brock and Taylor 2010). 
 2.  Another common interpretation is that the 
environmental Kuznets curve refl ects struc-
tural transformation of an economy. As 
economies become more industrial, environ-
TABLE 1.1 Potential benefi ts of green growth policies
Type of benefi t Impact on welfare Channels through which policy aff ects welfare 
Environmental Increases welfare directly Improved environment 
Economic Increases welfare by raising income Increase in factors of production (physical capital, 
human capital, and natural capital)
Accelerated innovation, through correcting market 
failures in knowledge
Enhanced eﬃ  ciency, through correcting 
nonenvironmental market failures and inﬂ uencing 
behaviors
Social Increases welfare through distributional eﬀ ects, 
reduced volatility, and other social indicators
Increased resilience to natural disasters, commodity 
price volatility, and economic crises
Job creation and poverty reduction 
mental quality deteriorates. But as economies 
shift from industry to services, environmental 
quality improves.
 3.  In some cases, even specialists debate the 
importance of these relationships.
 4.  Later efforts to explicitly model the envi-
ronment into an endogenous growth frame-
work include work by Smulders (1994) and 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1996); for a review, 
see Smulders (1999). 
 5.  Few studies examine the potential for sub-
stituting other inputs for natural capital 
(Markandya and Pedroso-Galinato 2007).
 6.  It may be possible to compensate for the loss 
of natural capital with other types of capital 
in the short term but not the long term. An 
example would be increasing the use of fer-
tilizer to compensate for soil degradation—
a short-term solution that is not sustainable 
over the long term.
 7.  For an illustration of this point in the context 
of South Africa, see World Bank (2011).
 8.  This argument on the impact of green policies 
on productivity is the macro-scale equivalent 
of the Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der 
Linde 1995), which states that regulation 
can enhance innovation and business per-
formance at the micro scale (for a review, see 
Ambec and others 2011).
 9.  A frequently asked question is whether pub-
lic support of green innovation should target 
green innovation or general innovation. The 
opposite question—can green innovation 
policies accelerate innovation in general?—is 
posed here.
10.  Hallegatte (2011) suggests that development 
can increase or decrease risk, depending 
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on its structure and pattern. Green growth 
strategies aim to make development risk 
decreasing, thereby increasing the resilience 
of the economic system.
11.  For instance, the GDP losses associated with 
a carbon tax differ widely depending on how 
tax revenues are used (Goulder 1995). 
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Key Messages
• Because economic incentives promote effi-
cient solutions, “getting the prices right” is 
key to greening growth without slowing it. 
Complementary policies will be needed to 
mitigate negative distributional impacts.
• Economic incentives cannot induce all of the 
changes needed to protect the environment, 
given market failures, behavioral biases, and 
political economy considerations.
• Other tools—such as information judiciously 
deployed to infl uence economic actors, and 
norms and regulations—are also needed. 
The starting point in greening growth is an understanding of why so much of traditional economic growth has 
been “non-green”—that is, why the world 
is not using environmental assets effi ciently, 
a reality that is harming economic growth 
and the environment.
For economists, achieving greener growth 
is fundamentally about changing the incen-
tives that have led to environmental deg-
radation and depletion—that is, “getting 
the prices right.” The reasons markets are 
failing to appropriately price the environ-
ment and thus create incentives to encour-
age greener growth are many (Sterner 2003). 
They include institutional and policy fail-
ures; market failures, such as externalities, 
the public-good nature of many environ-
mental goods; and missing or incomplete 
property rights (box 2.1). With a common 
pool resource like a fi shery or a shared aqui-
fer, for example, the lack of property rights 
(such as individual quotas) can lead to over-
exploitation and ultimately a collapse of the 
resource.
For psychologists, achieving greener 
growth is about compensating for behavioral 
biases, tailoring information and messages 
to the way people learn, and improving the 
way in which environmentalists and econo-
mists communicate the costs and benefi ts of 
greener behaviors. Examples include social 
marketing campaigns that changed social 
norms around water usage in Australia or 
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littering behavior in the United States. So for 
psychologists, incentives also matter but they 
must be tailored to how people process infor-
mation and react to it.
Unfortunately, inappropriate incentives, 
or the lack of incentives, led to the current 
widespread ineffi ciency in the way natural 
resources are used. This chapter exam-
ines the range of tools that can be mar-
shaled to increase effi ciency by changing 
behavior with respect to the environment 
and natural resources—tools that aim to 
increase social welfare through greener 
growth. The tools fall into the following 
areas:
• Incentivizing: providing effective market 
signals to spur green growth
• Informing and nudging: using informa-
tion and framing to infl uence economic 
actors
• Imposing: using rules and regulations.
BOX 2.1 Institutional and market failures that help explain why growth is often 
environmentally unsustainable
Growth may be environmentally unsustainable 
because of institutional and policy failure. Institu-
tions and governments may themselves face bad 
incentives, driven by political economy. Or they may 
lack information on the overall impact of the poli-
cies they promote. Subsidizing energy “to benefi t the 
poor” is a classic example—the subsidy encourages 
energy consumption, thereby increasing emissions 
of local air pollutants that often disproportionately 
affect the health of the poor. Moreover, it is gener-
ally the nonpoor who benefi t most from energy sub-
sidies, because they can afford an energy-intensive 
lifestyle.
Alternatively, market failures may be to blame. 
Under some technical assumptions, competitive mar-
kets are an effi cient means of allocating goods. But 
real markets deviate from the ideal in a multitude 
of ways that can have severe consequences for the 
environment and social welfare. Examples include 
the following:
• Externalities. These are uncompensated damages 
imposed by one economic agent on another. For 
example, a factory owner can maximize profi ts 
from production by releasing untreated effl uents 
into a river rather than incurring the costs of 
treatment. But the resulting water pollution can 
damage the health of people drinking the water 
downstream. This health damage is external to the 
profi t-maximizing decisions of the factory owner, 
with the result that the social benefi ts from pro-
duction are less than private profi ts.
• Public goods. Many environmental assets have a 
public-good nature—they provide services, such 
as amenities or the regulation of water fl ow, that 
are nonrival (one person’s enjoyment of the ame-
nity does not decrease another person’s enjoy-
ment) and nonexcludable (there is no practical 
way to prevent people from enjoying an amenity 
such as a beautiful view). The result is that public 
goods are typically underprovided by private mar-
kets, because there is no way for private actors 
to appropriate all the benefi ts from providing the 
public good.
• Information asymmetries and agency problems. If 
different agents have different information, envi-
ronmental impacts can result. Factory owners 
typically have much more information about pol-
lutants, treatment measures, and treatment costs 
than environmental regulators, which can reduce 
the effectiveness of regulation. Landlord-tenant 
relationships lead to a type of agency problem 
with regard to energy effi ciency: If the landlord 
pays the energy bills, the tenant has no incentive 
to conserve energy; if the landlord owns the fur-
nace but the tenant pays the energy bills, the land-
lord has no incentive to invest in a more effi cient 
furnace.
• Missing or incomplete property rights. For com-
mon pool resources (for example, a fi shery or a 
shared aquifer), the lack of property rights (such 
as individual quotas) can lead to overexploitation 
and ultimately the collapse of the resource. From 
an economic perspective, overexploitation mani-
fests itself as dissipation of resource rents: in the 
absence of quotas, exploitation efforts by users of 
the common pool drives up costs to the point at 
which economic profi ts drop to zero.
Source: Sterner 2003.
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Incentivizing, informing and nudging, or 
imposing—some combination of the three 
is likely to be needed. Determining the best 
mix requires a solid understanding of how 
individual decisions are made and framed. 
Behavioral economics and social psychol-
ogy thus provide indispensable insights into 
how to green growth. Economists will ignore 
them at their peril.
Incentivizing: Providing eff ective 
market signals to spur green 
growth
Economic incentives promote effi  cient 
solutions
Economic incentives—traditional price and 
quantity instruments—are critical to pro-
moting green outcomes, because they change 
behavior in a manner that typically leads to 
least-cost solutions. The intuition behind this 
approach can be seen in markets for tradable 
pollution emission rights. Because polluting 
fi rms use different technologies for produc-
tion, their pollution abatement costs differ, 
often markedly. Firms with high marginal 
abatement costs therefore tend to prefer to 
pollute more and purchase permits from 
fi rms that have low marginal abatement costs 
and fi nd it profi table to invest in less polluting 
processes and sell their pollution rights. This 
trade allows the market to minimize the over-
all cost of achieving a given pollution target.
Economists recommend a variety of 
incentive-based instruments to reduce envi-
ronmental damage and depletion—such as 
taxes, tradable permits, subsidies, deposit-
refund schemes, and refunded emission 
payments—that focus on either price or 
quantity. In the case of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), for example, the debate has centered 
on emission taxes, subsidies, and tradable 
emission permits.
Price instruments. These instruments 
aim to change behavior by ensuring that the 
prices paid for goods and services refl ect their 
full social costs, including externalities. To 
the extent that environmental taxes replace 
other distortive taxes (say, on labor), there 
can be a double dividend. Countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have imposed some 
375 environment-related taxes and about 
250 environment-related fees and charges 
(OECD 2006). However, about 90 percent of 
revenues from these taxes comes from taxes 
on fuels and cars (OECD 2011). The major-
ity of OECD countries also tax water usage 
in agriculture. Although they appear to have 
improved water effi ciency, these price instru-
ments still fall short of full cost recovery 
(OECD 2010, cited in OECD 2011).
In addition to refl ecting social and envi-
ronmental costs in prices through taxes, 
“full-cost pricing” implies the phasing out of 
harmful subsidies, such as subsidies on fos-
sil fuels, fi sheries, forestry, water use, land 
use, and agriculture. These subsidies not only 
encourage carbon emissions, resource deple-
tion, and environmental degradation, they 
also distort trade and strain public fi nance. 
Reforming them should be a high priority, 
although it may not be easy.
Quantity instruments. Unlike pollution 
taxes and subsidy reforms, which affect 
existing markets, quantity instruments (such 
as tradable permit schemes) create new mar-
kets for pollution allowances by affecting the 
costs of production. Once these new mar-
kets reach equilibrium and the permit price 
is determined, the cost of acquiring pollution 
permits affects the costs of production in a 
manner equivalent to a pollution tax. Trad-
able permits or quotas have also shown good 
results in managing renewable environmental 
assets, notably fi sheries.
“Cap and trade” schemes for pollu-
tion emissions have become the dominant 
market-based approach to controlling oxides 
of sulfur (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) in 
the United States, in the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme for CO2, and in 
many other jurisdictions. The basic prin-
ciple is that regulators determine the total 
allowable emissions per year (the cap) and 
allocate permits to polluters based on a vari-
ety of schemes (including “grandfathering” 
based on historical emissions or auctioning 
of all permits); fi rms are then free to trade 
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permits. The evidence on the effi ciency of the 
U.S. SOx trading scheme is positive: markets 
have been liquid and permit prices (hence, 
total cost to firms) have been lower than 
originally estimated (Fullerton and others 
1997). Moreover, international experience 
with CO2 emission trading schemes suggests 
that they can be used to assign a price to pol-
luting emissions from large sources, although 
implementation can be diffi cult (box 2.2).
Price versus quantity instruments. 
Although price schemes and cap and trade 
schemes are theoretically equivalent instru-
ments, they have distinctive characteristics 
in practice (World Bank 2010). For example, 
permit systems create certainty regarding 
emission reductions but uncertainty about 
price; taxes provide certainty regarding price 
but uncertainly about emission reductions. 
They also differ regarding economic and 
administrative effi ciency and their ability to 
generate revenues (theoretically both do, but 
in practice countries have tended to allocate 
permits free of charge). As such, many juris-
dictions, particularly in Europe, have opted 
for hybrid schemes to control carbon emis-
sions: tradable permits for large emitting 
sectors and taxes for smaller sectors charac-
terized by many actors, such as transport.
But imperfect markets and political 
economy complicate matters
Although in theory, economic incentive–
based instruments are the most effective, in 
practice, market imperfections and politi-
cal economy mean that additional measures 
may be needed to make these instruments 
more efficient. One well-known case con-
cerns innovation and long-lived investments, 
for which prices are not always effi cient (see 
chapter 3). But there are other circumstances 
BOX 2.2 Lessons from CO2 emission trading schemes
A review of existing and proposed carbon trading 
schemes in Alberta, Australia; the European Union 
(EU); New Zealand; Switzerland; Tokyo; and the 
United States (both national and state-level schemes) 
shows that these schemes are complex to implement 
but can be used to create a price of carbon for large 
emitters. To implement them effectively, policy mak-
ers should keep in mind the following dos and don’ts:
• Targets. Ambitious long-run targets are needed 
if firms are to invest in reducing their carbon 
footprints.
• Allocation. Free allocation of permits to produc-
ers in the electricity generation sector should be 
avoided, because it leads to windfall profi ts at the 
expense of consumers (electric utilities are typi-
cally free to pass costs along to consumers). Free 
allocation to new entrants should also be avoided, 
because it risks locking in high-carbon footprints 
(by, in effect, subsidizing a new source of emis-
sions). The EU Emission Trading Scheme is reduc-
ing the free allocation of permits.
• Start-up. Trading schemes have tended to overallo-
cate permits in the initial phase, leading to a price 
collapse. Allowing permits to be banked—that is, 
allowing permits from one period to be used in 
subsequent periods—can overcome this problem, 
but this solution simply carries forward the surplus 
permits into the next phase. Other options include 
establishing a price fl oor, with cancellation of any 
unsold permits, or initially using a fi xed price to 
aid the collection of data on emissions and abate-
ment costs that can then be used to determine the 
subsequent allocation.
• Offsets or links to other trading zones. Trading 
outside the permit scheme can help reduce permit 
prices, but doing so runs counter to policy goals 
to reduce domestic emissions and provide incen-
tives for innovation in achieving this reduction.
• Support to carbon-intensive sectors. Concerns 
about the competitive impacts on carbon-intensive 
sectors will lead to lobbying for fi nancial support 
to these sectors. Any support should be time lim-
ited, and communicated as such, to reduce fi scal 
costs and provide incentives for fi rms to invest in 
less polluting technologies.
Source: IEA 2010.
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in which narrow reliance on incentive-based 
instruments is misplaced. These include 
cases when:
Feasible alternatives are lacking. For pric-
ing mechanisms to be successful in address-
ing environmental issues, feasible alternatives 
must be readily available or easily brought 
to market. One example is high fuel prices, 
which will be more effective at reducing indi-
vidual car use if public transport is available 
or cities have been designed in such a way 
that walking or cycling are options. Another 
example is the emissions pricing scheme of 
the U.S. acid rain program, which success-
fully reduced SO2 because the required tech-
nologies were available and well understood 
(Zysman and Huberty 2010). In this case, 
prices were a powerful incentive for adopting 
existing alternative technologies.
Market imperfections exist. Prices may 
be ineffective incentives because of market 
imperfections or imperfect contracts. For 
example, contracts may need to be designed 
in a particular way to address the principal-
agent problem (the difficulty of motivat-
ing one party [the agent] to act on behalf of 
another [the principal]). An example is when 
building owners are responsible for insulation 
and heating systems but tenants pay energy 
bills; if owners cannot transfer the cost of 
higher energy effi ciency through higher rents, 
they will under-invest in energy efficiency 
regardless of energy prices.
Another example is fl ood insurance if it is 
not “risk-based”—that is, if the premium is 
not calculated as a function of the risk level, 
which is itself based on the characteristics 
and location of the asset. Insurance that is not 
risk-based creates a moral hazard problem, as 
it reduces incentives to invest in prevention. 
Households or businesses investing in risk 
mitigation improvements (such as a rein-
forced roof or windows) are not rewarded 
fully for their investments. Moving toward 
a “risk-based” premium would encourage 
prudent behavior. However, this approach is 
diffi cult to implement with one-year insur-
ance contracts, because investing in risk 
mitigation produces benefi ts over decades—
meaning that a homeowner who sells his 
or her house may not be able to recoup the 
benefi ts from the investment. In this case, 
attaching a long-term insurance contract to 
the property rather than the owner could 
help create the right incentives (Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan 2012).
Prices are difficult to change. The fact 
that so much pricing is currently ineffi cient 
suggests complex political economy consid-
erations. Whether it takes the form of pref-
erential access to land and credit or access 
to cheap energy and resources, every subsidy 
creates its own lobby. Large enterprises (both 
state owned and private) have political power 
and lobbying capacity. Energy-intensive 
export industries, for example, will lobby for 
subsidies to maintain their competitiveness. 
In emerging economies, industries that are 
likely to be most affected by climate change 
policies are export-based industries, which 
are also the most infl uential and most able to 
oppose environmental policies (Mattoo and 
others 2011; Victor 2011). Thus, governments 
need to focus on the wider social benefi ts of 
reforms and need to be willing to stand up to 
lobby groups (box 2.3).
In considering pricing reforms or the 
introduction of new taxes, policy makers 
need to consider social impacts. Increasing 
energy prices, for example, has far-reaching 
impacts, because energy is used pervasively in 
production and in households. And although 
energy subsidies almost invariably benefi t the 
rich much more than the poor, their removal 
can have devastating impacts on the purchas-
ing power of the poor (Arze del Granado 
and others 2010).1
To prevent this from happening, policy 
makers need to adopt complementary poli-
cies, such as the use of existing safety nets 
(where available), alternative short-term miti-
gation measures and subsidies, and energy-
pricing solutions. In middle- and high-income 
countries, social safety nets can be used for 
compensation. In low-income countries, 
where safety nets are often lacking, ad hoc 
measures are frequently necessary. Informa-
tion to target support is often not available, 
especially in urban areas, where geographic 
targeting is very ineffi cient (Kanbur 2010).
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Moreover, the political economy of 
reform will likely require compensatory 
transfers to the middle class. In the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, for example, where the 
law that reformed fuel and food subsidies 
stipulated that 50 percent of the revenues 
raised had to be redistributed to households, 
the initial thought was to target the bot-
tom 30–50 percent of the income scale. In 
the end, 80 percent of households received 
signifi cant transfers (Guillaume and others 
2011)—no doubt contributing to the success 
of the reform.
In the end, the redistributive impacts of a 
carbon price scheme depend on how revenues 
from the scheme are used. Compensatory 
measures can offset unwanted distributional 
effects. However, such schemes require the 
institutional capacity to manage the classical 
challenges of redistributive policies: political 
acceptability, imperfect information and tar-
geting, and behavioral issues.
To be eff ective, incentives must 
refl ect behaviors
Designing effective environmental poli-
cies requires a good understanding of 
how behaviors are determined and how 
they can be infl uenced.2 The hypothesis of 
rational  behavior—under which price-based 
instruments are optimal—is only a rough 
approximation of how people actually make 
decisions. In practice, individuals make deci-
sions in a variety of ways: “by the head” 
(based on calculation), “by the heart” (based 
on emotion), and “by the book” (based on 
rules) (Weber and Lindemann 2007). Alterna-
tive or complementary policies and measures 
are therefore needed to address behavioral 
biases or changes in values and preferences.
Four types of behavioral biases are 
particularly important. First, “cognitive 
myopia” prevents people from accurately 
balancing future benefits and immediate 
costs and from assessing the desirabil-
ity of reductions in immediate benefi ts in 
exchange for future gains (Ainslie 1975; 
Benartzi and Thaler 2004).
Second, individuals are inconsistent in 
their treatment of time (Ainslie 1975): they 
apply high discount rates to costs and ben-
efits that will occur at some point in the 
future, discounting much less when both 
time points are in the future and one occurs 
later than the other, in a kind of “hyperbolic 
discounting.” These biases explain why it 
is diffi cult to implement policies that entail 
immediate costs but future benefi ts even if 
the result is a net (discounted) gain. A classic 
example is the failure of consumers to buy 
more energy-effi cient appliances even when 
BOX 2.3 The political economy of subsidy reform
What lessons have been learned about subsidy 
reform? An analysis of the political economy of sub-
sidy reform—which looks at the few attempts that 
have been successful—suggests the need for careful 
analysis of the likely social impact of the reform and 
implementation of a program of appropriate support 
for those affected (Nikoloski 2012). Other elements 
of success include political will and institutional 
capacity, as well as an effective communications and 
outreach strategy that explains the justifi cation for 
the reform and the benefi ts to be derived from it. 
As for the timing and pace of the reform, there is 
no clear lesson as to whether “big bang” or gradual 
approaches are more successful.
Another study, which focuses on petroleum prod-
uct subsidies, confi rms the importance of addressing 
the political logic that led to subsidy creation and 
either compensating the political interest that would 
otherwise oppose reform or fi nding a way to insulate 
the reform from its opposition—advice that applies 
to any subsidy reform (Victor 2009). In addition, it 
is critical to ensure the transparency of the costs and 
purpose of the subsidy. Reforming a subsidy may be 
easier if all members of society are fully aware of the 
costs they are paying and the extent to which they or 
others are benefi ting.
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future energy savings would more than com-
pensate for higher up-front purchase costs 
(Gillingham and others 2009).
Third, individuals suffer from “loss 
aversion”—that is, they weigh losses more 
than gains, evaluating both relative to a ref-
erence point (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
If individuals use the current situation as the 
reference point, they will consider the cost of 
environmental policy as a loss and weigh it 
more heavily than the gain (averted environ-
mental damages). If the reference point is the 
future, when the loss is the environmental 
destruction, they will weigh it more heavily 
than the gain (the averted cost of environ-
mental policies). Weber and Johnson (2012, 
16–17) make the following observation about 
farmers:
Skillful insurance salespeople have long known 
that they need to move a farmer’s reference 
point, away from its usual position at the status 
quo, down to the level of the possible large loss 
that could be incurred in case of drought. By 
focusing the insuree’s attention on the severity of 
the possible loss and resulting consequences, all 
smaller losses (including the insurance premium) 
are to the right of this new reference point, mak-
ing this a decision in the domain of (forgone) 
gains, where people are known to be risk averse 
and will choose the sure option of buying the 
insurance.
Fourth, individuals have an aversion to 
ambiguity, which causes them to delay mak-
ing decisions (Tversky and Shafir 1992).3 
Aversion to ambiguity is particularly prob-
lematic for environmental issues, such as cli-
mate change, that involve huge uncertainties: 
while it disappears if decision makers regard 
themselves as expert in a domain (Heath and 
Tversky 1991), few people consider them-
selves experts in environmental policy.
Different behavioral changes can be 
triggered by different learning processes—
such as learning by being hurt, being told, 
and observing and imitating (Weber and 
Johnson 2012).
Learning by being hurt. Learning by 
being hurt refers to learning from personal 
experience. Because recent events have a 
strong impact, which recedes over time 
(Hertwig and others 2004), reactions to 
low-probability, high-severity events often 
appear erratic. In particular, people usu-
ally overreact when a rare event eventu-
ally occurs (Weber and others 2004). For 
instance, extremely ambitious fl ood defense 
projects were designed after each big fl ood 
in New Orleans, but none has been com-
pleted so far, as public interest in the issue 
faded a few years after each event. This 
tendency to overreact to recent events and 
then forget needs to be taken into account 
in developing green growth strategies, espe-
cially for disaster risk management (Halle-
gatte 2011).
Learning by being told. Learning by 
being told involves the absorption of objec-
tive information. For instance, hydrometeor-
ological data can be collected and analyzed 
to generate quantifi ed risk assessments that 
help individuals make informed choices. But 
providing information will not be enough 
to induce appropriate risk management or 
environment-friendly behavior, because 
people treat abstract information on dis-
tant events differently from concrete, emo-
tionally charged information linked with 
real-world experience (Trope and Liberman 
2003). So what is needed is a combination 
of communication tools that accounts for 
this bias and practical information on what 
needs to be done—for instance, rules to 
save energy or water or how to react in case 
of disasters.
Learning by observing and imitating. 
Learning by observing and imitating has 
the concreteness that “being told” does not 
have, making action more likely. One way of 
encouraging learning by observing and imi-
tating is to help individuals compare their 
behaviors with more environment-friendly 
ones and to provide them with feedback on 
their consumption and with tips on how to 
change their behaviors. In one experiment, 
an Internet-based tool that combined feed-
back on past consumption, energy saving 
tips, and goal setting was used to encour-
age households to reduce their energy con-
sumption. Households with access to the 
tool reduced their direct energy consump-
tion by 5 percent; household without access 
to the tool increased their consumption by 
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0.7 percent (Abrahamse and others 2007). 
Indicators are thus critical—even when they 
are imperfect—because they allow individu-
als to monitor their effort.
All of these biases vary with culture 
and education (Weber and Hsee 1998). For 
instance, individuals with greater ability 
to reason with numbers are more likely to 
rely on calculation-based processes to make 
their decisions (Peters and others 2006). 
This diversity means that policy makers may 
need to align their approaches with the cog-
nitive biases present in a given country or 
population.4
Informing and nudging: Using 
information and framing to 
infl uence economic actors
Many motives other than price signals drive 
individuals’ behavior. It is therefore critical 
that information on the environmental con-
sequences of their actions go beyond price. 
Information needs to be framed in a man-
ner that accounts for behavioral biases and 
the ways in which people learn and make 
decisions. Governments have a role to play 
to ensure that the required information is 
produced and disseminated effectively. For-
tunately, they can rely on the experience 
gained from decades of public health cam-
paigns. However, a vibrant civil society will 
be essential to ensure that action follows 
information.
Informing to infl uence policy makers: 
The role of green accounting
Environmental assets are seldom traded 
through markets and thus do not have readily 
identifi able prices. In such cases, development 
decisions (such as building a road through a 
rainforest) are often made with incomplete 
information. As a result, they may not maxi-
mize social benefi ts. Given that the outputs 
of environmental projects generally do have 
a readily identifi ed economic value—a road 
may increase the access of farmers to markets 
and thus increase food production—it is vital 
that economic values for environmental assets 
be comparable to other economic values.
Environmental valuation can help in a 
number of ways:
• It estimates people’s willingness to pay 
for environmental goods and services or 
willingness to accept compensation for 
the loss of an environmental asset (Bolt 
and others 2005; Ley and Tran 2011).
• It assesses the value of the services pro-
vided by natural ecosystems. Because 
ecosystem services are typically provided 
as externalities—for example, an upland 
forest provides water regulation services 
to lowland farmers—the natural systems 
providing these services may be at risk 
when decisions are made that ignore the 
fl ow of services from natural areas and 
their benefi ts to people.
• It establishes the schedule of marginal 
benefits associated with the provision 
of different quantities of environmental 
goods and services—such as changes in 
the volume of pollution emitted. This 
information is useful when setting tax 
rates on environmental “bads” or when 
determining total quota sizes, such as 
the number of pollution emission permits 
that will be issued in a given time period.
• It facilitates “green accounting” (box 2.4), 
which focuses on a country’s stock of 
assets (its wealth) rather than relying on 
a fl ow measure such as GDP. As such, it 
promotes good economic management, 
identifies situations in which economic 
growth is not wealth creating (because 
the growth degrades natural resources 
faster than it creates wealth), and assesses 
whether a country’s economic trajectory 
is sustainable. However, green accounting 
and environmental valuation are not sub-
stitutes for price signals, because they do 
not affect incentives faced by individuals 
and fi rms.
Informing and nudging to infl uence 
individuals: Tackling behavioral biases
Good design and careful interventions can 
help align individual preferences with social 
goals and address behavioral biases.
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BOX 2.4 What is “green accounting”?
All accounts serve two purposes: a scorekeeping 
purpose, providing indicators on how well you 
are doing, and a management purpose, providing 
detailed statistics so that anybody who does not like 
the “score” has the information to understand and 
do something about it.
In standard national accounting, GDP is meas-
ured as the market value of all goods and services 
produced by a country within a specified time 
period. Changes in GDP indicate whether the econ-
omy is growing, but not whether this growth is sus-
tainable. In particular, the use or misuse of natural 
capital is not taken into account.
Green accounting extends national accounts to 
include the value of the damage and depletion of the 
natural assets that underpin production and human 
well-being. In particular, net saving, adjusted for 
the depreciation of produced assets and the deple-
tion and degradation of the environment, indicates 
whether well-being can be sustained into the future. 
Negative net saving indicates that it cannot, because 
the assets that support well-being are being depleted 
(Asheim and Weitzman 2001; Dasgupta and Mäler 
2000; Hamilton and Clemens 1999).
At the regional level, East Asia and South Asia 
have exhibited strong wealth creation over more than 
a decade. In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
the depletion of oil and minerals has been offsetting 
savings by the public and private sectors, displays a 
worrisome trend (fi gure B2.4.1). At the country level, 
China’s near 10 percent annual GDP growth is being 
partly offset by environmental depletion and deg-
radation, reducing its adjusted net national income 
growth to an estimated 5.5 percent (World Bank and 
DRC 2012).
With green accounting, the scorekeeping indica-
tors (such as wealth accounts) can be used alongside 
GDP to better assess how well a country is doing 
for the long term. It also provides detailed accounts 
for management of natural capital, which many 
countries have adopted over the past 20 years—
especially for water, energy, and pollution. However, 
few countries have adopted the revised macroeco-
nomic indicators.
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Avoiding fear mongering. Given cogni-
tive myopia and people’s tendency to weigh 
emotion-filled consequences more heavily 
than abstract consequences, policy makers 
may be tempted to scare people into adopt-
ing environment-friendly behavior. Using 
“catastrophism” to make people change 
their behavior is ineffective, however, for two 
reasons. First, fear is only briefl y effective. 
Once people get used to the problem, they 
revert back to their initial behavior (Weber 
1997). For example, farmers informed about 
weather risks have a tendency to implement 
one mitigating measure (such as buying 
insurance), after which they consider their 
vulnerability problem solved, without con-
sidering how additional action may help.
Second, people have only a limited abil-
ity to worry; an increase in worry about one 
hazard decreases worry about other hazards 
(Weber 1997, 2006). This means that a pol-
icy based on fear leads to competition among 
hazards, and success in one area (for exam-
ple, climate change) comes at the cost of fail-
ure in others (for example, water pollution).
Greening default options. An important 
behavioral bias that environmental policy 
makers can use to their advantage is the 
tendency of people to stick with the default 
option (box 2.5). In European countries, 
where organ donation is the default option, 
more than 85 percent of people are organ 
donors. In contrast, in neighboring countries 
where people must designate themselves as 
organ donors, less than 30 percent of peo-
ple do so (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). In 
the United States, automatically enrolling 
employees in saving programs and requiring 
them to opt out if they preferred not to par-
ticipate increased participation from 37 per-
cent (under the opt-in design) to 86 percent 
(Madrian and Shea 2001).
Using nudging. In recent years, behavioral 
economists and the behavior change com-
munity overall have stepped up their interest 
in the potential role of nudges to infl uence 
behaviors. This approach advocates tweak-
ing “choice architectures” to nudge people 
to make better decisions about their health, 
the environment, or other desirable outcomes 
without restricting their freedom of choice 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2009). To count as a 
nudge, the intervention must be easy, inex-
pensive, and voluntary. Nudges are increas-
ingly being used to stimulate green behaviors; 
studies show promising results. For example, 
an electrical outlet (designed by Muhyeon 
Kim) that displays how much power it is 
using makes people more conscious of their 
energy use (fi gure 2.1). The Danish Nudging 
BOX 2.4 (continued)
A new partnership—Wealth Accounting and 
Valuing Ecosystem Services (WAVES)—is expanding 
efforts to account for ecological services. Botswana, 
a WAVES partner country, has defined one of its 
overarching objectives as to continue to grow while 
diversifying away from diamonds (which currently 
account for about 35 percent of national income) 
and eradicating poverty. Several natural resource–
based sectors are being tapped to play a lead role 
in this development strategy, including nature-based 
tourism, mining (especially coal for export), and 
irrigated agriculture.
Water plays a critical role in Botswana’s develop-
ment, given its scarcity; the increasing reliance 
on shared, international water resources; and the 
water-intensive nature of sectors identified for 
economic growth and diversifi cation. A key compo-
nent of WAVES in Botswana will be the establish-
ment of water accounts—physical supply and use 
accounts as well as monetary accounts (for supply 
costs, tariffs paid, and the value of water in dif-
ferent uses). Water accounts will enable Botswana 
to answer the following questions: Is there enough 
water in the right places to support the diversi-
fication strategy? What are the economic trade-
offs among competing users? How can incentives 
for water effi ciency be created? In the wake of the 
recent privatization of water under full cost recov-
ery management, what will happen to poor house-
holds’ access to water resources? The answers to 
these questions are critical for helping policy makers 
chart the best path forward.
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Network even hosts a Web site, iNudgeYou.
com, dedicated to sharing applications and 
study fi ndings.
Framing decisions judiciously. The way 
economic actors react to policies depends 
on many factors, including how the policy is 
presented, or framed. Firms know this well, 
which is why they rely on marketing tools 
and branding in addition to price signals. By 
priming or framing personal behavior as part 
of a larger social goal, the public and private 
sectors can induce people to behave in more 
environment-friendly ways, particularly when 
they act as groups, as group decisions have 
been found to be made with less selfi shness 
than individual decisions (Milch and others 
2007). By framing environmental protec-
tion as a “social project,” policy makers can 
make individuals think in terms of social and 
collective goals. For example, surveys show 
that many passengers are willing to pay more 
for fl ights to account for the environmental 
damage that flying causes. However, their 
willingness to do so depends partly on what 
the surcharge is called: simply relabeling a 
carbon “tax” as a carbon “offset” increases 
its acceptability (Hardisty and others 2010).
In addition, people are more likely to 
accept increases in energy prices if they per-
ceive them as needed to reach an ambitious 
Source: Webster 2012.
Note: Designer Muhyeon Kim has designed a switch that displays how much power it is using. Research has found that people are more conscious of their 
energy use when they can see it in action.
FIGURE 2.1 Energy-reporting electrical outlet
BOX 2.5 Changing the default option to spur the use of renewable energy
To spur, rather than coerce, the purchase of renew-
able energy, policy makers could rewrite the default 
electricity purchase contract to include a minimum 
share of electricity produced from renewable sources. 
Consumers would have to opt out to purchase their 
electricity without this constraint, at a lower cost.
A study of the impact of such “green default” 
in electricity provision provides support for this 
approach (Picherta and Katsikopoulos 2008). It 
looked at two cases in which electricity providers 
offered green options with more renewable energy 
and a higher price as the default option. In both 
cases, fewer than 5 percent of customers decided to 
shift to less expensive, less green options.
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and positive social goal than if they perceive 
them as top-down government decisions to 
reduce oil imports or protect the climate. 
Germany presented its decision to gradu-
ally replace its nuclear plants with renewable 
energy sources as a collective national project 
that positions it as a leader in the transition 
toward a greener economy. This framing 
makes it more likely that the public will accept 
the resulting increases in the price of electric-
ity. It also reduces the risk that the decision 
will be reversed by the next government. 
The certainty afforded by the decrease in the 
chance of policy reversal increases incentives 
for long-term investments in research and 
development and new technology.
It may be more effi cient to change the val-
ues related to the emotional part of decisions 
than to count on prices and other policies 
to counteract emotion-based decisions. For 
instance, many consumers prefer big and inef-
fi cient cars for status-related reasons. As long 
as such cars provide status, raising their price 
may not reduce consumers’ desire to own 
them. For this reason, price mechanisms may 
be less effective than efforts to make green 
and effi cient cars a status symbol (Griskevicius 
and Tybur 2010). Ideally, price mechanisms 
and behavioral changes can reinforce each 
other, as recent trends in French car purchases 
show (box 2.6).
It may also be more effi cient to infl uence 
consumer behavior through advertising than 
through price—witness the hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars firms spend every year to 
advertise consumer products (Bertrand and 
others 2009). What is true for commercial 
consumption choices is likely to be true for 
environmental behaviors.
Informing and nudging to infl uence 
fi rms: Enabling public pressure and 
focusing managers’ attention
Information allows citizens or governments to 
put pressure on businesses—the goal of pro-
grams that collect and disseminate informa-
tion about fi rms’ environmental performance. 
This approach has been deemed the “third 
wave” in environmental regulation, after 
command-and-control and market-based 
approaches (Tietenberg 1998). Studies show 
that it is making signifi cant inroads in terms 
of environmental benefi ts.
One type of disclosure program relies on 
emissions data without using them to rate or 
otherwise characterize environmental per-
formance. Regulations requiring U.S. elec-
tric utilities to mail bill inserts to consumers 
reporting the extent of their reliance on fos-
sil fuels led to a signifi cant decrease in fossil 
fuel use (Delmas and others 2007). Another 
type of scheme involves reporting regulatory 
violations. A policy of publicly disclosing the 
identity of plants that are noncompliant or 
“of concern” spurred emissions reductions in 
a sample of pulp and paper plants in British 
Columbia (Foulon and others 2002).
Performance evaluation and ratings pro-
grams (PERPs) report emissions data and use 
them to rate plants’ environmental perform-
ance. Examples include China’s GreenWatch 
program; India’s Green Rating Project (GRP); 
Indonesia’s Program for Pollution Con-
trol, Evaluation, and Rating (PROPER); the 
Phil ippines’ EcoWatch program; and 
Vietnam’s Black and Green Books initiative 
(box 2.7). These programs—which require 
no enforcement capacity or even a well-
defined set of environmental regulations 
but do require an active civil society, local 
activism, or both—are particularly helpful 
in developing countries, where weak formal 
institutions make traditional enforcement of 
environmental regulations diffi cult. Thanks 
to advances in information technology, the 
administrative cost of such programs (mainly 
data collection and dissemination) is falling 
(Dasgupta and others 2007).
Public disclosure can improve environ-
mental performance through a variety of 
channels. It can have the following effects 
(Powers and others 2011):
• Affect demand for fi rms’ products (out-
put market pressure).
• Affect demand for publicly traded com-
panies’ shares and the ability of such 
companies to hire and retain employees 
(input market pressure).
• Encourage private citizens to sue pollut-
ers (judicial pressure).
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BOX 2.6 Modifying car buyer behavior in France
From 2003 to 2009, the average emissions of new 
cars in France decreased, dropping precipitously in 
2008 when the government introduced a “feebate” 
that increased the price of high-energy and reduced 
the price of low-energy-consuming cars (figure 
B2.6.1). The average willingness to pay for a reduc-
tion of 10 grams of CO2 per kilometer increased by 
€536 during the period. This shift in preferences 
accounts for 20 percent of the overall decrease in 
average CO2 emissions of new cars—of which 34 per-
cent is related to the type of cars on the market and 
46 percent to price effects (gasoline prices and the 
feebate). The biggest preference changes occurred 
among young people and rich people.
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FIGURE B2.6.1 A sudden shift to greener cars 
(average CO2 emission of new cars in France, 2003–09)
BOX 2.7 How are PERPs faring in developing countries?
Performance evaluation and ratings programs 
(PERPs)—which are increasingly being used 
throughout the world—appear to generate environ-
mental benefi ts. Indonesia’s Program for Pollution 
Control, Evaluation, and Rating (PROPER) spurred 
signifi cant emissions reductions in wastewater dis-
charges (García and others 2007, 2009). A qualita-
tive evaluation of PERPs in China, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam found that in all pro-
grams examined a large number of plants initially 
rated “noncompliant” rose to “compliant” over 
time (in contrast, plants rated “fl agrant violators” 
and “compliant” tended to remain in these catego-
ries) (Dasgupta and others 2007). This evidence is 
consistent with the findings of other studies that 
concluded that performance ratings led to improve-
ments among plants with moderately poor perfor-
mance records but not among plants with either 
very bad or good records (García and others 2007; 
Powers and others 2011).
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• Build support for new pollution control 
legislation or more stringent enforce-
ment of existing legislation (regulatory 
pressure).
• Enhance pressure from community 
groups and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (community pressure).
• Provide new information to manag-
ers about their plants’ discharges and 
options for reducing them (manage-
rial information) (Blackman and others 
2004; Tietenberg 1998).
The impact of information disclosure goes 
beyond its effect on environmentally conscious 
consumers. Even when environmental con-
cerns are low and consumers are unlikely or 
unable to change their consumption patterns, 
disclosure can create an incentive for busi-
nesses to reduce their environmental impacts.
Imposing: Using rules and 
regulations
Price-based instruments such as taxes and 
polluting permits are generally considered 
preferable to norms and standards, under 
the simplifying assumptions of economic 
modeling (competitive industry, no enforce-
ment cost, and so forth) (Baumol and Oates 
1988; Morgenstern and others 1999). This 
may not be the case when additional com-
plexities are considered (Helfl and 1999).
When enforcement costs and political 
economy constraints (such as reaction against 
increases in fuel prices) are factored in, 
standards-based solutions may be more effi -
cient than incentive-based solutions in some 
contexts. Moreover, introducing a new stand-
ard may prove easier, especially in sectors 
that are already regulated, than increasing 
(or introducing) prices. In such cases, existing 
institutions can be relied upon to enforce new 
norms, and complex policy making may not 
be necessary.
That said, the enforcement costs of norms 
and standards should not be underestimated. 
Enforcement of a norm on emissions or a 
trading scheme requires the establishment of 
emission measurement and reporting systems, 
which are costly to create and operate.
Norms and regulations can also have 
negative side effects, by favoring incumbent 
fi rms at the expense of new entrants, thereby 
reducing the ability of the economy to inno-
vate and grow (Copeland 2012). To avoid 
such a risk, policy makers must design envi-
ronmental regulation in a way that does not 
create additional barriers to entry into mar-
kets, especially for small firms, which are 
often innovative and create the most jobs.
Policy makers must also avoid the risk of 
a rebound effect. Promoting water conserva-
tion technologies may increase the acreage 
of crops requiring irrigation, resulting in an 
increase in total water consumption (Pfeiffer 
and Lin 2010). Improving the fuel effi ciency 
of automobiles, by making it cheaper to drive, 
leads to an increase in car use, reducing by 
30 percent any energy gain reaped by 
improved technology (Sorrel and others 2009) 
(box 2.8).
BOX 2.8 What is the best way to promote vehicle fuel economy?
Are incentive-based measures or norms and regula-
tions more effective in increasing individual car fuel 
economy? Proponents of incentives argue that higher 
fuel prices are more effi cient than stricter fuel effi -
ciency standards. The latter, they contend, increase 
the costs of new vehicles, causing car owners (includ-
ing organizations with fl eets) to wait longer to replace 
their cars. The result is that fuel consumption remains 
the same rather than decreasing as owners continue 
to drive aging, and therefore less fuel-effi cient, cars. 
In addition, when car owners do purchase more fuel-
effi cient cars with unchanged fuel price, their ability 
to drive more for the same price can result in rebound 
effects, thus reducing energy savings and leading to 
increased traffi c congestion. In contrast, fuel taxes 
cause car owners to drive less, thereby not only 
decreasing local pollution but also reducing traffi c 
congestion and accidents. In addition, by increasing 
(continued next page)
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Figure B2.8.1 Fuel effi  ciency standards are key to reducing emissions from the transport sector
(historical fl eet CO2 emissions and current or proposed standards, 2000–25)
BOX 2.8 (continued)
tax revenues, fuel taxes can potentially allow other, 
more distorting taxes to be reduced without affecting 
the budget.
Proponents of fuel effi ciency standards argue that 
consumers may not appropriately value fuel economy 
when buying a car (Greene 2010). If consumers under-
value fuel economy, fuel efficiency standards will 
improve welfare. They also argue that opposition to 
fuel taxes makes their imposition diffi cult politically.
The debate over which approach is better ulti-
mately depends on the mitigation burden that should 
be borne by the automobile sector—that is, pick-
ing an appropriate carbon price as the basis for fuel 
taxes. The problem is that there is no consensus as 
to what could constitute an “appropriate” carbon 
price. Moreover, the carbon prices that have been 
implemented in the industrial sector (for example, 
the European Union’s Emission Trading System) are 
not high enough to trigger manufacturer’s invest-
ments in the technologies needed to dramatically 
reduce emissions (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2011).
In such a situation, fuel effi ciency standards, like 
the ones implemented in Australia, Canada, China, the 
European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and 
the United States (An and others 2007), are a reason-
able second-best solution, particularly when they are 
announced early enough to let manufacturers adapt 
their investments plans accordingly (figure B2.8.1). 
Standards are best applied in combination with price 
increases to minimize the risk of rebound.
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The efficiency of market-based instru-
ments is compromised by the existence of 
market failures that cannot be fi xed. Emis-
sion intensity standards, for example—which 
are widely considered to be less effective than 
emission taxes—can be preferable in sectors 
where production has positive external con-
sequences (for example, knowledge creation, 
transportation), because they generally have 
less of an impact on output. Emission inten-
sity standards can also improve social wel-
fare relative to emission taxes in the presence 
of market power (Holland 2009). The idea 
that a unique carbon price in the economy 
is the optimal policy has been challenged in 
situations in which future carbon prices are 
unpredictable (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 
2011); technologies exhibit lock-ins, making 
it diffi cult to disseminate new technological 
options (Kalkuhl and others 2011); or labor 
markets or revenue-raising taxes are distor-
tionary (Richter and Schneider 2003).
Norms and standards are usually costly 
in economic terms. They should not be 
implemented without a detailed analysis of 
their costs and benefi ts—but predicting and 
measuring the economic cost of regulations 
and norms is diffi cult. For instance, a pol-
lution regulation can increase production 
costs for industries and lead to reduced out-
put and employment, but it can also favor 
more labor-intensive technologies and create 
jobs. A study of pulp and paper mills, plas-
tic manufacturers, petroleum refiners, and 
iron and steel mills in the United States fi nds 
that the impact of regulation on employment 
is industry specific and the overall impact 
insignifi cant (Morgenstern and others 2002). 
When they target local public goods, regula-
tions can even lead to net economic gains—
by reducing health impacts from pollution, 
decreasing health costs, and increasing labor 
productivity, for instance.
In an analysis of U.S. environmental regu-
lations, Morgenstern and others (1999) fi nd 
that ex ante estimates of total (direct) costs 
tend to exceed actual costs, suggesting that 
environmental regulations may be less costly 
than usually predicted. The overestimation of 
total costs arises not from an overestimation 
of per unit abatement costs (how much it costs 
to reduce pollution by one unit) but from 
errors in the quantity of emission reductions 
achieved (how much pollution is reduced by a 
given regulation). This fi nding suggests that 
if regulation costs are often overestimated, so 
may their benefi ts.
In sum, rules and regulations are generally 
considered second-best solutions in situations 
with perfect markets (markets with perfect 
information and competitive industries). In 
the real world, where settings are imperfect, 
they can be a useful complement to price-
based incentives. In the next chapter we look 
at the need to navigate between market and 
governance failures through the careful use 
of innovation and industrial policies.
Notes
 1.  In a review of energy subsidies across more 
than 30 countries, Arze del Granado and 
others (2010) estimate that it costs $33 to 
transfer $1 to poor households through a 
gasoline subsidy. The fi gure is high because 
the vast majority of gasoline is consumed by 
higher-income households. 
 2.  Weber and Johnson (2012) provide a compre-
hensive review of this issue in a background 
paper for this report.
 3.  The Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961) shows 
that when faced with a choice between risk 
(which is represented by known probabili-
ties) and uncertainty (in which probabilities 
are not available) decision makers display a 
preference for risk. This tendency is known 
as ambiguity aversion.
 4.  This is a different issue from cultural dif-
ferences, which may make certain policies 
unacceptable (rather than ineffective) in 
particular countries. For example, London 
successfully adopted congestion charges, 
whereas such schemes are considered exclu-
sionary in France, which explains why they 
have not been applied in Paris to date.
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3Green Innovation and Industrial Policies
Brazil has supported the development of a biofuel industrial sector for decades. China is subsidizing research 
and development (R&D) and industrial pro-
duction of photovoltaic (PV) panels, most of 
which it exports. Morocco is investing pub-
lic resources in producing electricity from 
concentrated solar power and plans to sell 
renewable energy to Europe. In all three 
cases, the policy objective is both to produce 
environmental benefi ts and to create growth 
and jobs.
These countries are not alone in pursuing 
such approaches. Indeed, most countries tap 
these types of environmental policies—which 
really amount to green innovation policies 
and green industrial policies. Some com-
monly used policies include R&D subsidies 
for drought-resistant crops, national strate-
gies for electric cars, and efforts to create new 
green industries such as China’s promotion of 
solar PV production.
Why are these policies even needed? Get-
ting prices right is critical to addressing envi-
ronmental externalities and providing the 
right signal for economic agents to modify 
their consumption, production, and invest-
ment patterns. But as chapter 2 showed, 
  65
Key Messages
Innovation and industrial policies are poten-• 
tially useful tools to spur green growth, as 
they can correct market (environmental and 
nonenvironmental) failures, but they should 
be designed to minimize risks from capture 
and rent-seeking behaviors.
More advanced countries need to invest • 
in frontier innovation through research 
and development; lower-income countries 
(with more limited technological capacity) 
should focus on adapting and disseminat-
ing technologies already developed and 
demonstrated.
Although green growth and trade interact, • 
it is not through the much publicized but 
seldom observed “pollution haven” effects. 
Green policies create opportunities for devel-
oping exports of green products; meanwhile, 
imports facilitate the adoption of greener, 
more effi cient technologies.
WB_354_GG_CH03.indd   65 5/7/12   8:31:15 PM
6 6   I N C L U S I V E  G R E E N  G R O W T H :  T H E  P A T H W A Y  T O  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  
doing so is diffi cult because of behavioral 
quirks, political reasons, market or con-
tract imperfections, and low price elastici-
ties (how responsive quantities demanded or 
provided are to a certain price change).
And prices are notoriously limited instru-
ments for transforming economies or trigger-
ing investments with long-term or uncertain 
payoffs. Indeed, they are ill-suited to address 
the “classic” market failures usually invoked 
to justify innovation and industrial policies: 
knowledge externalities, latent comparative 
advantage and increasing returns, informa-
tion asymmetries, capital market imperfec-
tions, and the coordination needed across 
industries to permit a technological transi-
tion (box 3.1).
Further, for green growth, getting the 
price right requires pricing externalities, 
which requires government intervention. 
Future government policies (on carbon prices 
or pollution limits) determine the size and 
BOX 3.1 Market failures that can justify innovation and industrial policies
Many market failures may justify the broad inno-
vation policies and more targeted innovation and 
industrial policies that aim to support a specific 
green industry, fi rm, or technology:
Knowledge externalities and capital market imper-• 
fections. Absent government intervention, knowl-
edge spillovers create a gap between the private 
and social returns to producing knowledge that 
typically leads to under-provision of knowledge. 
And this is amplifi ed by information asymmetry 
in capital markets. Competitive innovation proj-
ects may struggle to fi nd fi nancing, making it dif-
fi cult for new businesses and activities to start. 
This is especially true because young businesses 
have more diffi culty securing fi nancing than large 
established companies, even though they may be 
very innovative.
Latent comparative advantages and increasing • 
returns. Latent comparative advantages—that 
is, future as opposed to current comparative 
advantages—are sometimes cited as a justi-
fication for industrial policies (Harrison and 
Rodríguez-Clare 2009; Khan 2009; Rodrik 
2004). Industrial policies may be warranted 
if the advantage includes learning or increas-
ing returns to scale, which require support at 
an early stage. When two or more technologies 
(some not even invented) are substitutes, profi t-
maximizing innovators may focus on improv-
ing the productivity of existing technologies 
(“building on the shoulders of giants”) because 
the market for these technologies is large and the 
returns are higher. Support—through production 
 subsidies or trade protection—can be provided 
to foster new technologies.
Coordination failures.•  Industrial policies may 
be warranted to address coordination failures 
within and across industries (Murphy and others 
1989; Okuno-Fujiwara 1988; Pack and Westphal 
1986; Rodenstein-Rodan 1943; Trindade 2005). 
The idea is that developing a comparative advan-
tage in an activity can depend on another activ-
ity in the region or country. (Morocco is hoping 
to develop a concentrated solar industry, which 
requires creating the demand, the needed trans-
mission lines, and the domestic supply chain for 
those parts in which Morocco can develop a com-
petitive advantage—such as mirrors.) An indus-
trial policy through which the government acts 
as the precommitment mechanism can solve this 
problem (Rodrik 2004). The same argument holds 
for “soft” industrial policies—policies that sup-
port particular clusters by increasing the supply 
of skilled workers, encouraging technology adop-
tion, and improving regulation and infrastructure 
(Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 2009).
International rent shifting.•  Some industries are 
characterized by fixed costs or indivisibilities 
 limiting the number of entrants and creating 
oligopolies, with significant rents for installed 
businesses. A classic example is the competi-
tion between Airbus and Boeing (Baldwin and 
Krugman 1988; Helpman and Krugman 1989). 
Depending on the case, it can be welfare enhanc-
ing to either introduce specifi c taxes to capture 
and redistribute the rent or support new entrants 
to increase competition and reduce rents.
(continued next page)
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BOX 3.1 (continued)
Spatial, redistributive, and political economy moti-• 
vations. Industrial policies are frequently used to 
promote regional balance and stimulate job growth 
and other economic activity where unemployment 
is worse, the population poorer, or a geopolitical 
reason exists to promote production in an area 
(such as Manaus in Brazil). Industrial policies are 
also used to smooth economic transitions—when, 
for example, structural change or trade liberaliza-
tion leads to unemployment and workers fi nd it 
diffi cult to shift from sunset to sunrise industries. 
In this case, an industrial policy can support a 
declining industry to mitigate transitional costs 
and allow time for retraining and shifting workers 
toward growing industries.
profi tability of the future green market. But 
because they cannot credibly commit to 
future policies, governments create policy 
risks for green fi rms. It thus makes sense for 
governments to share risks through invest-
ment subsidies. To the extent that such sub-
sidies reduce the future cost of green policies, 
they enable today’s governments to infl uence 
future policies: it is more likely that carbon 
prices will be implemented in the future if 
inexpensive low-carbon alternatives are avail-
able (Karp and Stevenson 2012).
For these reasons most countries resort 
to some form of innovation and industrial 
policies in their growth strategies. But given 
the mixed record of these policies—rife with 
both successes and failures—green growth 
strategies must heed the lessons from inno-
vation and industrial policies over the past 
decades.
This chapter explores the concepts of 
green innovation and industrial policies and 
identifi es their main benefi ts and potential 
pitfalls. It fi nds that they represent poten-
tially useful tools for facilitating green 
growth, provided that they are tailored to 
country contexts and that care is taken to 
navigate between the risks of market and 
governance failures.
Innovation policies: Tailoring 
mixes of instruments to a 
country’s innovation potential
Green innovation, which includes both the 
creation and commercialization of new 
frontier technologies and the diffusion and 
adoption of green technologies new to the 
firm, is critical to greening growth proc-
esses.1 Achieving greener growth requires 
both green innovation policies, supported 
sometimes by more targeted industrial poli-
cies, and environmental policies to create 
demand where the traditional environmental 
externalities are not fully refl ected in market 
prices (box 3.2).
Green frontier innovation is growing fairly 
rapidly, albeit from a small base. But the 
lion’s share of this growth is in high-income 
countries, raising concerns about the ability 
of developing countries to access and adapt 
new technologies tailored to their needs. A 
few large middle-income economies— Brazil, 
China, India—can become signifi cant frontier 
green innovators; they are already leading in 
incremental process innovation in the wind, 
solar, and biofuel markets. Other countries 
need to rely on global frontier innovation 
efforts while developing the capacity to iden-
tify, adapt, and absorb relevant technologies 
that are new to their fi rms.
The challenge is to combine innovation 
and environmental policies to make them 
effective and ensure that they are suitably 
balanced among policies that support fron-
tier innovation (relevant mostly for more 
technologically advanced countries); policies 
that promote catch-up innovation and the 
adoption and spread of suitably adapted tech-
nologies; and policies that improve domestic 
absorptive capacity, including strengthening 
local skills.
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BOX 3.2 Shedding light on green innovation, technologies, and industrial policies
Green innovation is the development and com-
mercialization of new ways to solve environmental 
problems through improvements in technology, with 
a wide interpretation of technology as encompass-
ing product, process, organizational, and marketing 
improvements. In addition to frontier (new-to-the-
world) innovations, this defi nition includes catch-
up (new-to-the-fi rm) innovations—also known as 
absorption—which covers the diffusion (both across 
and within countries), adoption, adaptation (to local 
contexts), and use of green technologies.
Green technologies comprise many fundamen-
tally different technologies to achieve more resource-
effi cient, clean, and resilient growth. They include 
technologies needed to achieve the following goals:
Reduce pollution and achieve greater resource • 
efficiency in buildings (thermal insulation and 
new materials, heating, energy-efficient light-
ing); production processes (new uses of waste 
and other by-products from firms); agriculture 
(from improved and resilient crop and livestock 
breeds, water management, and farming systems 
to mechanical irrigation and farming techniques); 
and infrastructure and urban design (such as land 
use zoning).
Mitigate climate change through a cleaner energy • 
supply (wind, solar, geothermal, marine energy, 
biomass, hydropower, waste-to-energy, hydrogen 
fuels); low-carbon end use (electric and hybrid 
vehicles, climate-friendly cement); and carbon 
capture and storage.
Reduce vulnerability and adapt to climate change • 
with tools for understanding climate risks, better 
early-warning systems, and climate-resistant tech-
nologies (sea-walls; drainage capacity; reductions 
in the environmental burden of disease; water, for-
est, and biodiversity management).
Support wealth creation from the more produc-• 
tive and sustainable uses of biodiversity, including 
natural cosmetics, pharmaceutical products, other 
sustainable bioprospecting, nature-based tourism, 
more sustainable production of plants and live-
stock, and ecosystem protection.
Green innovation policies are policies seeking to 
trigger green innovation by encouraging innovation 
broadly (horizontal policies) or supporting a specifi c 
technology (vertical policies).
Green industrial policies are policies aiming to 
green the productive structure of the economy by 
targeting specifi c industries or fi rms. They include 
industry-specifi c research and development subsi-
dies, capital subsidies, and tax-breaks; feed-in tar-
iffs; and import protection. They do not include 
policies targeting demand (such as consumer man-
dates), which can be met by imports without chang-
ing local production.
In practice, green innovation and industrial poli-
cies can be diffi cult to separate. Brazil’s support for 
biofuels relies on a range of policy tools from broad 
innovation to targeted industrial policies, with the 
ultimate goal of triggering innovation. Germany’s 
support for solar photovoltaic power amounts to 
innovation policy using industrial policy tools. Both 
countries would likely consider these efforts as part 
of their environmental policies.
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012 and World Bank.
Frontier innovation and catch-up 
innovation
Since the mid-1990s green frontier innova-
tion has increased substantially worldwide, 
mostly in high-income countries (fi gure 3.1a). 
In recent years the gap between developed 
and developing countries for green patents—
those based on key greenhouse gas–mitiga-
tion technologies—continued to widen, with 
the richer countries granted some 1,500 
patents in the United States compared with 
only 100 patents granted to poorer coun-
tries. Within the developing world the East 
Asia and Pacifi c region has by far the larg-
est number of patents; the Middle East and 
North Africa has the smallest number of pat-
ents (fi gure 3.1b). China, in 10th place glo-
bally in number of patents fi led in more than 
one country, is the only emerging economy 
represented among the top 10 “high-quality” 
innovating countries (Dechezleprêtre and 
others 2011). The number and share of green 
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patenting remains very small—less than 
1 percent—in both developed and developing 
regions (fi gure 3.1c).
In the developing world a few techno-
logically sophisticated countries are surfac-
ing as significant innovators; appropriate 
green innovation policy in these countries 
is likely to differ from appropriate policy 
in other developing countries. A group of 
nine emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
the Russian Federation, and South Africa) 
accounted for nearly 80 percent of all U.S. 
green patent grants to developing countries, 
over 2006–10.2 And unlike the less techno-
logically sophisticated countries, these “high 
flyer” economies display a sharp upward 
trend in green patenting, with their green 
patent grants more than doubling between 
2000–05 (30 grants) and 2006–10 (more 
than 70 grants).
But even if there is little capacity for fron-
tier green innovation in most developing 
countries, substantial capacity may exist for 
catch-up green innovation through the adop-
tion and adaptation of green technologies as 
well as indigenous base-of-pyramid innova-
tions, aimed at meeting the needs of poor 
consumers (box 3.3).
Trade data suggest that there is substan-
tial potential for catch-up innovation. Envi-
ronmental goods constitute a nontrivial and 
rising share of exports (3.4 percent in devel-
oping countries in 2010, 6 percent in high-
income regions; fi gure 3.2). But, except for 
the East Asia and Pacifi c region, the share 
of green exports has not been  rising, sug-
gesting a need for greater diffusion of green 
technologies. The policy implication of this 
trend depends on the extent to which it 
refl ects some underexploited comparative 
advantages in developing countries that 
account for lower levels of home produc-
tion and export of green goods and ser-
vices, whether driven by specifi c market or 
policy failures. Information on the extent 
to which weaker environmental regulations 
in many developing countries account for 
these differences could suggest appropriate 
policies.
FIGURE 3.1A Green frontier innovation occurs mostly in 
high-income countries…
(number of green patents granted in the United States, developing 
versus high-income countries)
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012, based on data from PATSTAT (the European Patent Offi  ce’s 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database).
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FIGURE 3.1B . . . with East Asia leading the way in developing 
regions . . .
(number of green patents granted in the United States, by developing 
region)
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012, based on data from PATSTAT (the European Patent Offi  ce’s 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database).
Notes: Total U.S. Patent Offi  ce grants in OECD green technology areas. Developing regions are 
AFR (Africa), EAP (East Asia and Pacifi c), ECA (Europe and Central Asia), LAC (Latin America and the 
Caribbean), MNA (Middle East and North Africa), and SAR (South Asia).
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Even if developing countries are not 
increasing their exports of green products, 
they could have substantial potential for 
moving into green industries to the extent 
that they are producing nongreen goods that 
use inputs or technologies similar to those 
used to produce green goods. The concept of 
“proximity” between products is useful for 
examining this broader capability for green 
exports.3 For example, a country with the 
ability to export apples will probably have 
most of the conditions suitable for exporting 
pears but not necessarily the conditions for 
producing electronics. Indeed, trade in green 
and close-to-green goods is about three to 
five times that of green goods alone, with 
East Asia and Pacifi c and Latin America and 
the Caribbean countries on par with high-
income countries (fi gure 3.3). This difference 
suggests a potential for developing exports 
in green products.
As for green imports, studies show that, as 
a share of all imports, they are as important 
FIGURE 3.1C . . . but worldwide green patents remain low
(green patents granted as a percentage of all patent grants in the United 
States, by region)
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012, based on data from PATSTAT (the European Patent Offi  ce’s World-
wide Patent Statistical Database).
Note: Ratio of three-year moving averages of U.S. Patent Offi  ce grants in OECD green technology 
areas to all U.S. Patent Offi  ce grants.
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BOX 3.3 What are green base-of-pyramid innovations?
Base-of-pyramid innovations are defi ned as innova-
tions that meet poor consumers’ needs. They include 
formal innovations for the poor—namely, innova-
tions by global and local formal private companies 
and public institutions, whether fully privately pro-
vided, supported by public subsidies, or produced 
through public-private partnerships (such as medi-
cines for neglected diseases and seeds for “neglected” 
soil types and climates). They also include informal 
innovations by local grassroots inventors, largely 
through improvisation and experimentation. Often 
facilitated by co-creation with poor consumers 
themselves, the innovations typically seek to better 
meet the needs of poor households at dramatically 
lower costs per unit, aided by signifi cant scale-up 
in volumes. They thus seek “to do more (products) 
with less (resources) for more (people)” (Prahalad 
and Mashelkar 2010). Three examples are described 
below.
Aakash Ganga (“river from sky”). In Rajasthan, 
India, ancient rainwater harvesting systems have 
been modernized to collect safe drinking water. 
This low-cost adaptation in arid regions has spurred 
additional innovations, generating many co-benefi ts 
for effi ciency and inclusiveness:
Automation of the traditional surveying system • 
with satellite imaging, which shortens design time, 
minimizes earthwork, and reduces material costs.
Creation of a numbering plan for reservoirs, • 
which facilitates co-investments.
Inducement of demand for stretchable roofs, • 
which has spurred more innovation.
Introduction of accounting transparency, which • 
has spurred policy debate on broader inequities in 
water affordability.
Novel uses of rice husks. Rice husks are one of 
India’s most common waste products. Husk Power 
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in developing countries as they are in high-
income countries, indicating the inter-
national transfer of green technology as 
embodied in green consumer products (fi gure 
3.4). Inasmuch as some of these products are 
used as inputs, this also indicates the green-
ing of the input mix, which may refl ect adop-
tion and adaptation of technologies by local 
fi rms. For instance, the purchase of manu-
facturing equipment in international markets 
is the main channel through which Chinese 
producers acquired the technologies and 
skills necessary to produce PV panels (de la 
Tour and others 2011). And the importing of 
green products may be a response to domes-
tic demand-side green policies in developing 
countries. However, there has not been any 
signifi cant upward trend in any region.
The dissemination of green technologies 
can be accelerated through policies that 
increase adaptation and adoption capacity 
(such as education in relevant disciplines, 
especially sciences and engineering) and 
through trade and industrial policies (such 
as local content requirements and technol-
ogy transfers). A good example is the suc-
cess of the high-speed train program initi-
ated in the Republic of Korea in 1993 by the 
purchase of the French Alstom TGV (train à 
grande vitesse). The contract included tech-
nology transfers (partly through training 
Korean workers in France) and the local-
ization of 50 percent of manufacturing in 
Korea (Lee and Moon 2005). Today, Korea 
BOX 3.3 (continued)
Systems (HPS), winner of the 2011 Ashden Awards 
for sustainable energy, has adapted and converted a 
biomass gasifi cation using diesel technology into a 
single-fuel rice husk gasifi er for rural electrifi cation. 
Households stop using dim kerosene lamps when 
they get HPS electricity, thereby saving on kerosene 
(and reducing CO2 emissions) and facilitating eve-
ning studying and other productive activities. Tata 
Consulting Services sells a $24 Swach (“clean” in 
Hindi) water fi lter that uses ash from rice milling to 
fi lter out bacteria. It is intended for rural households 
that lack electricity and running water.
Affordable green housing. In Mexico, Vinte spe-
cializes in building affordable, sustainable housing 
for low- and middle-income families. Its research 
and development in new technologies helped it intro-
duce innovations such as home designs that reduce 
energy costs by 75 percent.
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012.
FIGURE 3.2 Green exports are growing, especially in the East Asia 
and Pacifi c region
(export of green goods and services as a percentage of all exports, 
2000, 2005, 2010)
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012, based on data from COMTRADE + OECD list of environmental six-
digit harmonized system categories.
Note: Developing regions are AFR (Africa), EAP (East Asia and Pacifi c), ECA (Europe and Central Asia), 
LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), MNA (Middle East and North Africa), and SAR (South Asia).
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is among the fi ve top world competitors in 
exports of high-speed trains. In Morocco 
the contract for high-speed trains and 
the Casablanca tramway included a local 
 factory (created by Alstom and Nexans) 
specializing in railway beam and wire pro-
duction, which will produce for the local 
and international markets.
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FIGURE 3.3 Developing countries may have a substantial 
unrealized potential for producing green exports
(export of green versus green plus close-to-green goods and services 
from developing regions, as a percentage of all exports from developing 
regions, 2000–10)
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012, based on data from COMTRADE.
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FIGURE 3.4 Green imports are vital worldwide
(imports of green goods and services, as a percentage of all imports, 
2000, 2005, 2010)
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012, based on data from COMTRADE and OECD List of environmental 
six-digit harmonized system categories.
Note: Developing regions are AFR (Africa), EAP (East Asia and Pacifi c), ECA (Europe and Central Asia), 
LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), MNA (Middle East and North Africa), and SAR (South Asia).
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Green imports from higher-income coun-
tries may not, however, meet the needs of 
poorer consumers in low-income countries. 
In principle, home-grown base-of-pyramid 
innovations can offer a complementary sup-
ply of relevant green technologies (box 3.3). 
But few green base-of-pyramid innovations 
have been suffi ciently scaled up to date, sug-
gesting the need for more focused policy 
efforts in this area.
The adaptation of green technologies to 
local conditions is also critical for develop-
ing countries. Using green technologies effi -
ciently requires them to be more varied than 
nongreen technologies, given the signifi cant 
variance of the underlying environment by 
locality. For instance, turbine designs need to 
be adapted to work effi ciently in India, where 
wind speeds are lower than in Europe. Such 
adaptations can yield important co-benefi ts, 
including more sustainable corporate cul-
tures (box 3.4).
Fostering innovation
The policy instruments relevant to promot-
ing the development, dissemination, and 
adaptation of green technologies will differ 
depending on the maturity of the technolo-
gies and the market failures the policies seek 
to address. No single green bullet exists, so 
countries will need to employ a mix of instru-
ments (fi gure 3.5).
Policies to foster innovation should aim to 
strengthen entrepreneurship and local fi rm 
absorptive capacity, support new knowledge 
creation and commercialization, and support 
diffusion and adaptation of existing knowl-
edge to new local contexts. The importance 
of each and the modalities used depend on a 
country’s level of technological sophistication 
and implementation capacity.
Strengthening entrepreneurship and 
absorptive capacity: The importance of 
skills and the broader business environment
For fi rms to understand and assimilate the 
discoveries of others as well as create new 
technologies, they need strong absorptive 
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BOX 3.4 Rapidly growing champions of “new sustainability”
In principle, the home-grown green ideas of com-
panies to reduce costs, motivate workers, and shape 
their business environments by forging new relation-
ships should make it easier for their peers in devel-
oping countries to emulate such approaches. Several 
examples are described below.
Century Energy (Colombia) develops small-scale 
hydroelectric power plants in Colombian river basins, 
diverting fast-rushing stream water without the need 
for reservoirs and thus avoiding displacement. In the 
next 5 years it plans to develop up to 10 facilities, 
adding 250 megawatts of capacity to Colombia.
Energy Development Corporation (the Philip-
pines) pioneered the use of watershed management 
and recharge reinjection in its geothermal power 
plants as a way to extend the economic life of its facil-
ities and reduce maintenance costs. These practices 
have since been mainstreamed across the industry 
and are now a regular part of industry regulation.
Equity Bank agricultural financial products 
(Nairobi, Kenya) worked with mobile telecom pro-
vider Safaricom to create a mobile banking system 
on its existing platform. The system offers credit for 
inputs and supports farmers throughout the value 
chain of production, transport, processing, and 
marketing. It has partnered with groups such as the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development to 
reduce its risks when lending to smallholders.
Jain Irrigation Systems (Jalgaon, India) adapted 
drip irrigation systems to meet the needs of small-
holder farmers. The company works closely with 
customers to teach “precision farming” (optimizing 
the balance among fertilizers, pesticides, water, and 
energy to increase output) and uses dance and song 
to explain the benefi ts of drip irrigation to illiterate 
farmers.
Natura Organic Cosmetics (São Paulo, Brazil) 
worked transparently with rural communities and 
local governments to adapt its formal business prac-
tices to the local context. It tapped traditional knowl-
edge about how to extract raw materials sustainably 
(receiving the Forest Stewardship Council certifi cate 
for these raw materials), and then educated suppli-
ers in sustainable sourcing and production practices 
(such as reusing, refi lling, and recycling packaging 
and adopting a new green plastic derived from sugar 
cane, which is eventually expected to reduce green-
house gas emissions by more than 70 percent). The 
company also gives bonuses to workers who find 
ways to reduce the fi rm’s impact on the environment.
Source: IFC 2010; World Economic Forum 2011, cited in Dutz and Sharma 2012; 
and Russell Sturm (personal  communication).
capacity. Absorption is a subset of innova-
tion that focuses on the use of new-to-the-
fi rm technologies rather than the creation 
and commercialization of new-to-the-world 
technologies. Absorption of existing tech-
nologies can be improved by tackling the 
cross-cutting business environment con-
straints that impede experimentation, global 
learning, and attracting and retaining tal-
ent, as well as enhancing human capital in 
the public and private sectors.
An important starting point is to ensure 
that the business environment does not con-
strain entrepreneurship and innovative behav-
ior, whether green or complementary to green. 
Many cross-cutting policy measures are vital 
for creating a business environment that spurs 
and enables entrepreneurs and fi rms to create, 
commercialize, absorb, and adapt knowledge. 
They include the following:
• Policies to overcome the stigma of fail-
ure and encourage opportunities for 
reentry and renewed experimentation. 
Making it easier to wind up businesses 
is one of the best ways to get more peo-
ple to try new ideas, even though doing 
so involves difficult legal reforms and 
changes in attitude toward debt. Closing 
a terminally ill business takes fewer than 
10 months and allows more than 90 cents 
on the dollar to be recovered in Singapore, 
Tokyo, or Toronto. By contrast, in Mumbai 
it still takes on average 7 years to recover 
roughly 20 cents on the dollar (World Bank 
2012). Other policies include publicizing 
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innovative role models (such as India’s 
Tata Group’s awarding of an annual prize 
for the best failed idea) and reducing the 
sunk costs of trying to commercialize an 
idea, such as removing impediments to 
deeper rental and resale markets.
• Policies to facilitate global connectivity 
and learning. Here the emphasis should 
be on linking up with international 
consortia and helping firms insert into 
global value chains. International mobil-
ity of workers was critical to the rapid 
development of wind energy capabilities 
in China and India. Suzlon, the lead-
ing Indian wind turbine manufacturer, 
established R&D facilities in Germany 
and the Netherlands to have its workers 
learn from European expertise. Gold-
wind, the leading Chinese manufacturer, 
sent employees abroad for training.4 
Learning networks were also critical in 
the development of China’s PV panel 
industry.5 Mexico’s Green Supply Chains 
Program—a public-private partnership 
program—highlights a way to diffuse 
eco-effi ciency techniques to small- and 
medium-size enterprises.6
• Policies to increase the livability and 
“stickiness” of cities to attract and retain 
talent. Dense urban-industrial agglom-
erations spur technological upgrading 
and productivity growth by opening up 
opportunities and stimulating supplies 
of capital and skills.  China’s establish-
ment of special economic zones, fol-
lowed by a range of  support by national 
and local governments for further indus-
trial deepening in its three major urban/
industrial agglomerations and in a 
number of inland cities,  highlights how 
FIGURE 3.5 Snapshot of technology creation and diff usion
Source: IEA 2008 (Deploying Renewables: Principles for Eff ective Policies © OECD/International Energy Agency 2008, fi gure 1, page 25). 
Note: FIT= feed-in tariff s; FIP = feed-in premiums; PV = photovoltaic; RD&D = research, development, and demonstration; TGC = tradable green certifi cate.
Technology-neutral
competition
TGC
carbon trading (EU, ETS)
Stimulate market pull
voluntary (green)
demand
Mature technologies
(e.g., hydro)
Imposed market
risk, guaranteed
but declining
market return
Stability, low-risk
incentives
price-based: FIT, FIP
quantity bassed : tenders
High cost-gap
technologies (e.g., PV)
Prototype &
demonstration stage
technologies (e.g., 2nd
generation biofuels)
Continuity, RD&D, create market
attractiveness
capital cost-incentives, investment tax
credits, rebates, loan guarantees etc
m
ar
ke
t d
ep
lo
ym
en
t
Development Niche markets Mass market Time
Low cost-gap
technologies
(e.g. wind onshore)
WB_354_GG_CH03.indd   74 5/7/12   8:31:18 PM
 G R E E N  I N N O V A T I O N  A N D  I N D U S T R I A L  P O L I C I E S   7 5
a mix of instruments can be used (Yusuf 
and others 2008).
In addition, green innovation, like inno-
vation in general, depends on people who 
are able to generate and apply knowledge 
in the workplace and society at large. 
Required innovation skills include basic 
skills (reading, writing), technical skills 
(science, engineering), generic skills (prob-
lem solving, multicultural openness, lead-
ership), managerial and entrepreneurial 
skills, and creativity and design skills.7 The 
green economy requires greater empha-
sis on design and multidisciplinary team-
work, strategic leadership and adaptability, 
and knowledge of the sciences (CEDEFOP 
2009; OECD 2011).
Even advanced developing countries are 
far behind high-income countries in the share 
of professionals engaged in creating knowl-
edge and managing research projects. High-
income countries like Denmark and Finland 
have about 15 researchers per 1,000 employ-
ees. By contrast, China, Mexico, and South 
Africa each has fewer than 2 researchers per 
1,000 employees. And in developing countries 
the business sector plays a much smaller role 
in the national R&D system than the higher 
education and government sectors. In the 
United States, four of fi ve researchers work 
in businesses. By contrast, in Chile, China, 
Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, South 
Africa, and Turkey the number of research-
ers per 1,000 employees in industry is less 
than 1. Developing country fi rms need more 
individuals with research and related creativ-
ity skills in the workforce if they are to play 
a greater role in accessing green technologies 
and adapting them for local use.
Thus, policies are needed to strengthen 
market signals so that tertiary education insti-
tutions and technical and vocational educa-
tion and training systems are better attuned 
to fi rm demands. These institutions should 
ensure that the costs of skills upgrading are 
shared by students, employers, and the gov-
ernment in line with benefi ts, and that peri-
odic independent and transparent national 
assessments are adopted to ensure quality and 
consistency (OECD 2009). In West Africa an 
effort to better monitor monsoon variabil-
ity and impacts illustrates solutions to build 
relevant skills in a developing-country set-
ting (box 3.5). This case highlights the need 
to attract West African scientists trained in 
BOX 3.5 African monsoon multidisciplinary analyses
West Africa is extremely vulnerable to weather and 
climate variability because of its dependence on rain-
fed agriculture, on which 80 percent of the Sahel’s 
population relies. The African Monsoon Multi-
disciplinary Analyses (AMMA) is a research proj-
ect funded by agencies from Africa, the European 
Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States to better monitor West African monsoon vari-
ability and the impacts on society and the environ-
ment, including on climate. To do so, the AMMA 
community was created in 2002. It now comprises 
more than 600 people from 30 countries, includ-
ing 250 in Africa, among them 80 African PhD 
students. The AMMA community has established 
local university research programs in climatology, 
agronomy, and related social science fi elds, and has 
convened functional research teams to build new 
capacity for improved early-warning systems. These 
teams and programs will continue to train cohorts 
of African specialists, thus cultivating a community 
whose mutual interest in AMMA–related issues will 
help ensure sustainability.
AMMA has done fairly well in building a part-
nership between the international community and 
Africans in phase one (2002–10). The main chal-
lenge for phase two (2010–20) is clarifying the needs 
of users (farmers, hydropower and fl ood managers, 
and health care professionals) and identifying what 
science can offer. Stronger user demand should 
increase political support for scientifi c resources.
Source: Thorncroft 2011.
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better-equipped universities in high-income 
countries and the need to ensure enough local 
demand for established scientifi c and research 
facilities.
Promoting frontier innovation: Approaches 
depend on extent of local technological 
sophistication
Policies for frontier innovation include both 
supply-side “technology-push” elements 
(which reduce the costs of knowledge crea-
tion in advance of commercialization) and 
demand-side “market-pull” elements (which 
increase revenues from sales after com-
mercialization). Key recommendations to 
guide the design of such policies include the 
following:
Limit local technology-push support 
to countries with enough technological 
 capabilities. Government funding for early-
stage and pre-commercialization technology 
is a vital element of many innovation sys-
tems, including direct funding of public labs 
and universities; grants, matching grants, 
and soft loans (which give the government 
control over what research is conducted); 
and indirect R&D tax subsidies (which allow 
fi rms to choose the most profi table research 
opportunities, switching some marginal proj-
ects from unprofi table to profi table). All these 
tools have their drawbacks. Grants allow 
coordination of research efforts with little or 
no duplication but may fail to integrate infor-
mation from markets about what consumers 
want and are willing to pay for. They also 
run the risk of crowding out private R&D 
funding and need to be transparently allo-
cated. Tax incentives may promote distorting 
tax avoidance rather than productive invest-
ment in countries with a weak tax enforce-
ment system.
Despite these drawbacks, supply-push 
R&D support, through direct or indirect 
government funding, may generate new 
frontier innovations more effectively than 
demand-pull policies such as feed-in tar-
iffs and regulations—at least where local 
technological capabilities and good govern-
ance mechanisms exist. For wind power, 
the marginal million dollars spent on public 
support to R&D in wind power technology 
generated 0.82 new inventions, whereas the 
same amount spent on demand-pull policies 
induced, at best, 0.06 new inventions (Deche-
zleprêtre and Glachant 2011).
Consider carefully structured public-
 private partnerships as only one of many 
measures to foster early-stage financing. 
Much of the investment needed for green 
growth will come from private business. 
Many of these investments face uncertain 
cash fl ows and require signifi cant risk tak-
ing because they involve new technologies, 
including new business models. Once new 
ideas with commercial potential have pro-
gressed to the proof-of-concept stage, further 
fi nancing and mentoring support for early-
stage technology development (ESTD) are 
required.
The range of ESTD finance options 
includes both public and private resources. 
At this early stage, private sources are typi-
cally restricted to internal fi nancing (personal 
savings and retained earnings), friends and 
family, angel investors (successful wealthy 
entrepreneurs), venture capital (VC), private 
equity, and private corporations (which fund 
ideas developed in-house, operate their own 
VC units, and acquire young start-up com-
panies; see box 3.6). Among these sources, 
private equity and VC are uniquely suited to 
fi nance climate-friendly investments that are 
risky and fairly small. Although they will not 
provide more than a fraction of the resources 
needed, they can fi ll a key niche for driving 
green innovation.
However, developing the private equity 
and venture capital market for climate- and 
environment-friendly investments in emerg-
ing markets is hindered by capital market 
and carbon market barriers. These barri-
ers include high management expenses, a 
shortage of good fund managers, long time 
horizons for investment returns and regula-
tory uncertainties, and the uncertainty of 
raising capital and having profitable exit 
opportunities for new technologies with 
no track record of historical returns. The 
public sector and international financial 
institutions can assist in capitalizing such 
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funds by anchoring new funds, fi nancing 
new fund development, supporting pioneer 
investments, and supporting improved car-
bon payments. Even more important will 
be helping with the structure, manage-
ment, and exit routes for venture capital 
investments—for example, by providing 
equity contributions to increase potential 
returns or reduce potential risks, which 
would play a helpful demonstration role if 
there is enough deal fl ow.8 But experience 
suggests that the government role should be 
restricted to that of fi nancial backer, and 
not manager, with funds administered pro-
fessionally, free of bureaucratic burdens, 
and independent of political interference 
(Lerner 2009).
But capital market–based, arms-length 
forms of fi nance that structure and price each 
transaction on its merits require deep fi nan-
cial markets, which most developing coun-
tries still lack. Moreover, a number of other 
factors—such as government R&D expen-
ditures, the extent of patenting by entrepre-
neurial firms, and national environmental 
deployment policies designed with the long-
term perspective of creating a market for 
environmental technologies—appear to be 
more important in affecting the amount of 
private fi nancing of frontier innovation in the 
clean-tech sector.9
Provide global support for bottom-of-
pyramid and neglected technologies. It is 
not advisable for countries with weak tech-
nological capabilities and no comparative 
advantage in creating frontier technologies 
to dedicate significant public resources to 
this objective. But given the global nature of 
benefi ts from many green innovations, stable, 
long-term global public spending on R&D 
should be increased and channeled into pro-
grams that facilitate the development and 
adoption of technologies applicable to devel-
oping countries.
BOX 3.6 “Pinstripe greens”: Private fi nanciers making millions from clean-tech ventures
Although global venture capital investment in green 
energy declined with the 2008/09 recession and 
shares in clean-tech businesses have recently under-
performed the wider market by a large margin, a 
world of U.S. solar titans, German wind moguls, 
Brazilian biofuel magnates, and Chinese battery 
tycoons has emerged over the past decade. One 
often hears that green energy could be the biggest 
economic opportunity of the 21st century. In 2010 
the global clean energy sector (wind farms, solar 
parks, and related technologies) attracted a record 
$243 billion in new investment, nearly 5 times the 
volumes of 6 years earlier. Between 2000 and 2010 
the global market for solar and wind power rose 
from $6.5 billion to $132 billion, the number of 
hybrid electric car models jumped from 2 to 30, and 
the number of certifi ed green buildings grew from 
3 to 8,138. Examples of private green financing 
include the following:
Khosla Ventures•  is a venture capital fi rm founded 
by Vinod Khosla in 2004. Its clean-tech portfo-
lio spans utility-scale and distributed generation, 
 electrical and mechanical efficiency, batteries, 
building materials, plastics and chemicals, agricul-
ture, cellulosic alcohol, and advanced hydrocar-
bons. The portfolio also includes investments in 
a low-emission engine (with Bill Gates) and two-
bladed wind turbines (with Goldman Sachs).
Bloomberg New Energy Finance•  is a provider of 
analysis, data, and news about clean-tech, including 
renewable energy, energy-smart technologies, car-
bon, carbon capture and storage, renewable energy 
certificates, nuclear, power markets, and water. 
The company, founded by Michael Liebreich in 
2004, has generated more than $1 billion in profi ts 
in 2011.
Suntech•  is a Chinese company founded in 2001 
by Dr. Zhengrong Shi and floated on the New 
York Stock Exchange in 2005. It is the world’s 
largest producer of solar panels, with solar mod-
ules installed in more than 80 countries (and a 
low-carbon museum in Wuxi, west of Shanghai, 
opened by Al Gore).
Source: Dutz and Sharma 2012.
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Prize funds and advance market commit-
ments—also called purchase guarantees—
can be useful market-pull mechanisms for 
promoting R&D in neglected technologies.
• Prize funds are most appropriate when 
objectives can be well defined but the 
technologies are unknown. They may be 
particularly relevant for promoting more 
radical green innovations likely to be fos-
tered not through the traditional linear 
R&D approach but rather through out-
of-the-box new knowledge, involving 
co-creation and codesign by scientists, 
engineers, entrepreneurs, producers, and 
users from different disciplines.
• Advance market commitments work best 
when key characteristics of the desired 
technology are known and can be speci-
fied in a contract, typically for fairly 
homogeneous technologies rather than 
the more differentiated ones required for 
green growth. Although to date they have 
been used to provide affordable access to 
health care in low-income countries, they 
may help stimulate innovations and access 
to a few affordable green solutions—such 
as a nutrient-fortifi ed staple food crop or 
improved storage technologies in con-
texts of land and water scarcity, climate 
change, and declining crop yields.
Promoting catch-up innovation: 
Facilitating technology access and 
stimulating technology adoption
Promoting green growth in developing 
countries is typically more about catch-up 
innovation and the diffusion and adaptation 
of already-existing technologies than about 
frontier innovation. Relevant policies need 
to facilitate access to existing technologies, 
as well as stimulate their uptake.
Policies to facilitate access to green tech-
nologies. The best way to facilitate access to 
green technologies is through openness to 
international trade, foreign direct investment, 
technology licensing, worker migration, and 
other forms of global connectedness. Many 
green technologies are embodied in technol-
ogy licensing agreements and in equipment, 
machinery, and imported capital goods. 
Some are knowledge-based processes or 
business models that diffuse through move-
ments of people attached to multinational 
corporations or from the diaspora. Some 
can be recreated by emulating imported fi nal 
goods, copying lapsed patents, or studying 
and inventing around patents that are still 
in effect. Technology and skill transfer also 
occur through the purchase of manufacturing 
equipment on global markets, because sup-
pliers usually provide worker training with 
their equipment. This channel was critical in 
the ability of Chinese producers to become 
world leaders in PV panel production (de la 
Tour and others 2011).
Other underused policies to boost access 
to existing technologies include patent buy-
outs, compulsory licenses, patent pools, and 
open source approaches. A patent buy-out 
increases access to existing or future products 
that already benefi t from adequate innova-
tion incentives. Making it easier for countries 
to issue compulsory licenses under appro-
priate circumstances can help ensure more 
affordable access to patented green innova-
tions by poorer households in low-income 
countries.10
Patent pools provide a one-stop voluntary 
licensing service that combines multiple pat-
ents and licenses them, with patent holders 
getting royalties on the sales of adapted, more 
affordable products, and generic manufac-
turers getting access to broader markets. An 
example is the Medicines Patent Pool, funded 
by the international drug-purchasing facility 
UNITAID, which increases access to HIV 
medicines in developing countries. In open 
source development, a body of original infor-
mation is made available for anyone to use. 
Usually, any party using the original material 
must agree to make its enhancements publicly 
available. Open source projects are inherently 
royalty free. Both of these approaches could 
be used for neglected seeds for drought-prone, 
saline environments, or other green solutions 
for lower-income countries.
However, and perhaps most impor-
tant, countries should avoid imposing tar-
iffs on renewable energy technologies and 
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subsidizing fossil fuels, given that most stud-
ies show that these tools do more than pat-
ent protection to limit the transfer of clean 
technologies (Barton 2007 and Copenhagen 
Economics 2009, as cited in Hall and Hel-
mers 2010). A World Bank (2008) study 
finds that eliminating tariff and nontariff 
barriers in the top 18 developing countries 
ranked by greenhouse gas emissions would 
increase imports by 63 percent for energy-
effi cient lighting, 23 percent for wind power 
generation, 14 per cent for solar power gen-
eration, and 4.6 percent for clean coal 
technologies.11
Policies to stimulate adoption of green 
technologies. Green technologies are often 
more costly for firms to adopt and are not 
always immediately more attractive to end-
use customers. When feasible, ensuring that 
prices reflect the environmental external-
ity and removing subsidies that favor brown 
technologies are the best tools with which to 
encourage the adoption and spread of green 
innovation.
When prices cannot be adjusted, demand-
pull technology-deployment innovation 
policies (standards, regulations, public pro-
curement) are needed. Demand-side policies 
include guaranteed feed-in tariffs for renewa-
bles, taxes and tradable permits for emissions 
pollution, tax credits and rebates for consum-
ers of new technologies (compact fl uorescent 
light bulbs), comparison labeling (to inform 
consumers about the relative efficiency of 
products), endorsement labeling (“CFC–
free”), government regulations (limits to pol-
luting emissions from industrial plants), and 
industry-driven standards (home and offi ce 
building insulation). In contrast with radi-
cal innovation, demand-side policies appear 
to be effective in spurring fi rms to introduce 
incremental environmental innovations and 
adopt existing technologies.
Indeed, European Union surveys show 
that firms in most countries identify exist-
ing or future environmental regulations, fol-
lowed by market demand from customers, 
as the main driver behind adopting incre-
mental processes (Dutz and Sharma 2012). 
In high-income countries as a whole, most 
studies report that well- designed environ-
mental regulations stimulate innovation by 
fi rms, as measured by R&D spending or pat-
ents. That said, the induced innovation may 
not be enough to fully overcome the added 
costs of regulation (Ambec and others 2011). 
As for designing environmental regulations, 
studies emphasize the need for stability, pre-
dictability, and a focus on end results rather 
than means—allowing firms to choose the 
most cost-effective approach to meet the end 
result.
Voluntary sustainability standards for 
products and processes can help local fi rms 
upgrade environmental practices, a form of 
catch-up innovation for business practices. 
Roundtables and other multi-stakeholder ini-
tiatives provide new ways to manage natural 
resources more sustainably and efficiently. 
The best-known are international initiatives 
that group together producers, processors, 
traders, and other actors in a commodity’s 
supply chain with banks and civil society 
groups concerned about the harmful impacts 
of agriculture and aquaculture expansion. 
They aim at building consensus and setting 
voluntary standards on what constitutes 
responsible production and processing, along 
with promoting proven management practices 
to reach the set targets. Linking local fi rms 
to the global value chains of multinational 
corporations that have adopted sustainability 
standards helps leverage international market 
pressures (box 3.7).
Finally, a better financial infrastructure 
could significantly boost green technology 
absorption. In a study on adopting effi cient 
stoves, small biogas plants, and efficient 
tobacco barns for commercial farmers in 
Malawi, Rwanda, and Tanzania, financing 
emerged as the main stumbling block for all 
projects because of high start-up costs (Barry 
and others 2011). A study of low-income 
countries fi nds that higher fi nancial interme-
diation signifi cantly helps non-hydroelectric 
renewable energy generation per capita, 
because investment in renewable energy is 
constrained in environments where access 
to long-term loans is limited (Brunschweiler 
2010). Regarding China, a study cites access 
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to fi nancial credit and quality of after-sales 
service as key barriers to adopting solar home 
systems (D’Agostino and others 2011). And a 
study on Europe’s reconstruction after World 
War II emphasizes that the largely bank-
based, relationship-based fi nancial systems 
provided vital support for lower-risk technol-
ogy absorption by fi rms (Wolf 2011).
Green industrial policies: 
Ensuring that the standard 
caveats apply
Many countries include green industrial pol-
icies that target industries, fi rms, or technol-
ogy-specifi c innovation and production in 
their environmental policy mix, from feed-in 
tariffs for PV solar energy to tax breaks for 
innovative fi rms in specifi c environmental 
industries and green procurement (box 3.8). 
But given that this approach is vulnerable to 
powerful lobbies, rent-seeking behavior, and 
costly mistakes caused by information asym-
metries, there is no consensus on whether it 
is desirable.
Moreover, while industrial policies can 
transform an economy’s structure, the debate 
over whether they are effective instruments 
for accelerating growth continues. Some 
argue that industrial policies played a key 
role in the rise of Japan and other Asian 
countries (Chang 2006); others consider this 
catch-up a consequence of large investments 
(and a catch-up in capital intensity) in coun-
tries with high levels of education and insti-
tutional capacity (Krugman 1994). Whatever 
the case, it is critical to not blindly apply the 
lessons from East Asia to countries with very 
different characteristics, including low educa-
tion levels and weaker institutions.
Whether even Asia’s industrial policies 
would have passed a cost-benefit analysis 
is unclear (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 
2009; Noland and Pack 2003). But because 
green industrial policies offer environmental 
benefits, they could be desirable even with 
no net positive impact on growth or job cre-
ation. For instance, whether or not Brazil’s 
ethanol policy accelerated economic growth 
or created jobs, there is little doubt that it 
led to the creation of a dynamic biofuel sec-
tor that would, in the absence of that policy, 
probably not exist (or would at least be much 
smaller; Karp and Stevenson 2012). For their 
part, the biofuel policies of Europe and the 
United States can be considered examples of 
green industrial policies that failed to gener-
ate even an environmental benefit, as they 
are generally considered to have harmed the 
environment.
BOX 3.7 Voluntary standards support the sustainable management of South African 
deep-sea fi shing and Indonesian palm oil
A highly visible and credible certifi cation that deep-sea 
hake fi shing was sustainably managed by the interna-
tional nongovernmental standards organization (the 
Marine Stewardship Council) constrained local regu-
lators in South Africa from allowing excessive new 
entry of fi shers, which would have depleted stocks. 
It also led to restructuring of the equity structures 
of companies to meet the country’s Black Economic 
Empowerment goals.
For palm oil there was no comprehensive, 
agreed-upon sustainability standard that producers 
could adopt, despite the crop’s impact on deforesta-
tion and biodiversity loss. On top of environmental 
and social risks, this uncertainty raised the cost of 
World Bank loan preparation and monitoring and 
added potential reputation risk issues, affecting the 
availability and pricing of Bank fi nancing. Thanks to 
guidelines issued by the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO)—supported by the Indonesia Palm 
Oil Producers Association, Unilever, the Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the World Wild-
life Federation, Oxfam, the International Finance 
Corporation, and other key members—the share of 
RSPO-certifi ed palm oil has risen to 11 percent of 
the total market. To raise this share to the next level, 
broader government support in the consuming coun-
tries is needed to complement achievements driven 
by consumer activism.
Source: Levy and others 2011; IFC 2010; RSPO 2012.
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Whether green environmental policies are 
desirable, many countries, mostly middle and 
high income, are actively engaged in policies 
that support specifi c industries. Some of these 
policies aim to provide direct environmental 
benefi ts (biofuel production in Brazil, concen-
trated solar power in Morocco). Others aim 
to produce related upstream goods and serv-
ices (solar PV panels in China, high-speed 
trains in Europe). It is worth exploring the 
motivations for green industrial policies and 
the lessons from past experience with stand-
ard industrial policies.
What role for green industrial policies?
Green industrial policies can be implemented 
for multiple reasons. All these reasons are 
linked to different market failure or policy 
objectives.
Compensate for the uncertainty in future 
environmental policy and promote new 
industries and technologies. Most countries 
that adopt green industrial policies claim to 
do so to take advantage of a latent compara-
tive advantage, create jobs, and pursue new 
sources of growth. The underlying argument 
is that prices are not enough to address the 
standard market failures that hamper new 
industries (such as increasing returns, coordi-
nation failures, and underdeveloped fi nancial 
markets).
Even if prices were to fully reflect the 
environmental externality, current and new 
green industries would face many chal-
lenges. Pricing policies are politically vul-
nerable, and the lack of credible long-term 
commitments and regulatory uncertainty 
discourages the private sector from making 
long-term investments in green industries. 
Witness the European carbon emission 
trading scheme, which effectively created a 
carbon price but did little for environmen-
tal innovation (Borghesi and others 2012; 
Rogge and others 2011). When long-term 
innovation, deployment, and production 
scale-up is needed, pricing policies may need 
to be complemented by innovation and more 
targeted industrial policies (Vogt-Schilb and 
Hallegatte 2011), as with PV solar energy in 
Germany and China (box 3.9).
Level the playing fi eld. The risk of pol-
lution leakage from countries with strict 
environmental regulations to laxer coun-
tries has been used to justify green trade-
based industrial policies.12 The fear is that 
BOX 3.8 The role of green procurement
When governments look for ways to infl uence the 
economy to achieve greener growth, public pro-
curement stands out as a viable tool. For this rea-
son, both industrial and developing countries are 
now pursuing green public procurement. In recent 
years many countries—Brazil, China, the Republic 
of Korea, Turkey—have implemented green initia-
tives to protect the environment and mitigate emis-
sions (OECD 2010; Thomson and Jackson 2007). 
Green procurement is estimated to have accounted 
for 6 percent (Korea) to 60 percent (Sweden) of total 
public procurement in 2005 (OECD 2007).
The preferences of governments for green prod-
ucts in the early stages can help fi rms reduce produc-
tion costs. They can also have dynamic effects in rel-
evant markets. New companies can be motivated to 
enter the market, leading to further market develop-
ment. If the market evolves rapidly, private users of 
similar products will also be educated to use greener 
products. In addition, the dynamic market develop-
ment may lead to signifi cant economic competitive-
ness in such technological domains. For instance, a 
French company that invested in R&D to develop 
an environment-friendly paint for public road signs 
also developed other paint products that now lead 
the market (OECD 2007).
Governments can take advantage of standard-
raising demonstration effects and the provision of 
a guaranteed demand to foster markets of green 
products, change technological standards, generate 
green jobs, adapt public assets (such as buildings 
and infrastructure), and take a lead in educating 
consumers and fi rms to engage in more sustainable 
consumption and production. From a global welfare 
and climate change perspective, such procurement 
should not discriminate against foreign suppliers.
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BOX 3.9 Comparison of photovoltaic support policies in Germany and China
Germany and China are emerging as leaders in the 
global photovoltaic (PV) market, thanks to devel-
oping a dual industry composed of vertically inte-
grated firms and segment specialists (Grau and 
others 2011). Public support aims to trigger cost 
reductions through economies of scale and addi-
tional technological innovation. It is directed at 
three activities:
Direct R&D to support innovation.•  Both China 
and Germany provide support to R&D, especially 
to promote radical innovation that is not the 
usual focus of the private sector. But this support 
remains limited, with only 1 percent (in China) 
and 3 percent (in Germany) of the total support 
these countries provide to PV panel production 
(Grau and others 2011).
Standard environmental policies to support • 
deployment. Both China and Germany are using 
feed-in tariffs to support the large-scale deploy-
ment of PV modules. The German example points 
to the inherent risks resulting from a stable, long-
term commitment to buy electricity from PV. 
When the price of PV modules dropped in 2009, 
the sudden surge in profi tability led to a rush to 
install PV modules, infl ating the total cost of the 
program and jeopardizing its existence.
Investment to support manufacturing plants.•  
Investment to support manufacturing plants 
embraces direct subsidies, reduced taxes, public 
guarantees, and reduced-interest loans. Neither 
China nor Germany links investment support to 
specifi c innovation requirements.
Striking the right balance among the three forms 
of support is critical for reducing costs. But support 
schemes are further complicated by information 
asymmetries between the industry and the govern-
ment and by market power exerted by different 
actors in the industry.
Has public support made a big difference? There 
is little doubt that it helped achieve the large reduc-
tion in solar panel costs, which yielded global bene-
fi ts. But there are growing concerns that this support 
is increasingly focused on the interests of domestic 
producers rather than global welfare objectives.
In Germany the issue is whether hefty feed-in 
tariffs mainly benefit Chinese PV manufacturers 
who export to Germany. But Chinese producers are 
concentrated in the downstream segments of the PV 
panel supply chain, which are highly labor-intensive 
and are  where the country has a comparative advan-
tage (de la Tour and others 2011). These down-
stream segments have limited margins and small 
profits compared with upstream segments, such 
as silicon production, where industrial countries, 
including Germany, still dominate. (Germany also 
manufactures some of the machinery used in China 
for PV production.) In China the issue is whether 
the policy leads to the import of mature technology, 
thus preventing the takeoff of an internal innovation 
capacity for more radical technology changes.
stricter environmental regulations in one 
country may cause “dirty” industries to 
move to pollution havens rather than adopt 
cleaner processes. There is little support for 
this argument in the current context. Pollu-
tion abatement costs represent only a small 
fraction of production costs for most indus-
tries. And while environmental regulation 
may cause fi rms to move from a particular 
location, the destination location chosen 
likely has other draws (skilled labor, good 
business environment, and a well-developed 
fi nancial sector).
And studies show that the impact of 
current environmental regulations on fi rm 
competitiveness remains limited. Quirion 
and Hourcade (2004) calculate that in the 
European Union, a €20-per-ton CO2 tax 
has a lower impact on marginal cost than 
interannual exchange rate variations, even 
in energy-intensive industries and without 
tax revenue recycling. Econometric studies 
found no negative impact of the EU Emis-
sions Trading System (ETS) on net imports 
in the aluminum, steel, and cement indus-
tries (Ellerman and others 2010; Quirion 
2011; Sartor 2012). Anger and Oberndor-
fer (2008) reach the same conclusion on 
German fi rms and the EU ETS. Panel data 
from the U.K. production census suggest 
WB_354_GG_CH03.indd   82 5/7/12   8:31:20 PM
 G R E E N  I N N O V A T I O N  A N D  I N D U S T R I A L  P O L I C I E S   8 3
that the climate change levy (an energy tax) 
had a signifi cant impact on energy inten-
sity but no detectable effects on economic 
performance or on plant exit (Martin and 
others 2009).
Empirical evidence fails to support the 
notion of “pollution havens” (Copeland 
2012), though this could change if environ-
mental policies, such as  carbon taxes, become 
much stricter. Should this happen, trade poli-
cies may become an important complement 
to environmental policies: specifi c trade pol-
icies—from bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments on environmental regulation to border 
tax adjustments, with or without revenue 
transfers to the exporting country—can help 
level the competitiveness playing fi eld.
Smooth the transition. Countries may opt 
to use industrial policies to support ailing 
industries to facilitate the political economy 
of a green transition. Japan supported declin-
ing traditional industries to make the tran-
sition toward high-productivity, high-skill 
industries more acceptable for the popula-
tion. In the same manner a green strategy 
may need to include some transitional sup-
port to (declining) energy-intensive indus-
tries. This component of the green growth 
package can be a requirement for its political 
acceptability, despite its cost. The aim of such 
support would be to smooth the transition, 
help businesses adjust their production tech-
nologies, and help workers adapt by moving 
to other industries—while ensuring that any 
public support remains transitory, with clear 
sunset clauses.
Heeding the lessons of the past
The desirability of innovation and industrial 
 policies—green or not—cannot be assessed 
without analyzing a country’s economic sit-
uation, the benefi ts it can expect from these 
policies, and its ability to avoid capture by 
vested interests. Experiences around the 
world with these policies show that the fol-
lowing six lessons are key.
First, the relevant policy intervention 
depends on what market failure needs 
addressing (Baldwin 1969). Designing 
industrial policies requires that the govern-
ment be able to identify and analyze market 
failures (Pack and Saggi 2006). To do so, the 
government may need information on which 
firms and industries generate knowledge 
spillovers or benefi t from economies of scale 
and dynamics effects (for example, learning 
by doing). Without a clear understanding of 
the market failures that need to be corrected, 
innovation and industrial policies will be 
ineffi cient or detrimental, particularly if they 
are used as a substitute for an enabling busi-
ness environment.
Second, horizontal (or output-based) poli-
cies should be favored over vertical policies 
(“picking winners” or at least the winning 
technology) when possible. Vertical policies 
should be contemplated only when technolo-
gies or solutions have been demonstrated in 
other contexts or are justifi ed by industry or 
technology-specifi c characteristics.
But applying this recommendation to 
green growth policies may be challenging. 
For example, absolute technology neutral-
ity hardly applies as a guiding principle of 
climate policy (Azar and Sanden 2011). An 
example is feed-in tariffs (payments of a 
cost-based rate to energy producers for the 
electricity they generate from renewable 
resources), which can be designed to offer 
the same premium for any low-carbon elec-
tricity, thereby freeing electricity producers 
to choose the technology. But in the pres-
ence of learning-by-doing, a higher feed-in 
tariff may be desirable for the technology 
whose potential is estimated to be larger 
(del Rio Gonzalez 2008; Johnstone and oth-
ers 2010).
In the early 2000s, advocates of feed-in 
tariffs to support PV electricity production 
(rather than other carbon-free technologies, 
such as wind power) pointed to the large 
potential of this technology, its fairly high 
initial cost, and the improvements expected 
from learning-by-doing, which made it 
unlikely to be picked up under horizontal 
support to any carbon-free electricity produc-
tion technology.
Fortunately, picking winning technologies 
may be less risky for developing countries 
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implementing green growth, as they may be 
able to choose environmental technologies 
already developed and tested in high-income 
countries. This fact may partly explain why 
developing countries adopt environmental 
regulations at earlier stages of development 
and at lower cost than developed countries 
(Lovely and Popp 2011). Examples include 
technologies with large potential for econo-
mies of scale (such as solar PV) and technolo-
gies broadly used in industrial countries (such 
as low-sulfur fuels or wastewater treatment 
technologies). Technology support may also 
be less risky when a latent (that is, future 
rather than current) comparative advantage 
can be observed in an objective manner—for 
instance, renewable energies that depend on 
natural endowments, such as the potential 
for solar energy in North Africa and hydro-
power in Central Africa.
Third, the desirability of innovation and 
industrial policies depends on the balance 
between market failure and government 
failure. These policies need strong institu-
tions, because they are vulnerable to capture 
and rent seeking and to inefficient micro-
management of the innovation and invest-
ment process (Laffont 1999; Rodrik 2005). 
In climate policy, rent-seeking behavior is 
likely to infl uence policies even in countries 
with high institutional capacity and appro-
priate “checks and balances” (Anthoff and 
Hahn 2010; Helm 2010). Neven and Röller 
(2000) identify factors that make such prob-
lems more likely: sharply partisan political 
systems, weak governments, and absence of 
transparency. But rent capture remains pos-
sible even in the most efficient, balanced, 
and transparent country, because industrial 
lobbies are powerful actors in any economy 
(box 3.10).
Fourth, successfully using innovation 
and industrial policies requires the capacity 
to remove support when it is no longer jus-
tifi ed, especially if one technology proves 
less promising than expected. Regardless 
of their ability to “pick the winner,” there 
are plenty of political economy reasons 
to explain why governments find it diffi-
cult to interrupt support when a project or 
business fails. One option is to make sup-
port conditional on some market test. East 
Asian countries used export competitive-
ness, an indicator diffi cult to manipulate by 
local fi rms. They were fairly ruthless in ter-
minating support to underperformers and 
made continued protection in the domestic 
market contingent on export performance 
(World Bank 1993).
Subjecting green policies to a market 
test is more challenging than with stand-
ard industrial policies (Karp and Stevenson 
2012). When the market does not price the 
environmental externality—that is, in the 
absence of complementary price policies—
a market test cannot be used to decide 
whether the supported technology is the 
appropriate one. For instance, R&D sub-
sidies or feed-in tariffs that help the solar 
panel industry reach scale and technology 
maturity may need to be permanent to make 
the industry competitive in the absence of a 
carbon price. The profi tability of the low-
sulfur refining industry will depend on 
permanent subsidies in the absence of reg-
ulations on vehicle sulfur emissions. Con-
trary to classical industrial policies, which 
are supposed to be temporary because they 
correct temporary market failures (such as 
increasing returns to scale), green industrial 
policies may need to be  permanent if they 
are supposed to correct permanent market 
failures (such as an environmental exter-
nality). To avoid this issue it is preferable 
to use price-based instruments to correct 
permanent environmental externalities and 
industrial policies to cope with transient 
externalities.
Fifth, the benefits from innovation and 
industrial policies vary depending on the 
scale of assessment. When these policies 
make it possible to create a domestic industry 
with signifi cant market share, local benefi ts 
can be large in terms of jobs and income. But 
the assessment can be completely different at 
the global scale if market shares are gained 
thanks to public support at the expense of 
more effi cient foreign producers. The desir-
ability of these policies should be evaluated 
in view of trade-offs, especially if ambitious 
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BOX 3.10 Lessons from a “green” industrial policy: U.S. biofuels
In recent decades, concerns about national energy 
security, dwindling reserves of easily recoverable 
petroleum (and oil price hikes), and health and 
safety have prompted many industrial countries to 
look for renewable energy alternatives, including 
biofuels. The U.S. biofuels program offers useful 
lessons on green industrial policies—two of which 
appear particularly relevant for developing-country 
policy makers.
First, biofuel industrial policies have mixed con-
sequences for competition among technologies. The 
relationship between fi rst-generation (ethanol, pri-
marily from corn and sugar) and second-generation 
(or cellulosic) biofuels, which are being developed to 
prevent higher food prices and land use changes, has 
long been viewed as a cooperative process. By devel-
oping an infrastructure for handling large volumes 
of biomass and constraining fuel refi ners to blend 
increasing quantities of biofuels in fossil fuels, pro-
ducers of fi rst-generation biofuels would naturally 
pave the way for a new generation of biofuels. But 
a recent study suggests that fi rst-generation biofuels 
would be a tough competitor for the nascent indus-
try of next-generation biofuels (Babcock and others 
2011). And the diffi culty of the nascent technology is 
heightened by the fact that “declining industries are 
generally more successful in forming lobby groups 
and securing policy concessions from governments” 
(Damania 2002).
Second, the reversibility of a policy (and thus 
the risk from capture) depends on the instrument 
used. Producers of biofuels used to be supported 
through subsidies (or, equivalently, tax breaks). 
In the United States the corn-based ethanol tax 
credit has been complemented by an import tariff 
on all sources of ethanol, with the tax credit work-
ing with federally mandated blending minimums to 
ensure a domestic market for ethanol. U.S. ethanol 
subsidies are estimated to have cost taxpayers $6 bil-
lion in 2009 (Karp and Stevenson 2012). They likely 
imposed signifi cant costs on developing-country sup-
pliers that are more effi cient—such as Brazil, which 
uses sugar cane as a feedstock (though in 2009/10, 
Brazil imported small amounts of ethanol from the 
United States due to high food demand for sugar 
and competing crops worldwide). The subsidies 
sharply pushed up corn prices, though part of that 
increase could have been avoided if the U.S. market 
had been open.
The phasing out of the U.S. tax credit (and tariff) 
at the end of 2011 marked the end of the taxpayer’s 
support to biofuels. But the support by the consumer 
still remains, through the blending requirement of 
increasing amounts of ethanol. What is worrisome 
is that the consumption mandates appear far more 
difficult to reverse than direct subsidies—which 
were subject to annual review by legislative bodies 
in the United States and in most European Union 
member states. With consumption mandates, biofuel 
policies are less susceptible to public fi nance pres-
sure. Although the amounts at stake are substantial, 
the fact that the burden is spread across millions of 
consumers reduces the political pressure to relieve 
it. Indeed, substantial coordination would be needed 
on the consumer side to stand up against the man-
dates if warranted from a cost-benefi t perspective.
policies in a few countries lead to escalating 
support globally, beyond what is justifi ed by 
market failures.
Sixth, green growth is about synergies 
between economic growth and environmen-
tal protection. And more targeted innova-
tion and industrial policies represent a way 
to capture these synergies. Indeed, if and 
where these policies can promote growth 
cost- effectively and provide environmental 
benefi ts, it is possible that they can be devel-
oped to generate synergies between economic 
and environmental objectives.
In sum, a balanced view of costs, potential 
benefi ts, side-effects, and risks is needed to 
analyze the desirability of green innovation 
and industrial policies. The fact that these 
policies have infl uenced the structure of sev-
eral economies suggests that they are options 
for transforming economies and bringing 
them toward more environment-friendly 
patterns. But the potential for costly failure 
and waste of scarce public resources always 
needs to be factored into any policy decision. 
In the following three chapters, we explore 
the three key inputs in a greener production 
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function—human, natural, and physical 
capital—beginning with labor markets and 
whether green growth creates jobs.
Notes
 1.  This section is based on Dutz and Sharma 
(2012), a background paper produced for 
this report.
 2.  Indicators of technological sophistication 
(R&D personnel per capita) as well as the scale 
of the R&D sector (total R&D personnel) were 
considered in making this distinction.
 3.  Hausmann and Klinger (2006) show that as 
countries change their export mix, there is 
a strong tendency to move toward related 
goods rather than to goods that are farther 
away, where “relatedness” or “proximity” of 
products is defi ned at the global level.
 4.  See Popp (2012), who highlights the work of 
Lewis (2007) documenting how both coun-
tries went from having no wind turbine man-
ufacturing capacity to having almost com-
plete local production in fewer than 10 years. 
Sauter and Watson (2008) highlight this as a 
case study of “environmental leapfrogging,” 
explaining how the adoption of cutting-edge 
technologies was facilitated by the creation of 
learning networks.
 5.  See Popp (2012), who highlights interna-
tional mobility of workers as a more impor-
tant source of information than foreign direct 
investment or licensing, and de la Tour and 
others (2011) for the underlying analysis.
 6.  The initiative, led by the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, established by 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
included the environmental authority of 
the state of Queretaro and the Global 
Environmental Management Initiative, a 
nonprofi t organization of leading U.S. mul-
tinational corporations focused on envi-
ronmental sustainability. It is a 10-week 
eco-effi ciency educational training program 
emphasizing learning-by-doing with a com-
mitment by participating small and medium-
size enterprises to generate and implement 
pollution prevention projects, with recom-
mendations for change made by the partici-
pants themselves. Investments related to the 
implementation of the improvement projects 
were provided by individual participants, 
who became convinced of their value. Lyon 
and van Hoof (2010) fi nd that the average 
participant generated a project with a net 
present value of more than $150,000, saved 
1,900 cubic meters of water and 42,000 Kwh 
per year of electricity a year, reduced CO2 
emissions by 61 tons a year, and cut waste 
disposal by 1,455 tons.
 7.  Chapter 4 addresses the labor market–related 
questions concerning skills.
 8.  See chapter 4 of Zhang and others (2009) for 
an overview and recommendations of policies 
to strengthen the ecosystem for the venture 
capital industry in China, and see chapter 7 
of Dutz (2007) for India.
 9.  Regression results (based on comprehensive 
deal-level data on high-growth fi nancing and 
enterprises seeking investment in the clean-
tech sector over 2005–10 in 26 countries 
including Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, 
and India) suggest that deployment policies 
such as feed-in tariffs and tradable certifi cates, 
government R&D, and fi rm-level patenting 
are associated with higher levels of investment 
in clean-tech industries than short-term fi scal 
policies such as tax incentives and rebates. 
No signifi cant correlation is found between 
public investment loans or public fi nancing 
of venture capital and the amount of private 
fi nancing of innovative ventures (Criscuolo 
and Menon 2012). 
10.  Henry and Stiglitz (2010) document how 
the United States used the threat of a com-
pulsory license to manufacture Cipro dur-
ing the anthrax scare following September 
11, 2001.
11.  The assessment is based on fi rst-round 
approximations rather than full general equi-
librium effects.
12.  This is a different issue from the rise in 
imported emissions to high-income countries 
from developing countries, which is associ-
ated with their general deindustrialization. 
In 2008, China emitted about 1,400 MtCO2 
through its production of exported goods; 
the United States imported goods amounting 
to about 600 MtCO2 of emissions. 
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4Human Capital: Implications of Green Growth Policies for Labor 
Markets and Job Creation
For many countries the promise of new sources of growth and job creation is what lies behind the attractiveness of 
green growth. They look at Brazil, China, 
Denmark, India, and Japan—world leaders 
in exports of green products, who created 
entirely new industries in wind, solar, and 
biofuels. They hear about the promised dou-
ble dividend of a green fi scal stimulus that can 
create jobs in the short run while laying the 
foundations for a more sustainable future.
For others the fear of diminished com-
petitiveness and job losses remains one of 
the main barriers to pursuing green growth. 
They worry that tightening environmental 
policies could lead to industries relocating 
in countries with laxer environmental poli-
cies (so-called “pollution havens”)—and that 
these policies will lead to trade wars.
Yet, to some extent, this is an old 
debate—one that centers on the complex 
relationships between environmental regu-
lation and competitiveness, and the ensuing 
job impacts. The topic of “green jobs” is just 
the latest round, prompted by global eco-
nomic worries.
  91
Key Messages
• Green growth cannot substitute for good 
growth policies, and employment is no 
exception: shortcomings in labor markets 
will not disappear with the adoption of envi-
ronmental policies.
• But even if green jobs will not be a panacea, 
environmental regulation need not kill jobs 
either, and the net balance can be positive.
• To smooth the impacts on labor markets of 
the transition to green growth, policy mak-
ers need to tackle potential skill shortages 
and impediments to worker mobility—both 
of which have constituted barriers to other 
types of economic adjustment, such as trade 
liberalization. 
This chapter is based on Bowen (2012), except section “. . . and Learn from the Lessons of Trade Adjustment,” which 
draws from Porto (2012).
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Does green growth create jobs? The sup-
porters argue that green policies are “a new 
engine of growth” and “a net generator of 
decent jobs” (UNEP 2011). The recent glo-
bal economic downturn triggered many pro-
posals for “green” fi scal stimuli to promote 
growth and job creation (Pollin and others 
2008). The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) also 
suggested that investing in green activities has 
substantial potential to create jobs (OECD 
2011b). Chinese analysts estimate that meas-
ures to save energy, protect the environment, 
and replace polluting industries with high-
tech firms would lead to the net creation 
of some 10 million jobs over the next 5–10 
years, and that exports of green goods could 
create some 4–8 million jobs (CCICED 2011, 
cited in World Bank and DRC 2012).
But the critics claim that the potential 
is overestimated and that environmental 
policies may actually hurt labor markets 
(Michaels and Murphy 2009; Morriss and 
others 2009). A recent study of South Africa 
fi nds that while developing green industries is 
appealing, it has little chance of succeeding 
unless structural problems (regulatory obsta-
cles to creating small enterprises, a lack of 
skilled workers) are addressed (World Bank 
2011a). Similarly, investments to promote 
research and development (R&D) in green 
industries will do little if educational and 
fi nancial systems produce few skilled work-
ers and little risk capital.
To shed light on this debate, this chapter 
explores the net impact of green job crea-
tion—that is, whether more jobs will be cre-
ated than lost—and the relationship between 
labor markets and green growth policies. It 
fi rst discusses what exactly green jobs are, 
then moves to the factors that influence 
whether green growth policies lead to job 
creation, and fi nishes with measures needed 
to smooth the transition to greener growth 
paths for labor markets.
The key fi nding is that environmental poli-
cies will lead to substantial job creation only 
if other inefficiencies—including those of 
labor markets—are tackled. In other words, 
green growth policies are no substitute for 
good growth policies. But while green growth 
may not be the answer to chronic unemploy-
ment and low competitiveness, fears that 
environmental regulations would result in 
job losses and lower competitiveness are mis-
placed—indeed, odds are that the impacts 
will be quite moderate. Meanwhile, better 
regulations (particularly those supported by 
training) support for R&D, and tax recycling 
(that is, using revenues from environmental 
taxes to reduce other taxes) will help mini-
mize the risks posed by green growth policies 
and maximize co-benefi ts. 
Green policies may create jobs, 
but are no substitute for sound 
labor markets
A fi rst hurdle in framing the debate is that 
there is no agreement on how to define 
“green” jobs, even among economists. This 
lack of defi nition matters because it compli-
cates the debate on the desirability of green 
policies.
Defi ning green jobs…
As “employment in ‘green’ industries”
Some defi nitions of green jobs are fairly nar-
row, including only jobs with an identifi able 
environmental focus or employment in indus-
tries (or specific projects) whose products 
are deemed to be of environmental benefi t. 
This would include employment in renewable 
energy, energy effi ciency, and environmental 
services or in developing less carbon-intensive 
products (such as building railways).
For the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), job content, as well as the 
characteristics of industry goods and services, 
also matters (UNEP 2008). UNEP defines 
green jobs as
 work in agricultural, manufactur-
ing, R&D, administrative, and service 
activities that contribute substantially 
to preserving or restoring environmental 
quality. Specifi cally, but not exclusively, 
this includes jobs that help to protect 
ecosystems and biodiversity; reduce 
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energy, materials, and water consumption 
through high-efficiency strategies; de-
carbonize the economy; and minimize or 
altogether avoid generation of all forms 
of waste and pollution (UNEP 2008).1
This defi nition takes a broad industry per-
spective, extending beyond employment in 
narrowly defi ned environmental services. In 
principle it embraces employment in produc-
ing any goods and services that have smaller 
adverse environmental impacts than close 
substitutes.
Some defi nitions focus on industries pro-
ducing environmentally desirable outputs. 
The OECD/Eurostat defi nes the environmen-
tal goods and services industry as “activities 
that produce goods and services to measure, 
prevent, limit, minimize, or correct envi-
ronmental damage to water, air, and soil, as 
well as problems related to waste, noise, and 
ecosystems. This includes technologies, prod-
ucts, and services that reduce environmental 
risk and minimize pollution and resources” 
(OECD 1999). For example, air and resource 
pollution management would qualify.
Using the OECD’s defi nition, green jobs 
constitute a small but signifi cant share of 
total employment—about 1.7 percent of 
total paid employment in Europe  (European 
Commission 2007). That is probably a 
higher fraction than a global estimate along 
UNEP lines would suggest; as UNEP notes, 
much of the documented growth in green 
jobs has so far been in developed countries.2 
Employees in many jobs might find that 
their jobs are not counted as “green” despite 
the nature of the goods and services that 
they help produce. For example, jobs in the 
car industry are excluded, even though some 
may be devoted to developing low-carbon 
vehicles.
As “the employment consequence of 
green policies”
Some defi nitions of green jobs follow a dif-
ferent track, focusing on what happens 
when public policies to correct environmen-
tal externalities are introduced—opening 
the possibility of including jobs created 
and destroyed across the whole economy. 
In effect they try to answer the question, 
“What are the employment consequences 
of introducing green policies (such as cap 
and trade) relative to a baseline case?” This 
approach requires implicit or explicit eco-
nomic modeling of the policies.
Some studies in this vein count only jobs 
directly created by the policies—that is, 
“direct” employment effects. They focus on 
the specifi c labor requirements of technolo-
gies (“bottom-up” estimates, using simple 
spreadsheet-based analytical models in con-
junction with engineering estimates).3 An 
important issue is the timing and duration 
of job creation. There is a key distinction 
between construction, manufacture, and 
installation—where jobs may be fairly short-
lived—and ongoing operation, maintenance, 
and fuel processing—where the length of 
jobs depends on the durability of the relevant 
plant.
Other studies include both jobs created 
and jobs destroyed in sectors disadvantaged 
by green policies—that is, indirect and net 
employment effects. This net concept of 
employment change is crucial for evaluat-
ing the overall labor market impacts of envi-
ronmental policies. It can be done through 
input-output tables or general equilibrium 
modeling. They include jobs created by the 
aggregate demand generated by the extra 
direct and indirect employment (“induced” 
employment effects). This approach allows 
jobs to be counted as green if they are cre-
ated by green policies, even if they are in sec-
tors with no obvious direct relationship to 
environmental objectives (such as communi-
cation) or with only a secondary relationship 
(such as fi nancial services). It also includes 
other economic feedbacks and mechanisms 
triggered by environmental policies, thus 
hopefully capturing jobs lost owing to higher 
prices and lower real wages, lower final 
demand, and lower investment. But many 
studies do not follow through with this 
netting-out process.
Another approach considers different time 
horizons—the further the time horizon, the 
more economic variables can be adjusted. 
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For example, a study of the impact of car-
bon price policies on U.S. industry consid-
ers  outcomes along four time scales (Ho and 
others 2008):
• The very short run, where fi rms cannot 
adjust prices and profi ts fall accordingly.
• The short run, where firms can raise 
prices to refl ect the higher energy costs, 
with a corresponding decline in sales as a 
result of product or import substitution.
• The medium run, when in addition to 
the changes in output prices, the mix 
of inputs may also change, but capital 
remains in place, and economy-wide 
effects are considered.
• The long run, when capital may be real-
located and replaced with more energy-
effi cient technologies.
It concludes that employment conse-
quences of green policies differ strongly, 
depending on the time horizon. Short-term 
employment losses mirror output declines 
and are substantial in energy-intensive sec-
tors, but gains in other industries would fully 
offset those losses in the longer term.
But few studies account for labor market 
rigidities and other obstacles to job creation, 
and yet they may impair any positive effect 
of green policies. As the World Bank study 
on South Africa (World Bank 2011a) noted, 
green policies cannot correct all the problems 
holding back job creation—such as skill mis-
matches and the dualism (insider-outsider) of 
the job market. Thus, the scope for green job 
creation is limited in the absence of parallel 
economic policy changes.
Evaluating the impact of green policies 
on jobs: Gross versus net job creation
What is the overall job creation impact of 
green policies in developing countries? Few 
studies have explicitly focused on this, and 
those that have suffer from many defini-
tional issues, making comparisons dif-
fi cult.4 They also fail to look at economy-
wide effects. That said, the few that do 
exist suggest that climate-change policies 
in general and renewable energy policies in 
particular can generate considerable extra 
employment: 
• In South Africa, a study finds that an 
“energy revolution” scenario—that is, a 
scenario with a strong transition toward 
renewable energy—creates 27 percent 
more jobs than the International Energy 
Agency’s business-as-usual scenario and 
5 percent more than the growth-without-
constraints scenario (Rutovitz 2010).
• In India, a study finds that low-carbon 
employment is one of the key co-benefi ts of 
promoting the renewables sector. It notes 
that solar power is more labor- intensive 
than wind power and better able to meet 
India’s requirements for small-scale, off-
grid power. Biomass, green transport, and 
public works in water and forest manage-
ment are also attractive ways of achiev-
ing both employment and environmental 
objectives (GCN 2010).
• In China, a study emphasizes the possi-
ble employment losses from the planned 
sharp reduction in the energy intensity of 
Chinese industry, but notes that this could 
be outweighed by increased employment 
in renewables and—quantitatively, much 
more important—the shift of the Chinese 
economy toward services and away from 
heavy industry (GCN 2010).
• In Brazil, a study argues that renewable 
energy sources have a stronger potential 
in Brazil than is envisioned in official 
studies and government policies, both in 
contributing to CO2 mitigation and gen-
erating jobs (GCN 2010).
What is the record of green fi scal stimuli 
on job creation in developing countries? The 
evidence is scant, but a few studies do show 
some job creation, with substantial variation 
in jobs created per dollars spent.
• In the Republic of Korea, forest resto-
ration generated nearly eight times as 
many jobs per dollar as the least labor-
intensive green objective, “vehicles and 
clean energy” (Barbier 2009).
• In China, biomass spending was found 
to be nearly 30 times more effective in 
generating jobs per dollar than wind 
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power (UNEP 2008). That suggests that 
the focus on renewable energy and low-
carbon manufacturing prevalent in stud-
ies for Europe and the United States may 
miss the opportunities for employment 
creation from changes in land manage-
ment and agriculture in developing coun-
tries, where these economic sectors are 
fairly more important.
• In Latin America, water network reha-
bilitation and expansion in Honduras is 
much more effective (by a factor of more 
than 10) in creating jobs than hydro-
electric schemes in Brazil, with rural 
electrifi cation in Peru falling in between 
(Schwartz and others 2009).
While useful, these studies have limita-
tions. They do not discuss the capital con-
straints that may hamper the (public or 
private) investments needed to create the 
green jobs. They assume people will move 
seamlessly from one sector to another and 
ignore labor market rigidities. They tend to 
focus narrowly on the energy sector when 
green growth options (even when limited to 
climate change concerns) exist in other sec-
tors that may be more labor-intensive. And 
they do not always distinguish between 
substitution (using more labor and less 
capital, energy, and other inputs) and lower 
productivity (using more inputs to produce 
the same amount of output). This distinc-
tion matters because capital-labor substitu-
tion is desirable, at least for countries with 
excess labor supply, large unemployment, 
and limited access to capital; lower produc-
tivity is not.
Another quest ion worth asking is 
whether green spending is a good way of 
creating short-term employment during a 
crisis. The argument in favor of green fi scal 
stimuli is that they can both create jobs and 
lay the foundations for more sustainable 
growth. But experience suggests the need 
to look across the range of possible green 
works (from renewable energy to reforesta-
tion) as not all are equally labor-intensive 
and “shovel-ready.”
To begin with, if employment creation 
is the objective, higher spending in sectors 
with lower capital intensities than either 
conventional or renewable energy—such as 
reforestation programs or even education 
and health services—may be more effec-
tive. But there may be tradeoffs between 
rapid employment creation and “green-
ness.” Road building, for example, is fairly 
labor-intensive and can help to provide valu-
able infrastructure, but it is not particularly 
green. And some sectors, such as energy, 
will not top the list for sustainable rapid job 
creation, given that they require a long lead 
time for replacing capital.
And programs that yield larger employ-
ment effects tend to lead to more employment 
gains for largely lower skilled workers, so that 
the long-term growth effects are fairly small. 
Long-term development, including sustaina-
ble development, requires more of a focus on 
growth-enhancing infrastructure investment, 
which is not necessarily labor-intensive.
More analysis is needed of how global 
markets will affect job creation—leakages of 
green jobs and spending to other countries 
depend on endowments of skills, existing 
industry structure, the nature of the tech-
nologies newly deployed, and the ways that 
comparative advantage is exploited (GCN 
2010).
The last point is a useful reminder that 
general equilibrium effects matter. Yet these 
are largely ignored in the green jobs litera-
ture. That may be particularly misleading 
for developing countries, as the next section 
discusses.
The eff ect of green policies on 
employment depends on labor market 
structure and the specifi c policy 
considered
The problem with studies that discuss job 
markets is that they tend to either model 
them as perfectly competitive, and thus 
adapting instantly to all shocks with no 
involuntary unemployment (the neoclassi-
cal model)—or as having involuntary unem-
ployment that could be cleared with a fi scal 
stimulus (the Keynesian model). The fi rst set 
of assumptions implies that green jobs are 
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likely to displace as many jobs elsewhere in 
the economy.5 The second, that there will 
be no crowding out of jobs by green fi scal 
stimuli.
Neither approach is realistic. Most 
developing countries have surplus labor 
economies, so estimates limited to direct 
employment creation in the green jobs 
literature might be less misleading for 
developing countries than for industrial 
economies closer to full employment. But 
it is more complicated in “dual” economies 
with modern and traditional sectors or in 
three-sector economies with a traditional 
rural sector and both formal and informal 
urban sectors characteristic of many devel-
oping countries (Harris and Todaro 1970; 
Mazumdar 1976). In that case the (skilled) 
formal urban labor market is often very 
shallow and green job creations can have 
crowding-out effects on other activities.
So knowing how best to model how the 
aggregate labor market works—and, indeed, 
how the macroeconomy as a whole works—is 
crucial to properly assess overall (net) job cre-
ation. Babiker and Eckaus (2007) illustrate 
the value of the implicit or explicit macro-
economic framework, showing how climate 
policy could increase unemployment in the 
presence of real wage rigidities or barriers to 
the sectoral reallocation of labor. Guivarch 
and others (2011) highlight that climate pol-
icy costs depend signifi cantly on labor mar-
ket rigidities and that policy cost estimates 
are much higher in models with imperfect 
labor markets. Overall, labor market impacts 
can also be infl uenced by how the revenues 
from other environmental taxes are used, as 
the literature on the “double dividend” from 
environmental taxation shows (Fullerton and 
Metcalf 1997; Sartzetakis and Tsigaris 2007). 
Studies tend to show that if tax revenues are 
used to reduce payroll tax—a tax on labor 
supply—employment will fall by less or even 
increase.
The key point is that the overall effects of 
green policies on employment depend on the 
characteristics of the economy’s labor markets 
and the nature of the policy interventions, 
including their funding, not just the input 
requirements of rival energy technologies. 
Indeed, underemployment can have multiple 
causes, and the consequences of green poli-
cies will differ depending on these causes. It 
thus helps to consider the implications of a 
wider range of theories of underemployment 
and labor market adjustment in different 
types of economy (box 4.1).
But environmental regulation 
need not kill jobs either
A major fear being voiced in the green jobs 
debate is that environmental regulation—
needed to price externalities and encourage 
fi rms to change their production processes—
will destroy jobs.
A tale of two antithetical hypotheses: 
the “pollution haven” and “Porter” 
hypotheses
For the past 20 years the debate on the 
implications of environmental policies on 
competitiveness (and jobs) has revolved 
around two antithetical hypotheses: the 
“pessimistic” pollution haven hypothesis, 
which contends that fi rms will fl ee locations 
with strong environmental regulations; and 
the “optimistic” Porter hypothesis, which 
argues that environmental regulation will 
lead to innovation (Porter and van der Linde 
1995). In the latter, innovation reduces the 
cost of regulation (weak Porter hypothesis) 
and may lead to increased competitiveness 
and profi tability (strong Porter hypothesis).
What is the latest thinking on this issue? 
As chapter 3 reported, there is no evidence 
that environmental policies have systemati-
cally led to job losses because of an exodus 
of fi rms to pollution havens. Tighter environ-
mental regulation may cause fi rms to relo-
cate, but they will choose locations that are 
more attractive overall, as pollution abate-
ment costs represent a small share of pro-
duction costs for most industries (Copeland 
2012). Factors such as availability of capital, 
exchange rates, labor abundance, location, 
institutions, and agglomeration effects are 
more important than environmental policy 
in determining firm location and competi-
tiveness. Empirical evidence from existing 
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BOX 4.1 A framework to estimate the impacts of green policies on jobs
How can policy makers determine if green policies 
will create jobs? The following provides a frame-
work to assess labor market consequences, explor-
ing what would happen in an economy with two sec-
tors: a clean one and a dirty one. The products are 
imperfect substitutes that are produced with many 
inputs, including labor. The fi rst two cases explore 
the impact of green growth policies that focus on 
the demand side, and the rest deal with policies that 
focus on the supply side.
Case 1. Demand defi cit and a green stimulus
In this case the economy is typified by “Keyne-
sian” unemployment—that is, with insuffi cient  overall 
demand. The green policy involves a fi scal stimulus 
with spending focused on the clean sector. What 
would happen? Greater demand for the clean sector’s 
product would stimulate greater employment in the 
clean sector, in turn pushing up wages in this sector, 
and thus increasing fi nal demand. Increased demand 
in the labor market would put upward pressure on 
wages throughout the economy, possibly causing a 
slight decline in employment in the dirty sector. Over-
all, employment would be expected to rise as long as 
job creation in the clean sector outweighs the (indirect) 
job losses elsewhere, facilitating a virtuous outcome.
Case 2. A green paradox: demand defi cit and a 
green stimulus meet a skills defi cit
Here again we have a Keynesian economy, but 
there is a skills defi cit in the clean sector. The green 
policy involves a fiscal stimulus with spending 
focused on the clean sector. Higher demand for the 
clean sector’s products would feed into higher wages 
across the economy, because employment in the clean 
sector cannot expand, but overall employment levels 
would not expand much, and may even decline. Thus, 
the green fiscal stimulus would be largely ineffec-
tual, generate higher wages, and create little (if any) 
additional employment. (In an open economy the 
green stimulus may trigger imports, in which case it 
would have little impact on employment.)
Case 3. Pollution regulation with virtuous initial 
conditions
Now the green policy involves a pollution tax to 
correct a pollution externality in the dirty sector, and 
there are no wage or price rigidities in the economy. 
Faced with an emissions tax, the optimum response 
would be a contraction of output and an investment 
in pollution abatement. What would happen? The 
regulations would be expected to destroy jobs in 
the dirty sector, given that the tax raises production 
costs with the dirty technology and the price of these 
goods rises. As a result, demand for the clean substi-
tute good rises and employment in the clean sector 
increases—imparting incentives to reduce the exter-
nality either through new production techniques or 
end-of-pipe abatement, which would boost jobs in 
pollution abatement.
This scenario suggests that overall employment 
would increase when there exists a close and clean 
substitute produced with more labor-intensive tech-
nology or when abatement is feasible and more labor-
intensive than dirty production (on the margin). This 
situation might apply to economies such as Japan’s or 
the Republic of Korea’s that are well endowed with 
labor skills and technology for cleaning up.
Case 4. Pollution regulation with immiserizing 
initial conditions
This is similar to the previous case but with two 
key differences: no clean substitute for the dirty 
good, and pollution abatement is either far too 
costly or unavailable, or is highly capital intensive. 
Production and employment in the dirty sector 
would decline, with little or no offsetting increase 
in cleaner jobs. This situation most likely applies to 
economies reliant on extractive industries—such as 
artisanal mining, where pollution abatement is typi-
cally far too costly for the small producers and there 
is no clean substitute available for the mineral.
Case 5. Renewable resource regulations—restore 
rents but not necessarily jobs
Here we have a classic open-access common-
property resource such as a fishery. Entry occurs 
until the payoffs from harvesting decline to zero (or 
to the opportunity cost). If there is a tax or restric-
tion on harvesting, this would lower employment but 
increase resource stocks and the payoffs. Thus, while 
employment may decline, economic returns increase 
and environmental benefi ts accrue. Conversely, if the 
policy were accompanied by expenditure on ecosys-
tem restoration, there would be offsetting changes in 
employment, with ambiguous net impacts.
The bottom line is that the labor market conse-
quences of green policies depend on the policy under 
consideration, technological parameters, and the 
state of the economy. There are cases where a given 
policy can create jobs, and other circumstances 
when it can destroy jobs.
Box text contributed by Richard Damania.
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regulation or environmental taxes confi rms 
this result (Anger and Oberndorfer 2008; 
Ellerman and others 2010; Martin and others 
2011; Morgenstern and others 2002; Quirion 
2011; Sartor 2012). But this evidence is based 
mostly on existing regulations in developed 
countries, and future research needs to ascer-
tain whether these results extend to develop-
ing countries and to more ambitious envi-
ronmental policies than have been applied to 
date.
For sectors intensive in natural capital—
with which many developing countries are 
well endowed—the pollution haven hypothe-
sis is even less likely. After all, without sound 
environmental policies, the increased pres-
sures coming from trade could rapidly deplete 
natural capital, and then the short-term ben-
efits from increased trade would be wiped 
out by the subsequent collapse of the resource 
base of the activity (Copeland 2012).
The reality is that stringent environmen-
tal provisions are essential for guaranteeing 
the long-term sustainability of the economic 
activities (and jobs) that depend on natu-
ral capital. If a natural resource base is well 
managed, it can be used to create jobs (mov-
ing up the value chain by creating a down-
stream processing sector, for instance) and 
seize opportunities in global markets.
At the firm level, studies show that the 
impact of more stringent environmental regu-
lation on productivity and competitiveness is 
modest and sometimes even positive, thanks 
to innovation (Ambec and others 2011). The 
large body of literature triggered by the semi-
nal paper by Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
supports the weak version of the Porter 
hypothesis: innovation does reduce costs.
Further, recent studies have found an 
increasing number of cases where environ-
mental regulation had positive impacts on 
profi ts (Ambec and others 2011). This may be 
due to the fact that regulators have become 
better at designing smart regulatory policies, 
as well as that the models used to assess the 
effects of environmental regulation on inno-
vation and competitiveness were refi ned to 
account for the lagged structure of innova-
tion (essentially they wait a few more years 
to evaluate the impact, giving the fi rm more 
time to adapt).
Thus, the overall effect of environmental 
regulations on jobs is likely to be limited. 
In the United States, an econometric study 
of highly regulated industries fi nds that the 
impact of stringent environmental regulations 
on U.S. jobs was negligible in most cases—
across all industries, 1.5 jobs were created per 
$1 million spent in additional environmental 
spending, with a standard error of 2.2 jobs 
(Morgenstern and others 2002).
Types of adjustment needed across 
countries
There is much variation across developing 
countries in the likely ease of transition to 
a low-carbon growth pathway. Chapter 3 
shows that developing a comparative advan-
tage in the production of equipment for low-
carbon electricity depends on the manufac-
turing base of the country and on whether 
there are scale and learning economies in the 
technology. Some countries have a compara-
tive advantage in particular renewable energy 
sources because of natural endowments. 
Brazil has the right climatic conditions and 
soils to give it a substantial cost advantage 
in biofuels, though other characteristics of 
the Brazilian economy also help, in addition 
to being very well endowed in hydroelectric 
potential (Kojima and Johnson 2005).
Developing countries that produce a high 
level of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of 
GDP face a more diffi cult challenge of struc-
tural adjustment. They are the ones in which 
more labor is likely to have to be reallocated 
from greenhouse gas–intensive activities, 
either by switching technologies within an 
industry or by moving labor between indus-
try sectors. Given the importance of CO2 
emissions from energy production, energy-
intensive economies will compose a large part 
of this group.
Endowments of fossil fuels combined with 
industrial development strategies that have 
favored carbon-intensive industry make a 
transition to low carbon much more chal-
lenging (EBRD 2011). If such economies 
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impose a carbon tax, the standard economic 
policy instrument to internalize the green-
house gas externality, the relative returns to 
different factors of production are likely to 
change. The few empirical studies focusing 
on how carbon taxation might affect factor 
returns suggest that the incidence of a carbon 
tax is likely to be regressive when emission 
abatement measures are capital-intensive, 
requiring complementary policies (Fullerton 
and Heutel 2007, 2010). Countries such as 
Kazakhstan and Mongolia, with a much 
larger-than-average proportion of the labor 
force in mining and energy supply, are more 
likely to suffer as a result of this adjustment 
and also from the diffi culties of reallocating 
displaced labor to other sectors. Chapter 3 
discusses how industrial and other sector-
specifi c policies can facilitate this transition.
Smoothing the transition to 
greener growth paths for the 
labor market
Policy makers need to worry about skills 
that can limit job creation…
To what extent are the skills needed in the 
labor force for greener growth being altered? 
This matters because if the skills required 
are unavailable, that could place a major 
obstacle in the way of the transition to green 
growth.
Overall, “green restructuring” brings 
with it the usual challenges to policy makers 
trying to facilitate restructuring and reduce 
the labor market adjustment costs, includ-
ing those from a changing skill mix. Many 
of the expanding industries are likely to be 
using new products and processes, refl ecting 
the transition to low-carbon technologies, 
so the generic skill requirements of many of 
the newly created jobs are likely to be higher 
than average, as they have to allow for 
assimilation of unfamiliar tasks and work-
ing methods and “learning-by-doing.” But 
a larger proportion of jobs in the renewable 
energy sector and in energy efficiency are 
lower skilled than in the fossil fuel energy 
sector (Pollin and others 2009). Contrary 
to the coal industry—which employs many 
low-skill workers in developing countries—
the oil and gas industries tend to have fairly 
well-paid workers and a large proportion of 
highly qualifi ed engineers and technicians.
Perhaps the most thorough study of green 
growth and skills so far is ILO/CEDEFOP 
(2011), which reports and synthesizes the 
results of 21 country reviews. It notes that the 
demand for skills is being affected in three 
ways by the transition to green growth:
1. Induced structural change across indus-
tries increases the demand for skills 
specifi c to expanding industries such as 
renewable energy and reduces the demand 
for skills such as those for coal mining.
2. Some new occupations are emerging—
such as photovoltaic (PV) fitters and 
carbon-footprint assessors—though there 
appear to be fairly few unique green 
skills.
3. The content of many jobs in current indus-
tries is changing, as companies focus on 
achieving better energy effi ciency, switch-
ing from fossil fuel sources to renewable 
energy, and producing capital equipment 
for expanding green industries. In agri-
culture, low- and no-till  agriculture and 
reduced use of fertilizers and pesticides 
will entail changes in farmers’ practices, 
as will increased production of bio-
fuel crops and efforts to increase forest 
 cover—a development likely to have the 
most pervasive effects on labor markets, 
particularly in developing countries.
What is worrisome is that skill shortages 
may already be impeding the transition to 
green growth (box 4.2). In 2011 the OECD 
(2011a) drew attention to widespread skill 
shortages in energy-efficient construction 
and retrofitting, renewable energy, energy 
and resource efficiency, and environmen-
tal services. Many countries have reported 
specifi c bottlenecks, such as the shortage of 
skilled PV workers in Germany and the lack 
of design engineers for smart grids in the 
United Kingdom. Karp and Stevenson (2012) 
identify similar shortages in developing coun-
tries. In India, maintaining and operating the 
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renewable energy systems deployed by the 
Remote Village Electrifi cation is complicated 
by the lack of skilled workers (IEA 2010).
In 2001 China started the Township 
Electrifi cation Program to bring electricity 
to rural communities using solar PV, small 
hydro, and wind. While installation appears 
to be working well, there are problems with 
maintenance and operation, partly because 
of a lack of qualifi ed electricians. Reasons 
for these reported shortages include the 
underestimation of the growth of certain 
green sectors, the general shortage of sci-
entists and engineers, the low reputation 
and attractiveness of some sectors impor-
tant for the green transition such as waste 
management, and a shortage of teachers 
and trainers in environmental service (ILO/
CEDEFOP 2011).
Many of the skill shortages already 
reported in connection with green growth 
strategies appear to result from generic fail-
ings in education and training. And they 
refl ect long-standing issues such as the lack 
of functioning universities and research 
centers, the mismatch between students’ 
choices of discipline and the needed skills, 
the lack of incentives for employers to invest 
in developing the transferable skills of their 
workforces, the lack of access for the disad-
vantaged to time and finance for training, 
and the stickiness of relative pay rates.
Fortunately, there is a potential for syn-
ergies between green policies aimed at skill 
development and growth policies aimed at 
increasing labor capital, worker education, 
and labor productivity. Figure 4.1 shows that 
many developing countries need to increase 
their enrollment in technical tertiary edu-
cation. Such an increase would accelerate 
growth and help with skill limitations created 
by green policies.
…and learn from the lessons of trade 
adjustment
Green growth is about transforming our 
production and consumption processes 
from a dirty, environmentally unsustainable 
model to a sustainable one. Like any struc-
tural transition it inevitably entails transition 
costs, which green growth policies must seek 
to minimize. As such, the trade literature, 
which has extensively documented adjust-
ment costs associated with trade liberaliza-
tion, offers interesting insights.
BOX 4.2 Shortage of skills and inadequate training provisions can undermine green 
programs
The problems that can arise when training provi-
sion is not up to the challenge of the induced struc-
tural change are illustrated by Australia’s experience 
with a new Home Insulation Program introduced in 
 February 2009 as a key part of the government’s fi s-
cal stimulus.
The program was designed partly to generate 
jobs for lower skilled workers in the housing and 
construction industries. At the start of the program 
only supervisors were required to satisfy one of three 
minimum competences—prior experience in the insu-
lation industry, qualifi cations in an approved trade, 
or insulation-specifi c training. The program proved 
popular. At its peak, demand was running at almost 
2.5 times the anticipated level and some 1.1 million 
roofs of 2.7 million eligible were insulated. But fi res, 
fitters’ deaths, and reports of fraud undermined 
public confi dence, and the program was canceled in 
February 2010. A subsequent sample of inspections 
revealed that nearly 30 percent of installations had 
some level of defi ciency. Investigations showed that 
low skill levels in the industry, inadequate provision 
of training, and poor management of the program 
were among the factors responsible.
The importance of competent project manage-
ment and national policy making in this case is a 
reminder of the key role of higher level management 
and planning skills in a policy-induced transition to 
green growth that is likely to take sustained effort 
and policy credibility over a long period.
Source: Australian National Audit Offi  ce 2010.
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Adjustment costs, whether stemming 
from trade shocks or a transition to green 
growth, are fundamentally driven by factor 
immobility—sluggishness in capital or labor 
market adjustments.6 These costs would be 
zero were workers able to adjust instantly 
to the changing demand for skills (moving 
instantly from one industry to another) and 
were firms able to instantly modify their 
fixed capital following changes in carbon 
prices or pollution standards.
In the real world, labor markets are slug-
gish, as experience with trade liberaliza-
tion shows. Trade liberalization creates and 
destroys jobs within industries. But the fl ow 
of labor across sectors—from shrinking to 
expanding ones—is slow. In Brazil it took 
several years for workers displaced from de-
protected industries to be absorbed by sec-
tors with comparative advantages (Muendler 
2010). In addition, large wage differences 
persist among workers with similar qualifi ca-
tions and status across industries, suggesting 
limited mobility of workers across industries 
(if workers were mobile, they would switch to 
the highest paying industry until wages equal-
ized). This “industry-effect” explains a large 
fraction of wage differences across workers, 
and prevails in both developed and develop-
ing countries, for skilled and unskilled work-
ers (Krueger and Summers 1989).
What does this sluggishness stem from? 
Slow labor market adjustments reflect 
demand-side (industries requiring specific 
skills) and supply-side (worker characteris-
tics) factors. Whether sector-specifi c knowl-
edge and training are a bigger impediment 
to mobility than labor market frictions (the 
time and costs associated with search and 
matching) depends on the extent to which 
worker experience is specifi c to each sector 
(Cosar 2010; Dix-Carneiro 2010). And there 
appears to be significant variation in the 
mobility of different types of workers, with 
lower adjustment costs for younger workers 
and skilled workers. The policies needed to 
help transition may thus differ by country 
(depending on the nature of the adjustment) 
or by affected worker categories (depending 
on age, skill, and so on).
As for capital stocks, a shift toward 
greener production processes is likely to 
require substantial changes, as firms may 
need to invest in new product lines, machines, 
and equipment. Yet, as experience with trade 
adjustment shows, the process may be quite 
costly—for example, following Argentina’s 
trade reform, the required capital adjustment 
averaged 14.5 percent of fi rms’ capital stock 
(Bet and others 2011). Thus, the capacity of 
economies to adjust to green policies may be 
limited by capital constraints, which could 
affect labor demand.
Because adjustment costs are a direct func-
tion of factor immobility, efforts to increase 
labor or capital mobility will be critical. And 
support policies should be targeted to facili-
tating the transition rather than cushioning 
potential losses. Simple unemployment insur-
ance tends to hamper reallocation and skill 
formation. But employment subsidies can be 
useful if made conditional on working in the 
export-oriented (or green) sector (a form of 
industrial policy; see chapter 3).
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ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (accessed March 18, 2012); World Bank 2011b.
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FIGURE 4.1 Many developing countries need to increase their 
enrollment in technical tertiary education 
(enrollment in engineering, manufacturing, and construction in tertiary 
education as a percentage of the total population, 2009)
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Ultimately, the cost of the transition will 
depend on the overall economic policy frame-
work and the extent to which it facilitates the 
emergence and growth of new sectors and 
fi rms. So the ability to carry out and reap the 
benefi ts of a green growth policy will depend 
on good economic policy.
In sum, fears that environmental regula-
tions will lead to massive job losses or loss of 
competitiveness are probably as unfounded as 
the hope that green jobs will single-handedly 
solve countries’ employment problems. That 
said, it is vital to invest in human capital to 
accelerate growth and to green growth. This 
is one of the inputs to economic production. 
Natural capital is another critical input, and 
the next chapter will look at why it is impor-
tant to invest in this domain, too.
Notes
 1.  UNEP also includes a provision that “green 
jobs need to be decent jobs” (UNEP 2008).
 2.  At the same time developed countries are 
responsible for, by far, the largest share of 
the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere. They have also probably made a 
disproportionate contribution to long-lived 
solid waste. So some of the green jobs refl ect 
the unsustainability of developed-country 
economies.
 3.  See Kammen and others (2004) and Wei and 
others (2010) for a review.
 4.  Further, studies use a range of methods, 
refl ecting the different defi nitions of green job 
creation discussed above, differ in coverage of 
countries and sectors and as to whether they 
include gross or net effects and whole value 
chain effects, and make varying assumptions 
concerning economic growth and business-
as-usual scenarios (Bacon and Kojima 2011; 
Fankhauser and others 2008; GCN 2010; 
GHK 2009; Kammen and others 2004; Wei 
and others 2010). The few studies of develop-
ing countries conclude to signifi cant job crea-
tion, but offer no analysis of the net impact 
(see box 4.2). 
 5.  In such models implementing carbon pricing 
will tend to both redistribute labor to low-
carbon activities and reduce overall labor 
supply due to the higher relative price of 
carbon-intensive goods and services. There 
can be net job destruction, depending on how 
the revenues from carbon pricing are used as 
in a study of the potential implications of a 
cap-and-trade system for the United States, 
which found signifi cant reductions in labor 
input in 29 of 35 U.S. industries without rev-
enue recycling (Goettle and Fawcett 2009).
 6.  For instance, Guivarch and others (2011) 
model economic transaction costs due to a 
climate policy with different levels of rigid-
ity in the labor market, fi nding that mitiga-
tion costs are much larger when labor market 
imperfections are considered.
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5Natural Capital: Managing Resources for Sustainable Growth
Meeting peoples’ needs for food, fuel, and fi ber depends on sound management of the natural 
 capital—agricultural lands, forests, water, 
fisheries—on which production of these 
goods depends. Manufactured goods also 
depend on sustained production from natu-
ral capital, such as subsoil assets.
But what exactly is natural capital? The 
term refers to the stock of natural resources 
that provides flows of valuable goods and 
services. Major types of natural capital include 
agricultural lands; subsoil assets (oil, gas, coal, 
and minerals); forests; water; fi sheries; and the 
atmosphere.1 Goods and  services provided by 
natural capital underpin conventionally meas-
ured economic growth by  providing inputs to 
agriculture, manufacturing, and services and 
by increasing the  productivity of agriculture 
and the reliability of infrastructure services 
through climate control.
Complementing natural capital with 
human, physical, and social capital greatly 
increases its productive capacity. But the 
  105
Key Messages
• Sustainable management of natural capital 
underlies green growth in key sectors—such 
as agriculture, manufacturing, and energy—
and is vital for resilience and welfare gains.
• Different resources require different types 
of policies. For extractable but renewable 
resources, policy should center on defi ning 
property rights and helping fi rms move up 
the value chain. For cultivated renewable 
resources, policy should focus on innovation, 
effi ciency gains, sustainable intensifi cation, 
and “integrated landscape” approaches.
• The elements of natural capital cannot be 
regarded in isolation. Integrated landscape 
approaches can increase production of both 
“regulating” and “provisioning” services of 
natural capital.
• In some cases, growth and green outcomes—
such as cleaner air, cleaner water, less solid 
waste, and more biodiversity—will involve 
tradeoffs. But not all of these tradeoffs are 
inevitable: innovation, which can be sup-
ported through smart subsidies, can help 
minimize or eliminate some of them.
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extent to which other forms of capital can 
substitute for natural capital is bounded, 
because people require water, food, and air 
to live, and demand for water and food will 
increase as population and incomes rise.
How can better management of natu-
ral capital lead to green growth? Sustain-
able management of capture fisheries can 
increase economic returns. Restoration and 
enhancement of watershed services can 
enhance agricultural productivity. Conser-
vation of biodiversity can generate economic 
returns through nature-based tourism and 
bioprospecting. Rents accrued from mineral 
extraction can be invested in infrastructure 
and human capital, thus generating economic 
returns.
But achieving these outcomes is not easy, 
given the myriad market and institutional 
failures at play. What is needed, therefore, 
is a package of measures encompassing both 
price and nonprice interventions to enhance 
the management of natural capital. Reaping 
higher economic returns from natural for-
ests, for example, requires aligning policies, 
incentives, capacity, and governance. Reap-
ing higher returns from mineral extraction 
requires policies that increase production 
effi ciency, fi scal policies that are fair to both 
the government and investors, and public 
expenditure policies that encourage the rein-
vestment of income for broader development 
gains.
This chapter explores how better man-
aging natural capital can promote green 
growth. It looks at four broad categories: 
(1) extractable renewable resources (capture 
fisheries, natural forests, soil, and water); 
(2) cultivated renewable resources (crops, 
livestock, aquaculture, and forest planta-
tions; (3) nonrenewable resources (oil, gas, 
coal, and minerals); and (4) ecosystems 
that provide regulating services (watershed 
management, climate regulating services, 
and nature-based tourism). The fi rst three 
categories provide “provisioning” services 
(those that directly produce goods and serv-
ices, such as food and water); the fourth 
embraces “nonprovisioning” services (those 
that provide regulating services, supporting 
services, and cultural services).2
The key fi nding is that sustainable man-
agement of natural capital is essential for 
green growth in key sectors—such as agricul-
ture, manufacturing, and energy—and is vital 
for resilience and welfare gains. The type of 
measure (both price and nonprice) needed will 
vary with the type of resource being targeted:
• For extractable but renewable resources, 
policy should center on defining prop-
erty rights and helping fi rms move up the 
value chain.
• For cultivated renewable resources, policy 
should center on innovation, efficiency 
gains, sustainable intensification, and 
“integrated landscape” approaches that 
can lead to productivity gains without 
damaging the environment.3
• For nonprovisioning services, efforts 
should concentrate on increasing knowl-
edge of the economic value of these serv-
ices and incorporating these values in 
policy decisions.
• For nonrenewable resources, the focus 
should be on minimizing environmen-
tal damage and recovering and reinvest-
ing rent optimally for broader economic 
development.
Second, the elements of natural capital 
cannot be regarded in isolation. Integrated 
landscape approaches can increase produc-
tion of both “regulating” and “provisioning” 
services of natural capital—for example, by 
integrating the production of crops, trees, and 
livestock on the same land area or by manag-
ing animal waste to enhance soil fertility and 
produce energy rather than contributing to 
pollution. But solutions need to be adapted to 
local circumstances and need to include the 
right policy measures to provide incentives 
for innovation and adoption.
Third, in some cases, growth and green 
outcomes—such as cleaner air, cleaner water, 
less solid waste, and more biodiversity—will 
involve tradeoffs. These tradeoffs are most 
common in current cultivation practices in 
agriculture, livestock, aquaculture, and plan-
tation forests. But not all of these tradeoffs 
are inevitable: innovation, which can be sup-
ported through smart subsidies, can help 
minimize or eliminate some of them.
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Extractable renewable resources: 
Defi ning property rights and 
moving up the value chain
Extractable renewable resources (capture 
fi sheries, natural forests, soil, and water) are 
often, though not always, common property 
resources—goods from which it is diffi cult 
to exclude potential users, whose consump-
tion precludes consumption by others. The 
inability to exclude users often leads these 
resources to be managed under open access 
property rights regimes, under which no eco-
nomic returns or rents accrue to the scarce 
natural capital. Under such a scenario, more 
factors of production are employed in the 
extraction of the resource than is effi cient, 
and more of the resource is extracted, accel-
erating its depletion.
If property rights were established, total 
output would increase (perhaps after a lag 
during which the resource regenerates itself), 
and rents would accrue to the scarce natural 
resource. Some factors of production, such 
as labor, could, however, be worse off once 
property rights were established, unless 
the rents were redistributed (Weitzman 
1974). The fact that establishment of prop-
erty rights can reduce the returns to labor 
may explain the resistance to introducing 
such rights. These potential losses should 
be weighed against enhanced productivity, 
which can improve overall economic welfare 
and, with a supportive policy environment, 
can enhance opportunities for moving up 
the value chain (by shifting from extraction 
alone to downstream processing), providing 
new job opportunities.
Capture fi sheries
Globally, capture fi sheries added $80  billion 
in gross value and provided direct and indi-
rect employment to more than 120  million 
people in 2004 (World Bank and FAO 2009). 
But because fi sh are mobile, marine capture 
fi sheries are very diffi cult to manage: only a 
handful of fi sheries are being managed rea-
sonably effi ciently.
The open access nature of capture fi sher-
ies has led to overcapitalization, rent loss, 
and overexploitation. Because of a shrinking 
resource base, the growing number of fi shers 
and fi shing overcapacity, the catch per fi sher 
and per vessel has been declining globally—
despite signifi cant technological change and 
investments in vessel capacity (figure 5.1). 
The prevalence of subsidies has reduced the 
cost of fi shing below its economic cost and 
has contributed both to overfishing and 
resource depletion and to the economic waste 
associated with overcapacity (World Bank 
and FAO 2009).
The good news is that well-managed fi sh-
eries could accrue rents as high as $50 bil-
lion (World Bank and FAO 2009), which 
could be used to build wealth or increase 
productivity. Establishing property rights 
would help unlock the potential economic 
value of fi sheries. But defi ning and enforc-
ing these rights remains a challenge. High-
sea capture fi sheries (beyond the exclusive 
economic zone) are dominated by large 
commercial vessels, which are often largely 
unregulated, overcapitalized through subsi-
dies, or both.4
For their part, inshore capture fisher-
ies have long been used as a safety net 
FIGURE 5.1 Current fi shery practices are not sustainable
(productivity of global fi shing fl eet, 1970–2005)
Source: World Bank and FAO 2009.
Note: The fl eet capacity index is the relationship between the capacity of a fi shing fl eet to catch a 
particular quantity of fi sh and the quantity of fi sh it  actually catches.
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BOX 5.1 Job creation and revenue generation from off -shore capture fi sheries in Namibia
Soon after gaining independence from South 
Africa in 1990, the new Namibian government 
declared an extended economic zone, established a 
coherent fi sheries policy, and enacted comprehen-
sive fi sheries legislation based on long-term fi shing 
rights (rights-based management) and payments 
for these rights. At the same time, it focused on 
the “Namibianization” of the processing sector. 
Before independence, all fish were exported (or 
transshipped at sea) whole and frozen for later 
processing into value-added products abroad. By 
investing in local processing capacity, Namibia 
created many jobs and increased the industry’s 
value added (although it also created considerable 
processing overcapacity).
With an average catch of 500,000–800,000 tons 
a year (in 2003 the total catch was about 636,000 
tons), the fisheries sector’s contribution to gross 
domestic product rose from about 4 percent at inde-
pendence to 10.1 percent in 1998. About 95 percent 
of Namibia’s total fi sh production is exported, yield-
ing about $375 million in foreign exchange in 2005. 
About 14,000 people were employed in the fi sheries 
sector in Namibia in 2003, about half of them in 
onshore processing.
Source: http://www.fao.org/fi shery/countrysector/FI-CP_NA/en. 
for the rural unemployed; for this reason, 
policy makers resist altering the status quo. 
 Success stories suggest that policy inter-
ventions that directly address the job loss 
 associated with defining property rights 
can make green growth politically feasi-
ble  (box 5.1). In addition, moving up the 
value chain can help create jobs that are 
more productive. However, such “indus-
trial” policies may not refl ect the country’s 
comparative advantage and would need to 
be justifi ed on a case-by-case basis (Haus-
mann and others 2008).
Natural (including managed) forests
Natural forests (including natural forests 
that are actively managed) provide a range 
of extractable commodities (from timber 
to wood fuel to various nontimber forest 
products) and a range of ecosystem serv-
ices (from regulation of soil, water, and the 
climate to sequestration of carbon and pro-
vision of habitats). In Africa alone, forests 
account for 65 percent of the total primary 
energy supply. Nontimber forest products 
(fruit, nuts, medicinal plants, and game) are 
an important source of rural livelihoods.
Global demand for industrial wood was 
about 1.8 billion cubic meters in 2010, and 
it is projected to rise to 2.6 billion cubic 
meters by 2030, with most of the increase 
coming from Asia and Eastern Europe 
(FAO 2011).5
How will this growing demand be met 
given that natural forests are often not 
well managed? The global rate of defor-
estation remains high, especially in tropical 
regions, with deforestation averaging about 
1 percent a year in Latin America and Africa 
over the 1990–2010 period. The encourag-
ing news is that the rate of deforestation has 
been  declining since 2000 (FAO 2011), with 
impressive declines in some key countries such 
as  Brazil. Moreover, some areas—such as 
temperate and boreal zones and some emerg-
ing economies—have witnessed increases in 
forest area through both natural forest recov-
ery and reforestation. Indeed, more than 80 
 percent of traded timber is produced in tem-
perate countries.
A problem for the world’s forests—
80  percent of which are publicly owned—is 
poorly defined property rights. In many 
developing countries, forests are often 
treated as de facto open access areas. Signifi -
cant progress has been made in recent years 
toward devolving full or partial forest man-
agement to local communities to deal with 
the problems associated with open access 
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regimes (box 5.2). But there have been few 
assessments of the impact of changes in 
forests management regimes on the rate of 
deforestation or the productivity of forests. 
A review of 42 studies on community forest 
management concludes that little is known 
about the effect of community forest man-
agement on improving the productivity of 
forests or reducing poverty (Bowler and oth-
ers 2010).
Another problem is that assessments 
of the economic value of forests are rare, 
especially in developing countries, particu-
larly when it comes to valuing the economic 
contribution of nontimber forest products. 
These products are undervalued because, 
in many countries, they are not refl ected in 
national accounts systems, in part because 
they are produced informally. For example, 
in Europe, where these products are eco-
nomically marginal, they were valued at $7 
billion in 2010. In contrast, in Africa, where 
they are much more important economi-
cally, they totaled only an estimated $0.5 
billion (FAO 2011).
Where these assessments do exist, they sug-
gest that a number of factors limit the value 
added from these resources. A  meta-study of 
61 case studies of production of and trade in 
nontimber forest products in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America fi nds that, by and large, 
commercialization has not helped reduce 
poverty, for four reasons:
• Resources are often collected under open 
access regimes, where overexploitation is 
common, leading to rent dissipation.
• Access to markets tends to be poor, limit-
ing economic returns.
• Fluctuations in quantity and quality make 
commercialization of nontimber forest 
products diffi cult.
• Middlemen often capture the bulk of 
added value (Belcher and others 2005).
As with capture fi sheries, increasing the 
economic returns from natural forests sus-
tainably requires a package of measures that 
includes strengthening property rights; assess-
ing the economic value of forests; and adopt-
ing measures, such as better market access 
BOX 5.2 Reform of forest tenure in Albania and China
In Albania serious degradation of the forests and 
pastures was observed in the early transition years. 
To address the problem, the government reformed 
and decentral ized national inst itutions and 
increased support to pasture and forest management 
at the local level. Reforms transferred management 
rights of forests and pastures to local communities. 
To deal with fi re management and control illegal 
logging, the government adopted a cross-sectoral 
approach. It provided local investment support for 
the restoration of watersheds, forests, and pasture 
land using participatory planning approaches. This 
support included small-scale investments in the 
planting of forests and orchards in degraded lands, 
the thinning and cleaning of degraded forests and 
pastures, and measures to control erosion and graz-
ing. This mix of policy, social, and natural capital 
investments enhanced resilience (erosion control 
and soil restoration), yielded environmental benefi ts 
(carbon sequestration), increased effi ciency (greater 
pasture and forest productivity), created jobs, and 
reduced poverty.
In China, the government has made substantial 
investments in tree planting across the country over 
the past 25 years to restore environmental bal-
ance and secure supplies of raw materials. It has 
also reformed forest user rights to collective forests 
(forests under the control of provinces and other 
subnational authorities). Like reforms to property 
rights of agricultural lands, these reforms sought 
to harness the productive energies of rural house-
holds and communities. They amount to the larg-
est transfer of forest wealth ever recorded. Most 
reforms involve provisions that offer individual 
households a large degree of economic autonomy 
and independence to manage the forests, with 
households and farmers’ groups receiving certifi -
cates of use rights.
Source: World Bank 2010b, 2010c.
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and improved product quality, that increase 
economic returns and refl ect the full value of 
the service.
Soil
Soil quality reflects how well a soil per-
forms the functions of maintaining biodi-
versity and productivity, supporting plants 
and other structures, and providing a slew 
of other nonprovisioning ecosystem serv-
ices. Land degradation includes deteriora-
tion of soil quality, vegetation, and water 
resources (Nkonya and others 2011). It is 
a process that affects all agroecological 
zones, potentially reducing GDP (table 5.1). 
A quarter of the world’s agricultural land is 
estimated to be seriously degraded (Bai and 
others 2008).
Factors leading to land degradation 
include poor agricultural and grazing prac-
tices and forest degradation as well as fac-
tors outside the renewable natural resource 
sector, including poorly designed infra-
structure and mining activities. Land deg-
radation can, in turn, affect the operation 
of infrastructure installations by silting up 
key facilities such as ports and hydroelectric 
power generation facilities.
Land users need to be given the right eco-
nomic incentives to invest in preventing or 
mitigating land degradation. The strength 
of these incentives depends on the nature of 
land tenure regimes (Deininger and Feder 
2001; López 2002) and on the way costs 
and benefi ts are shared. Costs, for example, 
are often borne only by the farmer, whereas 
environmental benefi ts accrue to society as 
a whole.
Well-defined, transparent, and secure 
land tenure systems are essential if farmers 
are to undertake the long-term conserva-
tion that underpins agricultural production 
and investments to improve natural capital 
and productivity. In Rwanda, for example, 
land tenure reform led to a rapid doubling 
of investment in soil conservation, with 
even larger increases for plots managed 
by female farmers (Ali and others 2011). 
Secure land tenure also leads to the devel-
opment of land markets, which improves 
overall allocative effi ciency and the possi-
bility of using land as collateral in formal 
credit markets. That said, land registra-
tion and tenure systems must be adapted 
to local conditions and customs (Deininger 
and Feder 2001). In Africa, approaches to 
land use rights increasingly recognize that 
customary and modern systems may exist 
side by side.
On-site approaches, such as conserva-
tion agriculture, can be tapped to foster 
natural ecological processes to increase 
agricultural yields and sustainability. This 
approach, which dates back to the 1930s, 
is based on three main principles: continu-
ous minimum mechanical soil disturbance; 
permanent organic soil cover; and diversifi -
cation of crop species grown in sequences, 
associations, or both (FAO 2001). Its use 
yields environmental benefits (decreased 
nutrient pollution of waterways, increased 
carbon sequestration in soils), increases the 
effi ciency of production (through the use of 
lower levels of energy inputs), increases resil-
ience (through frequent crop rotation), and 
increases long-run agricultural productivity 
(through decreased erosion and enhanced 
soil structure). Local conditions should dic-
tate the technology (box 5.3).
Conservation agriculture tends to involve 
up-front costs (for new machinery necessary 
for direct seeding or for tree seedlings in 
TABLE 5.1 Poor soil quality and land degradation hurt economic 
growth
Country Type of degradation
Percentage of 
GDP lost
Central African Republic Cropland and soil 1.0
Colombia Land 0.8
Egypt, Arab Rep. Soil 1.2
Ghana Agricultural soils, forests, and 
savanna woodlands
5.3
Pakistan Soil salinity and erosion 1.2
Tajikistan Land, including soil erosion 
and salinity
3.7
Source: Country Environmental Analyses conducted by the World Bank (World Bank 2005a, 2006a, 
2006b, 2007c, 2008b, 2010a).
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agroforestry systems) and short-term yield 
reductions as farm systems are changed. 
Benefi ts may materialize only in the medium 
to long run. Smart subsidies and access to 
long-term fi nancial markets can help cover 
short-run costs and increase adoption.
Focusing public support measures on 
soil fertility can yield impressive results. 
In  Brazil—where state support of agricul-
ture is just 5 percent of aggregated gross 
farm receipts compared with an average of 
18 percent in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries in 2010 (OECD 2011)—the gov-
ernment has concentrated on investments 
in soil fertility enhancement, land and 
water management systems, and crop and 
livestock breeding for varieties adapted to 
Brazil’s climate and ecosystems. Brazil’s 
public support of research and soil fertility 
has paid off handsomely, helping transform 
the country from a net food importer into a 
global food exporter.
Water
The sustainable management of water 
resources is becoming more urgent than 
ever as several global trends collide.6 In 
developing countries, growing populations 
are increasing demand for water to pro-
duce essential commodities like food and 
energy. Higher rates of urbanization fuel 
demand for water for domestic and indus-
trial uses, putting stress on existing raw 
water sources. Exacerbating matters, cli-
mate change increases the risks of greater 
water variability.
One big worry is water scarcity. Develop-
ing countries account for 71 percent of glo-
bal water withdrawals, and their demand is 
expected to increase by 27 percent by 2025 
(from 2010). In 2010, about 44 percent of 
the world population lived in areas of high 
water stress, and projections indicate that 
an additional 1 billion people will be living 
in areas with severe water stress by 2030 
(OECD 2008). And many countries in Asia 
BOX 5.3 Conservation agriculture in Brazil and Zambia
Conservation agriculture fi rst emerged in the 1930s 
during the severe dust storms in the United States. 
It has been gaining momentum worldwide since the 
1990s, when it was employed to deal with soil ero-
sion crises in southern Brazil. Its use is now wide-
spread globally. By 2007, for example, zero-tillage 
practices were in use on about 43 percent of arable 
land in Latin America (World Bank 2007a).
In Brazil, conservation agriculture relies on a 
variety of technologies, depending on the region. 
One approach supports a mixed livestock and crop 
system, rotating pastures with crops. The zero-
tillage system supplies residual nutrients for cheap 
pasture, thereby reducing pests, weeds, and diseases. 
The most common rotations are soybeans, cotton, 
and maize, followed by 1–3 years of pasture. These 
practices have increased pasture stocking rates and 
have reduced soil degradation and water runoff.
In Zambia, five basic conservation farming 
technologies are being used: retaining crop resi-
dues, concentrating tillage and fertilizer applica-
tion in a permanent grid of planting basins or series 
of planting rows, completing land preparation in 
the dry season, weeding aggressively to reduce 
plant competition, and intercropping or rotating 
 nitrogen-fi xing legumes on up to 30 percent of cul-
tivated area.
Many farmers also incorporate nitrogen-fi xing 
trees, which provide fodder and fuelwood. As of 
2010, Zambia had restored 300,000 hectares in an 
effort that involved more than 160,000 households. 
Conservation agriculture practices doubled maize 
yields over those achieved with conventional plow-
ing systems, and increased cotton yields 60 percent. 
A recent study finds returns of $104 per hectare 
for plots under conservation agriculture in Zam-
bia—5.5 times the $19 per hectare of plots under 
conventional tillage (FAO 2010a).
Source: Landers 2005; FAO 2010a; Scherr and others 2011.
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and North Africa are exhibiting moderate 
or extreme scarcity, which is expected to 
increase in the future.
Another worry is poor water quality, 
which sets back growth because it degrades 
ecosystems; causes health-related diseases; 
constrains economic activities (such as agri-
culture, industrial production, and tourism); 
reduces the value of property and assets; and 
boosts wastewater treatment costs. For exam-
ple, the annual costs of poor water quality 
stand at 0.6 percent of GDP in Tunisia and 
2.8 percent of GDP in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (World Bank 2007b).
Yet another worry is natural hazards—the 
vast majority of which involve water—which 
affect almost everyone and retard growth. 
Kenya, for example, was hit by several dis-
asters over a 3-year period that undid years 
of economic growth (an extreme fl ood cost 
its economy 16 percent of GDP, and extreme 
drought 11 percent of GDP) (World Bank 
2004). And when these natural hazards 
strike, it is the poor who suffer most, because 
of their locations, low incomes, insuffi cient 
infrastructure, and greater reliance on cli-
mate-sensitive sectors like agriculture.
What can policy makers do to better man-
age water resources? Four green growth 
water policies—none of them easy to design 
or implement—can be adopted:
• Correct distortions in water allocation 
decisions. New mechanisms for allo-
cating water resources should embrace 
economic principles of allocative effi-
ciency to correct for market failures 
and  imperfections. These failures are 
compounded by the sector’s political 
economy and the fact that more effi cient 
water pricing boosts costs for some ele-
ments of society more than others. Deci-
sion makers need to devise effi cient and 
flexible ways to allocate water among 
competing quantity and quality demands 
for human use (energy, agriculture, fi sh-
eries, and urban consumption) and eco-
systems health (forests and wetlands) 
(World Bank 2010d). A study of China 
finds that improving water allocation 
could increase per capita income by 
1.5 percent a year between 2000 and 
2060 (Fang and others 2006).
• Expand the use of water pricing mecha-
nisms to manage demand. The price of 
most water services does not include invest-
ment, operation, and maintenance costs or 
the scarcity value of the resources. Pricing 
could be used as an effective instrument to 
ensure the resource’s  optimal allocation. 
Most countries fail to use it because of the 
political and social sensitivities of water 
management, particularly the need to 
ensure affordability for the poorest com-
munities. Most countries allocate surface 
and groundwater by assigning fi xed quotas 
to major sectors and activities. Although 
far from effective, these quotas have been 
politically and socially acceptable. In the 
short term, they seem to be a more realis-
tic option than full cost pricing.
• Create new markets. Tradable water 
rights are an effective water management 
instrument in the long term but have 
proven diffi cult to implement in the short 
term in most developing countries—
partly because success depends greatly on 
sound design and partly because it takes a 
long time to establish the necessary insti-
tutions (World Bank 2010d). Thus, in the 
short term, it is imperative to ensure that 
the proper institutional arrangements and 
capacities are in place.
• Strengthen the framework for  analyzing 
the relationship between growth and 
water. There have been few attempts to 
analyze and quantify the relationship 
between water and economic growth 
and development because of the com-
plex spatial and temporal dimensions 
of water and its management. There is a 
need to strengthen this analytical frame-
work by examining regional differences 
in growth within a country or group of 
countries. This information would allow 
more informed decision-making processes 
by providing a clear understanding of the 
economic tradeoffs of policies in different 
sectors (such as energy, agriculture, urban, 
land use, environment, and health).
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Cultivated renewable resources: 
Innovation, sustainable 
intensifi cation, and integrated 
landscape approaches
Food production will need to increase by 
75 percent between 2010 and 2050 to cope 
with rising demand caused by population 
and income growth and changes in the 
structure of demand. As incomes increase, 
demand for higher-value horticultural and 
livestock products is likely to increase by 
more than direct demand for staples; demand 
for livestock products will likely increase 
85 percent between 2010 and 2030  (Foresight 
2011). Yet hunger remains a challenge: 
800 million people in the world remain food 
insecure. Improving agricultural productiv-
ity and access to food remain core elements 
of an inclusive growth agenda.
For cultivated renewable resources, 
the main policy challenges are to support 
sustainable increases in productivity and 
resource-efficient production by focusing 
on innovation, increasing effi ciency in input 
use, regulating pollution, and ensuring that 
smallholder farming more fully realizes its 
potential, especially in lower-income devel-
oping countries. In the future, a larger share 
of fi sh and wood products is likely to come 
from aquaculture and plantation forestry 
than from natural forests or wild fi sheries, 
further increasing the importance of sus-
tainable management of cultivated renew-
able resources in meeting green growth 
objectives.
Agriculture, including livestock
Agricultural production is strongly affected 
by how natural capital—especially energy, 
land, water, forest, marine, and coastal 
 systems—is managed. Agriculture, including 
livestock, accounts for 70 percent of fresh 
water consumption and 40 percent of land 
area. Many agricultural systems depend 
heavily on fossil fuels for nitrogen fertilizer, 
crop husbandry, harvesting, transport, and 
pumping water for irrigation. Thus, food 
and fossil fuel energy prices are closely 
linked. There are synergies and tradeoffs 
between maximizing production of food at 
low cost and conserving the environment. 
These synergies need to be maximized and 
the tradeoffs managed.
Strategies in support of a green growth 
agenda for agriculture need to differentiate 
between agriculture-dependent, transition-
ing, and urbanized economies and between 
land and water–dependent and land and 
water–abundant ecosystems and countries. 
In agriculture-dependent countries, agricul-
tural productivity and inclusive growth are 
closely related: GDP growth in these sectors 
is estimated to benefi t the poor two to four 
times as much as GDP growth in other sec-
tors (World Bank 2007a). Four elements may 
be considered in a green growth strategy for 
agriculture.
Increasing productivity while improv-
ing  l an d  an d wat e r  m an age m e nt . 
 Intensifi cation—producing more with less—
has been responsible for the dramatic rise in 
global cereal yields in recent decades. From 
1960 to 2010, rice yields rose 250 percent 
(from 1.8 to nearly 4.5 tons per hectare 
[Dobermann and others 2008; Interna-
tional Rice Research Institute data]), while 
between 1965 and 2000 cultivated land 
area increased by just 20 percent (from 125 
million to 150 million hectares [Khush and 
Virk 2005]). Attaining the same production 
increase with no growth in yields would 
have required increasing the area planted 
with rice to  300 million hectares, reduc-
ing further land  availability for wetland or 
watershed protection functions. Extensive, 
poorly managed agricultural and grazing 
systems, often related to poverty and lack of 
access to fi nance or knowledge, contribute 
to the land degradation and loss of soil fer-
tility described above. Sustainable intensifi -
cation can protect biodiversity, reduce defor-
estation, save water, and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. By integrating improved land, 
soil, and water management measures into 
production systems, such intensive systems 
can also increase productivity while main-
taining and even enhancing the value of 
natural capital.
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In a number of agricultural systems inten-
sifi cation has been accompanied by negative 
environmental consequences. Excessive and 
poorly managed fertilizer and agrochemical 
use has polluted water bodies and soils; run-
off has created “dead zones” in coastal areas 
that cover about 245,000 square kilometers 
worldwide, mostly in OECD countries.7 Agri-
cultural run-off from intensive farming is the 
single greatest water polluter in China and 
other intensively farmed countries, including 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United 
States (Chinese National Census of Pollution 
2010; Scheierling 1996).
Similar tradeoffs are linked to live-
stock production. In the United States, for 
example, production effi ciency in the dairy 
industry soared over the past 60 years. In 
2007, producing 1 billion kilograms of 
milk required just 10 percent of the land, 
21 percent of the animals, 23 percent of the 
feed, and 35 percent of the water used to do 
so in 1944. But there were plenty of nega-
tives, including the geographical concentra-
tion of livestock waste, increased water and 
air pollution, and reduced animal welfare. 
These problems could be avoided with the 
right mix of incentives and regulation to 
protect water bodies and manage waste. 
Productivity increases, innovation, and 
genetic improvements are a “low-hanging 
fruit”: in India, average milk yields are only 
3.4 kilograms per day compared with the 
world average of 6.3 kilograms, and only 
20 percent of animals are cross-bred; dou-
bling productivity would halve greenhouse 
emissions per cow.
But in Colombia, a mix of policies has 
supported sustainable productivity increases 
for livestock by encouraging landscape-
based, mixed agro-sylvi-pastoral systems. 
The aim is to introduce trees and better 
pasture in grazing lands, provide improved 
fodder and shade, and reduce heat stress for 
animals and soil degradation. The results are 
impressive—including increased meat and 
milk yields as well as improved water infi l-
tration, increased bird populations, reduced 
methane generation, and improved carbon 
capture (López 2012). This livestock policy is 
part of a broader land use policy intended to 
support sustainable intensifi cation together 
with forest and landscape restoration. These 
approaches have helped achieve “triple wins” 
of increased productivity, enhanced resilience 
to climate variability, and reduced carbon 
emissions (“climate-smart agriculture”).
Some agricultural subsidies exacerbate the 
negative effects of intensification. In land-
scarce, intensely farmed agricultural systems 
with already high levels of inputs, subsidiza-
tion of inorganic fertilizer encourages over-
use, with deleterious effects on the environ-
ment (box 5.4). However, in countries with 
low-input/low-output systems, a fertilizer 
subsidy may initially be justifi ed to increase 
yields and enhance vegetative growth and 
soil carbon.
BOX 5.4 The use and misuse of agricultural input subsidies in India
In India, fertilizer and other input subsidies 
 contributed to rapid development of irrigation 
and more intensive farming methods, resulting 
in increases in yields and food security: by 2010, 
irrigated wheat yields in some provinces averaged 
4.5 tons per hectare, up from 1.5 tons per hec-
tare in 1975. However, subsidized energy is now 
contributing to excess groundwater withdrawals 
(about 75  percent of groundwater used in Punjab 
and Harayana  originates from overexploited aqui-
fers),  requiring pumping water from ever-deeper 
aquifers and  salinization of aquifers in some areas. 
In addition, the fertilizer subsidy—which cost 
the  government $30 billion (2 percent of GDP) in 
2008—is contributing to  excessive use of nitrogen 
compared with phosphorus and potassium, exacer-
bating nitrate pollution of rivers and aquifers.
Source: Prince’s Charities’ International Sustainability Unit 2011.
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Increasing effi ciency and reducing waste. 
Reducing food waste involves some of the 
same issues encountered in  increasing energy 
effi ciency: even where the saving potential is 
huge, many barriers,  including  transactions 
costs, prevent effi ciency-increasing  investments 
from being made. The  problem has been rec-
ognized for decades, but limited progress has 
been made. In both  agriculture-dependent and 
OECD countries, up to one-third of food is 
lost or wasted. The  reasons for this waste—
and the solutions to the  problem—vary with 
the settings  (Foresight 2011).
In agriculture-dependent countries, where 
food accounts for a large share of household 
expenditure (46 percent in Pakistan), there is 
little household waste, despite lack of refrig-
eration at home. But 15–30 percent of food 
produced is lost before it reaches markets, 
because of postharvest losses caused by poor 
storage and ineffi cient transport systems. The 
problem is compounded by food quality and 
food safety issues, which may preclude poor 
farmers from participating in value chains 
(Gómez and others 2011). For low-income 
countries, the following strategies could 
reduce food waste:
• Diffusing existing knowledge and tech-
nology in storage and investing in trans-
port infrastructure.
• Investing in new technologies to reduce 
postharvest waste.
• Using information and communication 
technology to improve market informa-
tion, helping match supply and demand 
in local markets.
• Investing in capacity building, infrastruc-
ture, and regulatory improvements in 
food quality and food safety.
OECD countries have developed effi cient 
supply chains from farm to market, with low 
spoilage rates and effective transport sys-
tems. But about one-third of food supplied is 
nevertheless wasted through losses in super-
markets (food thrown away because it is 
not sold by the sell-by date), losses in homes 
(food discarded before it is used), and plate 
waste (food that is served but not consumed). 
Because food accounts for a relatively small 
proportion of household expenditure in 
OECD countries (11 percent in Germany, 
7 percent in the United States), there is lit-
tle price incentive to avoid waste. However, 
new technologies, such as enhanced sensor 
technologies to monitor the edibility of food, 
could help reduce wastage. The main chal-
lenge is changing consumer behavior.
Harnessing technology. Technological 
innovation plays a key role in green growth 
strategies for agriculture. It can be used to 
increase input efficiency, as is the case in 
 irrigation water management, where advances 
in the use of remote sensing technologies per-
mit estimation of crop evapo-transpiration 
(the sum of evaporation and plant transpira-
tion to the atmosphere) on farmers’ fi elds and 
facilitate improvement of water accounting 
at the regional and basin-wide levels. China 
is adopting this approach with its Xinjiang 
Turpan Water Conservation Program, in 
an arid part of the country (World Bank 
2010c). This program monitors basin-wide 
 evapo-transpiration with remote sensing 
and supports a combination of engineer-
ing, agronomic, and irrigation management 
measures to increase agricultural productiv-
ity measured in terms of evapo-transpiration. 
 Innovation includes developing agricultural 
products that feature improved characteris-
tics, such as being drought resistant, requiring 
less fertilizer, and being resistant to  common 
pests and diseases (which reduces the need 
for pesticides)—as India is doing with better 
backyard chickens (box 5.5).
Innovation can also be used to increase 
access to weather and climate information 
services for farmers, which improves resil-
ience, increases effi ciency, and raises income. 
In Florida, a timing tool helps farmers reduce 
the quantity of fungicide they use, reducing 
the harmful effects on the ecosystem and sav-
ing them money (Pavan and others 2010). But 
in many developing countries and transition 
economies, investment and expenditure in 
the classic public goods of weather and cli-
mate information generation and services 
is far too low (World Bank 2008a). A 2010 
study by NetHope in Kenya indicates that 
farmers gain access to information through a 
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range of methods, including SMS (cell phone 
messaging), radio, newspapers, and extension 
offi cers.8
Changing the structure of support  policies. 
Changes in the structure of support policies 
can also help manage potential tradeoffs. In 
the European Union (EU)—and to a lesser 
extent the United States—the past 20 years 
have been characterized by a shift away from 
highly distortive price and quantity instru-
ments (target prices, export subsidies, and 
quotas) toward lump-sum payments. The 
policy change has weakened the incentives 
for farmers to use polluting inputs, such as 
 fertilizers and pesticides. Between 1991 and 
2006 fertilizer use decreased in most EU 
member countries, though it increased in new 
member countries (Eurostat 2011). Moreover, 
as agricultural transfers became decoupled 
from production, they became increasingly 
subject to environmental provisions.9
Aquaculture
In 2009, humans consumed 117 million tons 
of fi sh—almost half of which was produced 
on farms (FAO 2010b). By 2030, this fi gure 
is expected to rise to 140 million tons. Cap-
ture fi sheries are not expected to support the 
higher demand, leaving aquaculture to meet 
shortfalls in supply.
As in the livestock industry, competition, 
economies of scale, and economies of agglom-
eration have increased productivity but have 
pushed some systems into potentially damag-
ing environmental practices. Farms tend to 
concentrate where there is expertise, good 
land, water resources, and marketing infra-
structure. This crowding has sometimes led 
to overuse of ecosystems services, pollution, 
and massive fi sh kills. Agglomeration in the 
Norwegian salmon farming industry, for 
example, has reportedly improved the trans-
fer of knowledge and increased the supply 
of specialized production factors, but it has 
also helped spread fi sh disease (Tveteras and 
 Battese 2006).
There are two approaches to greening 
aquaculture. The first is zoning—that is, 
leaving adequate space between farms and 
interspersing a variety of aquaculture systems 
(including a mixture of species at the farm 
BOX 5.5 Producing a better backyard chicken in India
Kegg Farms in India has bred a robust and improved 
dual-purpose backyard chicken. The “Kuroiler” 
lays 100–150 eggs a year (many more than the 
40 eggs a year the Desi chicken lays) and grows to 
2.5  kilograms in about half the time a Desi chicken 
reaches 1  kilogram. The chickens typically com-
mand a premium of about Rs 60 per kilogram over 
other broiler  chickens, because the meat is darker 
and more fl avorsome.
Kegg Farms produces about 16 million day-old 
chicks a year, which it sells to 1,500 small enterprises 
that raise the chicks for about two weeks before inoc-
ulating them and selling them to about 6,500 bicycle 
salespeople, who sell them to some 800,000 farmers, 
most of them women, many located in some of the 
remotest parts of the country. The turnover in sales 
of chicks is about $5 million a year, with another 
$5 million turnover by the  thousands of small, rurally 
based businesses that grow and sell the chicks.
An independent assessment indicates that the 
average gross revenue generated per Kuroiler chick 
(as eggs and meat) is $3.10. With some 16 million 
chicks distributed annually, total output is about 
$50 million, with a net profi t of about $10 million. 
Profits from the Kuroiler are significantly higher 
than profi ts from the Desi bird. The Kuroiler birds 
contribute significantly to household cash flow. 
Women have maintained control over their chicken-
growing enterprises as the business has become more 
commercial.
The success of Kegg Farms refl ects several factors. 
Its chickens are more robust than other chickens, are 
better able to scavenge food, and have higher food 
conversion ratios. The company’s business model 
features a devolved, rural-based distribution system 
with in-built incentives.
Source: Isenberg 2006.
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or watershed level) and water uses between 
major centers of production. This approach 
would hinder disease transmission, moder-
ate negative impacts on wild fi sh populations, 
and reduce the contribution of aquaculture to 
water eutrophication.
The second approach is creating synergies 
with other economic activities in the water-
shed. The farming of aquatic plants (such 
as seaweed) and the filter feeding of detri-
tivorous organisms (such as mussels, clams, 
and sea cucumbers, which together represent 
about 40 percent of total global aquaculture) 
reduce nutrient loading from livestock, agri-
culture, and other sources. Fish production in 
cages or culture-based fi sheries can be con-
ducted in reservoirs and irrigation systems to 
amortize costs, improve water quality, reduce 
weeds, and replace wild catch where dams 
have destroyed indigenous fi sh stocks. Mixed 
fish and rice production systems are wide-
spread in low-lying areas and fl ood plains, 
taking advantage of synergies between the 
water and land management approaches.
Although dispersing fi sh farms is good for 
the environment, it does raise costs, in part 
because of the losses from agglomeration. 
Thus, green growth strategies will require 
practical fi nancial and market incentives to 
support spatial dispersing, technical guide-
lines on green technology, and government 
policies that encourage investors to avoid the 
traditional practice of copying successful pro-
duction/ market models and instead explore 
new partnerships at the watershed level.
Plantation forests
Afforestation—the planting of forests 
in areas that were not forested in recent 
times—is expected to meet an increasing 
share of the demand for wood and fi ber, pos-
sibly reducing pressure on primary and nat-
ural forests. In 2010, the global area under 
plantation forests (forested areas artifi cially 
created by planting or seeding) accounted for 
7 percent of total forest area and 40  percent 
of industrial timber production (FAO 2011). 
Plantation forests provide a growing share 
of industrial timber, both because the area 
under plantation forests has increased and 
because productivity has risen. Areas under 
bamboo and rubber plantation are also 
increasingly being used to provide timber 
products, providing an important source of 
income for rural households. Reforestation 
and restoration of degraded woodlands also 
play a role in plantation forestry.
Whether plantation forests help or hurt the 
environment depends on the land use systems 
they replace. In China, for example, bamboo 
plantations have helped control soil erosion 
by replacing agriculture on steep slopes. But 
in some provinces, where plantations have 
replaced natural forests in areas not well 
suited to bamboo, soil erosion has increased. 
The Chinese government has tried to address 
these negative environmental effects by estab-
lishing environmental regulations, but these 
regulations have been resisted in some cases 
(Ruiz-Perez and others 2001). More recently, 
China has supported programs with species 
better adapted to local ecosystems (World 
Bank 2010c).
Agroforestry systems, in which trees are 
incorporated into the broader production 
landscape, are widespread in some areas. 
They can yield the “triple wins” of climate-
smart agriculture by enhancing productivity, 
resilience, and carbon sequestration, as they 
have in Kenya and the Sahel (Liniger and 
others 2011).
Nonprovisioning services: 
Creating knowledge and markets 
for economic valuation
In addition to ecosystems that provide food 
and water (“provisioning services”) are eco-
systems that regulate, support, and offer 
cultural services (“nonprovisioning” serv-
ices). This group includes nature-based tour-
ism supported by biodiversity, watershed 
services, and climate-regulating services. 
The main challenge in this area is to cre-
ate markets for these services so that they 
become part of the visible economy and are 
effi ciently provided.
Another challenge is coping with the tim-
ing of benefi ts. Although efforts to reduce the 
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loss of ecosystem services are likely to boost 
growth in the near term, efforts to restore 
these services take a long time and are unlikely 
to do so in the near term (Vincent 2012).
Biodiversity
Biodiversity refers to the degree of vari-
ation of life forms, including all animals, 
plants, habitats, and genes. It matters 
because genetic diversity provides the basis 
for new breeding programs, improved 
crops, enhanced agricultural production, 
and food security. When species become 
extinct or habitats are threatened, biodi-
versity is reduced; according to the Interna-
tional Union for Conservation of Nature, 
875 species went extinct (or extinct in the 
wild) in 2008. Ecosystem fragmentation 
can contribute to species loss, especially for 
large predators, leading to a cycle of habi-
tat degradation.
Tropical, temperate, and boreal forests 
(forests in northerly latitudes) are home to 
the vast majority of the world’s terrestrial 
species. They play a major role in biodiver-
sity and provide cultural, recreational, and 
other supporting services, such as soil and 
water conservation. For this reason, 12 per-
cent of the world’s forests are designated 
for the conservation of biodiversity—an 
increase of more than 20 percent since the 
1990s (FAO 2010a).
A key reason why the world has experi-
enced such a dramatic loss in biodiversity is 
the diffi culty of valuing it, given knowledge, 
time, and spatial asymmetries. Building a 
road around, rather than through, a frag-
ile ecosystem increases its cost by a known 
amount, payable immediately; the benefit 
of protecting the ecosystem and its inherent 
biodiversity is much more diffi cult to value 
and accrues only over time. At the global 
level, many efforts are under way to protect 
biodiversity, dating back to the 1992 Con-
vention on Biological Diversity. At the local 
level, the incentive could come in part from 
the economic returns that biodiversity can 
generate through nature-based tourism and 
bioprospecting.
Nature-based tourism. Nature-based 
tourism (or ecotourism) is defined by the 
International Ecotourism Society as “respon-
sible travel to natural areas that conserves 
the environment and sustains the well-being 
of local people.” It is one of the fastest-
growing sectors in the tourism industry, 
with annual growth rates of 10–12 percent 
(TIES 2006). Nature-based tourism aims to 
combine stringent environmental provisions 
with the generation of local economic rev-
enues, thus concurrently triggering positive 
development impacts and incentives to con-
serve natural capital.
Nature-based tourism can be a sig-
nifi cant source of employment, economic 
growth, and revenue (including foreign 
exchange) (Aylward and others 1996; 
Wunder 2000). A study of nature-based 
tourism in Zambia estimates that eco-
tourism generated 3.1 percent of GDP in 
2005 (agriculture contributed 6.5 percent, 
mining 8.6 percent, and manufacturing 
10.6 percent) (World Bank 2007d). Poten-
tial tradeoffs between rural livelihoods and 
nature-based tourism need to be managed 
by involving local communities. Indeed, the 
success of a nature-based tourism initiative 
is often linked to such involvement, which 
requires establishing incentives for local peo-
ple to effectively protect their community’s 
natural capital (box 5.6). Tourism revenues 
are only a partial solution, however, as many 
important ecosystems have only limited 
appeal for tourists.
Bioprospecting. Bioprospecting is the 
search for genetic material from plants or 
animal species that can be used to develop 
valuable pharmaceutical (or other) products. 
It represents a second example of how the 
creation of a market can provide incentives 
to protect biodiversity, although in practice it 
is hard to achieve (Polasky and others 2005). 
Returns to bioprospecting are often too low 
to provide suffi cient incentives to conserve 
biodiversity, and disputes arise over the dis-
tribution of rents resulting from discoveries. 
The Access and Benefi t Sharing provisions of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity may 
help alleviate this problem.10
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Watershed services
Watersheds—that is, the area of land where 
all of the water that is under it or drains off it 
goes into the same place—provide a range of 
ecosystem services, supplying water and hydro-
electric power, regulating water flows and 
fl oods,11 controlling soil erosion, and creating 
habitats for wildlife. Because of spatial trade-
offs—and in some cases open access regimes—
the market often underprovides these services, 
creating the need for public intervention. To 
correct this market failure, governments have 
been investing directly in the restoration and 
enhancement of watershed services through 
initiatives such as watershed development 
programs. Payments for such environmental 
services are a recent policy innovation to cre-
ate markets and provide incentives to conserve 
or generate these services.
Support for investments in soil and water 
conservation. Investments in soil and water 
conservation normally include support for 
a mix of measures adapted to local condi-
tions, including landscape restoration, ero-
sion control, grazing management, water 
harvesting, and agricultural productivity 
support measures. At lower altitudes in irri-
gated landscapes, they often include support 
for improved irrigation water management, 
drainage, and salinity control. Such inte-
grated programs have been supported to scale 
in a number of countries and include a mix of 
private and public investment measures.
In Turkey, better land management 
practices—promoted through investments 
in watershed rehabilitation and landscape 
restoration and reforestation programs, as 
well as profound changes in agricultural 
policy—have led to greening in the interior 
of the country, despite declining rainfall and 
increased temperatures in these areas. How-
ever, it is unclear whether this “regreening” 
also led to increases in rural incomes and 
employment.
In India, where several watershed develop-
ment programs have been tried in semiarid 
rain-fed regions of the country, the verdict 
is still out. These programs seek to increase 
agricultural productivity by controlling 
soil erosion, preventing siltation of water 
BOX 5.6 Involving local communities in nature-based tourism in Indonesia
The Komodo National Park is a protected marine 
area in the Lesser Sunda Islands of Indonesia. This 
World Heritage Site was established in 1980 to pro-
tect the habitat of the Komodo dragon. Since then, 
its goals have expanded to include protection of 
the area’s many coral species and nearly 1,000 fi sh 
species.
In 2005, a nonprofi t joint venture, Putri Naga 
Komodo (PNK)—comprising The Nature Con-
servancy, a local tourism company, and the Inter-
national Finance Corporation—was set up to run 
the area. The aim is to protect biodiversity and 
enable local communities to benefi t from the park 
in a sustainable way—through carefully managed 
nature-based tourism, alternative livelihoods for 
local people, and collaborative protection strate-
gies, such as antipoaching patrols. All proceeds 
go toward stewarding biodiversity and developing 
alternative and sustainable livelihoods for the local 
communities.
PNK, which is the exclusive manager of the ven-
ture, has invested $1 million in helping people in the 
park develop new activities, such as woodcarving 
and textile weaving. It has also provided them with 
technical assistance to develop sustainable seaweed 
farms, as well as facilitate the breeding of high-value 
reef fi sh to substitute for threatened wild fi sh. These 
efforts notwithstanding, a recent evaluation report 
(Agardy and others 2011), while acknowledging the 
project’s positive impacts, raises concerns about the 
sustainability of the results, given the difficulties 
encountered in making this public-private partner-
ship work.
Source: The Nature Conservancy website (http://www.nature.org/); Catherine 
Cruveillier-Cassagne (personal communication).
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bodies, and improving the reliability of water 
resources. They also hope to provide employ-
ment opportunities and improve the availabil-
ity of drinking water, particularly during the 
summer. Between 1996 and 2004, the gov-
ernment of India spent more than $6  billion 
on watershed development (WRI 2005), but 
no systematic, large-scale assessment of the 
impact of these programs has been conducted 
(Joshi and others 2004).
There are nevertheless some positive 
results for integrated landscape approaches. 
In Kazakhstan, the Syr Darya/Northern Aral 
Sea Control program in the lower Syr Darya 
watershed supported innovations in water 
management, combining “soft” and “hard” 
infrastructure solutions and fl ood manage-
ment, which helped restore river functions 
and the Northern Aral Sea, leading to recov-
ery of grazing lands, ecosystems, and fi sher-
ies (World Bank 2011b). In Rwanda, the land 
husbandry, water harvesting, and hillside 
irrigation programs have already increased 
yields and incomes and have reduced soil 
losses (World Bank 2011a).
Payments for ecosystem services. The 
Pago por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) pro-
gram, implemented in Costa Rica in 1997, 
was one of the first schemes to pay people 
to provide ecosystem services. Under this 
program, private landowners and communi-
ties receive payments for conserving the for-
est and helping protect water quality down-
stream. Financing for the scheme comes from 
donor grants, earmarked taxes, and buyers 
of ecosystem services, including municipal 
utilities. Other examples of payments for 
ecosystem services include schemes estab-
lished to eliminate or reduce animal waste 
and agricultural chemical residues to pro-
tect water reservoirs, payments to landown-
ers to encourage conservation, and REDD+ 
schemes, under which payments will be made 
for carbon sequestration services and to pro-
vide an incentive to reduce deforestation and 
forest degradation.12
In some developing countries, policy mak-
ers have tried to design payment for ecosys-
tem services programs to benefi t the poor, but 
the evidence on both the environmental and 
the poverty reduction effects of payment pro-
grams is thin (Pattanayak and others 2010). 
In China’s Sloping Land Conversion Pro-
gram, average household incomes remained 
unchanged, although incomes increased for 
some households and decreased for others. In 
addition, increased availability of fodder to 
improve income from livestock rearing, and 
extension services to improve agricultural 
productivity have helped compensate house-
holds for the loss of agricultural incomes 
from the conversion to forests. In Ecuador, 
Costa Rica, and Mexico, large-scale payment 
for ecosystem services schemes (table 5.2) 
may have benefi ted the poor, although assess-
ments remain to be done.
Whether the poor are helped will no 
doubt depend on the scheme’s design. Those 
based on land diversion (from current use 
to a use that is more oriented toward the 
provision of environmental services) are 
likely to benefi t the landed, some of whom 
are poor— although they could also hurt 
poor households, especially the landless, by 
reducing access to key natural resources. 
Those based on working lands are likely 
to increase the demand for labor and may 
thereby benefi t the poor. However, schemes 
expected to meet poverty reduction goals 
may be less effective in meeting environmen-
tal goals (Jack and others 2008). Where the 
poverty reduction impacts are likely to be 
small, it may be better to design schemes to 
be as effective as possible in achieving envi-
ronmental goals and draw on other instru-
ments to reduce poverty (Bond and Mayers 
2009; Wunder 2008).
Climate-regulating services
Natural capital—including the oceans, land, 
and their living organisms—plays a key role 
in climate regulation.13 However, the value 
of these key regulating services is not ade-
quately captured through markets, and val-
uing them is diffi cult.
One of the most important services that for-
ests, soils, and water provide is storing  carbon. 
Indeed, out of the 9 gigatons (Gt), or billion 
tons, of CO2 emissions released in 2007, the 
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oceans absorbed about 2Gt and terrestrial 
ecosystems about 2.7Gt. The remaining half 
remained in the atmosphere, increasing the 
concentration of CO2 and  contributing to glo-
bal warming (World Bank 2010d). Maintain-
ing and, where possible, increasing the seques-
tration capacity of  terrestrial, coastal, and 
marine ecosystems thus plays an important 
role in mitigating  climate change.
Healthy ecosystems that sequester 
 carbon also function better in flood and 
erosion management, increasing the adap-
tive capacity of ecosystem services such as 
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in the 
following ways:
• Coastal ecosystems (including mangroves 
and wetlands) reduce erosion and fl ood-
ing and provide spawning grounds for 
marine species.
• Freshwater wetlands and floodplains 
maintain water fl ow and quality, acting 
as fl oodwater reservoirs and water stor-
age facilities in times of drought; they 
also provide grazing land for livestock 
and aquatic habitats.
• Forests and vegetation stabilize slopes, 
control erosion and fl ash fl oods, and con-
serve soil fertility for agriculture.
• Integration of trees into agricultural pro-
duction systems builds climate resilience.
However, ecosystem losses reduce their 
effectiveness as carbon sinks and their role 
in adaptation. Under current management 
regimes, land-based ecosystems in some coun-
tries contribute signifi cantly to greenhouse 
gas emissions: emissions from agriculture, 
land use change, and forestry (deforestation, 
degradation, and fi res) account for more than 
30 percent of greenhouse gas emissions (for-
ests account for about 17 percent and agricul-
ture another 14 percent) (UNFCCC 2007).
Overall, more progress has been made 
in recognizing the importance of terrestrial 
ecosystems in climate regulation than in 
marine ecosystems, and more progress has 
been made in recognizing the role of forests 
in climate mitigation than of soils (UNEP 
and others 2009). Total carbon stocks in 
vegetation and in the top meter of soils are 
estimated at 466Gt (vegetation) and 2,011Gt 
(soil) ( Ravindrah and Ostwald 2008; Watson 
and others 2000). The top meter of soil is 
 important because annual crops depend on 
its quality and organic content for growth. 
For tropical forests, nearly half of the 428Gt 
of carbon stocks is from above-ground 
TABLE 5.2 Impacts of payment for ecosystem services schemes on poverty reduction
Country/study Scheme Seller characteristics/results Payment Impact on income
China/Bennett 
(2008)
Sloping land 
conversion 
program
Tens of millions of rural 
households; 9 million ha of 
marginal sloping lands converted 
from agriculture to forests, 
4.92 million ha of degraded 
lands reforested
Annual in-kind payment of grain 
(1,500–2,250 kg per ha), cash 
subsidy ($36 per ha), and free 
seedlings. Length of subsidy 
depends on type of forests. 
Income from forests and 
grasslands tax free 
Mixed results: in Gansu, 50% 
of participants lost 8% of 1999 
household net income; in 
Sichuan, 30% lost 11% of net 
income; in Shaanxi, 7% lost 
33% of net income; estimates 
do not include net present 
value of future income from 
trees and grasses
Costa Rica/
Pagiola (2008)
Payments for 
environmental 
services
Private landowners, indigenous 
communities; 270,000 ha 
enrolled in 2005
$64 per ha per year for forest 
conservation and $816 per ha for 
10 years for timber plantation 
(15% of which goes toward 
transactions fees)
Bulk of beneﬁ ts goes to larger 
and better oﬀ  farmers, but 
no assessment of impact on 
poverty reduction
Ecuador/Wunder 
and Albán (2008)
PROFAFOR 109 private landowners (50- ha 
minimum contract size), 
43 communities.
$100–$200 per ha to cover 
plantation costs; 70–100% value 
of harvested wood, 100% of 
nontimber forest products
Upfront payment of $60–$635 
per household (6–50% of 
household expenditure); 
income of $7–$2,481 per 
household from harvesting
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vegetation; in tropical savannahs, 80 percent 
of the 330Gt of carbon stocks is from soil.
Much work remains to be done to incor-
porate agricultural and grazing land and 
soils into climate change regimes. Only one 
pilot program in Africa, the Agricultural Soil 
Carbon Project, has benefited from finan-
cial support from carbon finance through 
the BioCarbon Fund.14 The project supports 
increased agricultural productivity, agro-
forestry, and sustainable land management 
practices on more than 65,000 hectares in 
western Kenya; farmers benefi t from selling 
carbon sequestered both in and above the 
soil as a result of improved farming practices 
(World Bank 2011a). The Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism recognizes emissions from 
livestock and paddy rice as major sources of 
emission, especially in more intensive farming 
systems in East Asia and OECD countries.15
Lessons can be learned from the progress 
made on forests, including the work on 
REDD+. As countries prepare REDD+ strat-
egies, they must address carbon monitoring, 
reporting, and verification as well as chal-
lenges regarding tenure rights to carbon stored 
or sequestered, potential tradeoffs between 
conservation and development, the rights of 
indigenous people and forest-dependent com-
munities, and the tradeoffs between carbon 
sequestration and other ecosystem services, 
such as biodiversity.
Increasingly, countries are weighing 
 co-benefi ts from adaptation and local income 
generation as they develop REDD+ strategies 
(box 5.7). However, given the modest devel-
opment of international carbon markets, it is 
important to manage expectations regarding 
potential revenues from these sources over 
the next few years (FAO 2010a).
The role of marine ecosystems in adapta-
tion and mitigation has received relatively 
little attention, partly because of their com-
plexity, their status as an international com-
mon property resource, and the absence of 
robust mitigation metrics. Focusing first 
on coastal ecosystems in relatively shallow 
waters, where restoration approaches are well 
known, would be a low-risk, shorter-term 
strategy that could restore their capacity in 
oxygenating coastal waters, provide nurseries 
for fi sh stocks, and shelter coastal settlements 
BOX 5.7 Scoring a triple win in Ethiopia by restoring the landscape
The overexploitation of forest resources in Ethiopia 
has left less than 3 percent of the country’s native 
forests untouched. In Humbo, near Ethiopia’s Great 
Rift Valley, deforestation threatens groundwater 
reserves that provide 65,000 people with pota-
ble water. It has caused severe erosion, resulting 
in floods and mudslides. With a population that 
depends heavily on agriculture, exacerbation of 
droughts and fl oods creates poverty traps for many 
households, thwarting efforts to build up their assets 
and invest in a better future.
Under the Humbo Assisted Natural Regeneration 
Project (implemented with the help of World Vision), 
farmer-managed regeneration of the natural forest 
encourages new growth from felled tree stumps that 
are still living. The regeneration of nearly 3,000 hec-
tares has resulted in increased production of wood 
and tree products, such as honey and fruit, which 
has increased household revenues. Improved land 
management has also stimulated grass growth, pro-
viding fodder for livestock that can be sold as an 
additional source of income. Regeneration of the 
native forest is expected to provide an important 
habitat for many local species and reduce soil ero-
sion and fl ooding.
The forest now acts as a carbon sink, absorbing 
and storing nearly 0.9 million tons of CO2 over 
the project life. The project is the fi rst large-scale 
reforestation project in Africa to be registered 
with the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. The operation is regarded 
as a model for scaling up under a broader green 
growth and landscape restoration strategy for 
Ethiopia.
Source: Brown and others 2011.
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from storms while additional scientifi c work 
is undertaken on assessing technical strate-
gies for using oceans as potential carbon 
sinks (UNEP and others 2009).
Nonrenewable resources: 
Promoting rent recovery and 
reinvestment
Economic growth in countries with non-
renewable resources is a process of extract-
ing resources efficiently and investing 
revenues from these resources in other forms 
of productive capital that can continue to 
produce income after the nonrenewable 
resources are depleted. Only in this way can 
these resources be used to promote sustain-
able development.
Some nonrenewable resources are essen-
tial for green growth. The generation of solar 
power uses silicon; devices that control vehi-
cle exhaust and refi ning processes for clean-
ing fuels require precious metals to act as 
catalysts; wind turbines, semiconductors used 
in smart grids and other computer applica-
tions, and batteries for hybrid vehicles require 
rare earths; and almost all processes require 
steel, which is made from iron, carbon, and 
alloying elements. Natural gas is a relatively 
clean fuel; because it can readily generate 
power on demand, it complements solar and 
wind power well.
Avoiding the natural resource curse
One major problem for countries with 
 abundant natural resources is what is 
known as the natural resource curse. This 
phenomenon refers to the economic obser-
vation that countries rich in natural assets— 
particularly oil, gas, and minerals—often 
fail to use these resources as a platform for 
sustainable growth and actually grow less 
rapidly than similar countries without such 
assets. These countries—such as the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Nigeria, 
and República Bolivariana de Venezuela—
fail to transform natural capital into other 
types of capital, such as human capital and 
infrastructure.
Early explanations of the resource curse 
focused on economic factors, such as the dif-
fi culty of managing revenue volatility or the 
negative impact of exchange rate appreciation 
on the more technologically sophisticated 
manufacturing sector (Dutch disease). Such 
analysis left open the question of why some 
countries were able to overcome these eco-
nomic hurdles.
The current consensus is that the resource 
curse is the result of weak governance (insti-
tutional capital) and human capital (Gelb and 
Grasmann 2010). Concentrated resources, 
coupled with very large investments, are easily 
subject to capture. Instead of directing their 
energies toward productive activities and the 
development of the institutions needed in a 
market-oriented economy, political and eco-
nomic elites engage in “rent seeking,” using 
their proceeds to reward their supporters and 
stifl e dissent by potential reformers. During 
downturns, the government fi nds it diffi cult 
to adjust to lower levels of spending, because 
the survival of the regime may depend on 
rent allocation. In short, resource rents are 
used not to develop other forms of productive 
capital but to perpetuate the political regime 
and its inefficient economic policies. Once 
trapped in the resource curse, it is diffi cult to 
escape, because the elite have little incentive 
to do so. In the extreme case, the resource 
curse can lead to armed confl icts as a way to 
determine access to the rents.
Not all resource-rich countries get 
trapped by the resource curse. Some (like 
Australia, Botswana, Canada, Chile, and 
Kazakhstan) have managed to avoid it 
altogether. Others (like Ghana, Peru, and 
Zambia) suffered the resource curse earlier 
in their development but went on to enjoy 
steady growth in the past 10–15 years. 
Moreover, many of the fastest-growing 
countries in the world in the past decade 
have been mineral-rich countries, some of 
which were once victims of resource curse, 
although the sustainability of such growth 
has not been tested by a signifi cant drop in 
resource prices or production.
Given that most of the fastest-growing 
countries in Africa since 2000 have large 
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extractive industries—with major invest-
ments ongoing or planned—it is  particularly 
important that these countries act now to 
avoid the resource curse. History shows 
that countries that have successfully man-
aged concentrated natural resources for 
economic development have tended to have 
a cadre of strong technocrats, pointing to 
the importance of developing human capi-
tal. Countries that have recently become 
resource abundant, such as Mongolia and 
Mozambique, need to be as transparent 
with their rents as possible (through the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive and other means); set up a means of 
smoothing volatile revenue, such as a fi s-
cal stabilization fund; and focus on policies 
and programs to build human capital and 
competitive industries.
Even where growth has been rapid, the 
presence of nonrenewable resources can 
skew income distribution in undesirable 
ways. In Equatorial Guinea, for example, 
one of the richest and most resource-
dependent countries in Africa, 77 percent 
of the population lives on less than $2 per 
day (Goldman 2011). Institutional innova-
tions can help countries avoid this outcome. 
Botswana and Norway, which have strong 
institutional capacity, have managed their 
resource rents well. That even countries 
with a history of political instability—such 
as Chile, Indonesia, and Malaysia—have 
used resource rents effectively for economic 
development suggests what can be achieved 
(Gelb and Grasmann 2010).16
Managing resource revenues
How can policy makers promote effi cient 
production, rent recovery, and rent rein-
vestment in ways that support broader 
 economic growth? First, they can adopt 
saving mechanisms, such as fiscal stabi-
lization funds and saving funds, which 
help smooth expenditure and ensure that 
funds are used only when the country has 
the capacity to absorb the new investment. 
Second, they can use the nonrenewable 
resource rents to help overcome market 
failures or  defi ciencies—such as inadequate 
skills, poor health and social protection, 
lack of infrastructure (especially electric-
ity), and high business transactions costs. 
Third, they can avoid using these rents to 
promote industries in which their country 
has no or little comparative advantage.
The World Bank’s comprehensive wealth 
accounts—notably, its adjusted net sav-
ings (ANS) indicator—assess whether 
countries rich in subsoil assets are using 
their natural capital to support sustain-
able  development through rent capture and 
reinvestment (World Bank 2005b, 2010b). 
These accounts can help countries assess 
whether they are on a sustainable develop-
ment path. Unlike national accounts, which 
measure gross savings and depreciation of 
produced capital but do not record changes 
in the stocks of human and natural capital, 
ANS measures the change in a country’s 
national wealth. Since 2000, many low-
income, resource-rich countries have failed 
to leverage their nonrenewable resources 
for broader development. In fact, their 
ANS indicators were negative for several 
years and were relatively low when posi-
tive, suggesting that they may be running 
down their total wealth (fi gure 5.2). High-
income non-OECD countries are also 
exhausting their natural resource wealth. 
The Wealth and Valuation of Ecosystem 
Services Initiative is being used to pilot 
incorporation of natural resource deple-
tion or restoration, including renewable 
natural resources, into national accounts 
in a number of OECD and developing 
countries.
Practicing sustainability in mining
The largest source of employment in non-
renewable industries comes from artisanal 
and small-scale mining. This sector con-
tributes to livelihood development, creating 
tens of thousands of jobs in many countries 
and hundreds of thousands in several coun-
tries (including the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo and Ghana). But for the sector to be 
sustainable, there needs to be a long-term 
commitment by the government and strong 
local institutions.
Artisanal and small-scale mining is often 
a highly destructive industry that causes sig-
nificant environmental damage, including 
mercury pollution and extensive riverbed 
destruction. The struggle to obtain control 
of the resources in remote, largely lawless 
areas also creates social tensions. Although 
continuation of the current mode of arti-
sanal and small-scale mining is damaging, 
prohibiting it would immediately throw 
many miners and their families into poverty. 
For this reason, there is a consensus that the 
way forward is to recognize the role of this 
type of mining in development and to sup-
port improved management and livelihood 
development through formalization of the 
sector, registration of both miners and trad-
ers, adoption of technological good practice, 
strengthened health and safety standards 
and their enforcement, economic diversifi ca-
tion, and adequate protection for female and 
child labor.
For medium- and large-scale min-
ing projects, foundations and financial 
sureties are increasingly being used to 
deliver sustainable benefits to communi-
ties. These two instruments help mining 
contribute to broader economic develop-
ment while providing environmental pro-
tection (box 5.8).
Sustainable management of natural capi-
tal underlies green growth in other sectors, 
including agriculture and manufactur-
ing. It is also key to resilience and welfare 
gains. Well-managed, nonrenewable natu-
ral capital can provide both jobs and rev-
enues for investment in human capital 
and infrastructure. Well-managed, renew-
able natural capital protects people and key 
infrastructure from floods and drought, 
provides key productive and cultural 
services, and is the basis for important tour-
ism-based activities. Innovation, effi ciency 
gains, and enhanced human and physical 
capital all play roles in achieving natural 
capital outcomes that are consistent with 
green growth. In turn, as the next chapter 
illustrates, the infrastructure agenda and 
investments in physical capital can sup-
port or undermine green growth, depend-
ing on management, policy, and investment 
choices.
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FIGURE 5.2 Not enough wealth creation from natural capital
(adjusted net savings of resource-rich countries, by income group, 2000–08)
WB_354_GG_CH05.indd   125 5/7/12   8:31:36 PM
1 2 6   I N C L U S I V E  G R E E N  G R O W T H :  T H E  P A T H W A Y  T O  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  
Notes
 1.  By and large, natural capital is the form 
of capital that is not created by deliberate 
investment, although investments may be 
needed to restore it (by removing pollutants 
or reversing soil erosion, for example) or 
enhance it (by building water storage struc-
tures to enhance the water retention services 
of watersheds, for example). This chapter 
considers the role of natural capital as a fac-
tor of production. Its role as a sink and the 
relationship to growth is covered in other 
chapters.
 2.  Following the Millenium Ecosystem Assess-
ment (2003), ecosystem services can be classi-
fi ed into “provisioning services” (services that 
produce goods and services, such as water, 
food, fuel, fi ber, and fodder) and “nonprovi-
sioning services.” Nonprovisioning services 
include services that provide regulating serv-
ices (such as watershed management and cli-
mate regulation), supporting services (such as 
nutrient cycling and soil formation), and cul-
tural services (including services that embody 
recreational and spiritual values). The report 
states that biodiversity and ecosystems are 
closely related concepts. Biodiversity is the 
BOX 5.8 How the mining sector is investing in communities
Medium- and large-scale mining projects typically 
leave a large environmental footprint, resulting in 
the destruction of land, loss of natural habitats, 
damage to ecosystems, and the reduction of water 
and air quality. To reduce these negative externali-
ties and produce sustainable benefi ts for the com-
munity, mining companies are increasingly estab-
lishing foundations—there are now more than 60 
worldwide—and fi nancial sureties (a sum of money 
or a guarantee by a third party that a fi nancial lia-
bility will be met).
Foundations
Mining companies often set up foundations for 
larger mining operations; a few countries, includ-
ing Canada and South Africa, require that they be 
established. These entities increase the benefi ts of 
mining by developing skills (for mining-related jobs 
and alternative livelihoods) and providing funds that 
can provide a benefi t stream once a mine is closed. 
They are usually funded by one or more mining 
operations, which contribute 0.25–1.0  percent of 
their gross revenues. The funds are used to deliver 
community investment programs for companies, 
facilitate the use of government payments to local 
areas, and manage compensation funds. A criti-
cal condition for success is adaptation to the local 
context, which should be subject to extensive social 
assessment to defi ne the foundation’s vision, ben-
efi ciaries, and project types. The foundation’s com-
plexity should be proportionate to the funding and 
capacity of the operating environment, and its oper-
ations should be integrated with local and regional 
development plans.
Financial sureties
Over the past 20 years, it has become the norm for 
mining companies to be legally obligated to set up 
fi nancial sureties. These instruments reduce the neg-
ative externalities associated with mining by ensur-
ing that there will be suffi cient funds to pay for site 
rehabilitation and postclosure monitoring and main-
tenance at any stage of a mining project, including 
early or temporary closure. Funding should be based 
on a cash accrual system or a fi nancial guarantee 
provided by a reputable fi nancial institution. Mine 
closure requirements should be reviewed annually 
and the closure funding arrangements adjusted to 
reflect any changes. Financial sureties should not 
be regarded as a surrogate for a company’s legal 
liability for clean-up but rather as a buffer against 
the public having to shoulder costs for which the 
operator is liable. Closure costs vary enormously but 
tend to range from $5–$15 million for medium-size 
open pit mines to more than $50 million for large 
operations. Some sureties include socioeconomic 
obligations, making their goals similar to those of 
foundations.
Source: Sassoon 2009; Wall and Pelon 2011.
WB_354_GG_CH05.indd   126 5/7/12   8:31:36 PM
 N A T U R A L  C A P I T A L   1 2 7
variability of living organisms from all types 
of ecosystems.
 3.  Landscape approaches integrate management 
of land, agriculture, forests, fi sheries and 
water at local, watershed and regional scales 
to ensure that synergies are captured. 
 4.  Exclusive economic zones—referred to in the 
preamble to the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982)—are 
defi ned as waters that are 200 nautical miles 
or less from the coastline of a sovereign state. 
Within these areas, the state has exclusive 
economic rights concerning management of 
all natural resources. 
 5.  Projections vary widely, depending on 
assumptions about recycling and the move 
from paper to electronic communication 
formats. 
 6.  In the case of aquifers, in which the actual 
recharge rate is negligible, water can be con-
sidered as a nonrenewable resource. A study 
of China estimates the annual environmen-
tal cost of the depletion of nonrechargeable 
groundwater in deep freshwater aquifers to 
be on the order of 50 billion yuan (World 
Bank 2007b). 
 7.  Dead zones are areas in which oxygen concen-
trations are less than 0.5 millimeters per liter 
of water. These conditions usually lead to 
mass mortality of sea organisms.
 8.  Nethope is a Kenya-based organization that 
brings together 33 nongovernmental organi-
zations, with the mission of improving con-
nectivity and access to information. 
 9.  EU farmers receiving direct payments must 
respect mandatory cross-compliance pro-
visions, which require them to fulfi ll the 
requirements of 19 European legislative 
acts related to the environment, public and 
animal health, pesticides, and animal wel-
fare. Farmers who do not comply face par-
tial or total withdrawal of their Single Farm 
Payment. Benefi ciaries of direct payments 
must also keep their land in good agricultural 
and environmental condition.
10.  The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefi t-
Sharing is an international treaty that aims 
to develop greater legal certainty as well 
as transparency for providers and users of 
genetic resources. The protocol covers the 
use of genetic resources (covered by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity) and 
the traditional knowledge that is associated 
with it. Its objective is for both parties to 
acknowledge and respect their reciprocal 
obligations.
11.  The evidence on the role of forests in regu-
lating water fl ows and fl oods is mixed, as 
Vincent (2012) notes. The evidence that 
forests mitigate large fl oods is scant, and it 
appears that their effect on low fl ows can go 
in either direction, depending on the balance 
between infi ltration and evapo-transpira-
tion. 
12.  REDD stands for “reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation.” To 
this, REDD+ adds conservation, sustainable 
management of forests, and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks.
13.  This section does not address nonrenewable 
natural capital from subsoil assets (fossil fuels), 
which are dealt with in other chapters.
14.  The BioCarbon Fund, housed within the 
World Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit, is a pub-
lic-private initiative mobilizing resources for 
pioneering projects that sequester or conserve 
carbon in forest and agro-ecosystems, miti-
gating climate change and improving rural 
livelihoods.
15.  The mechanism, defi ned in Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, allows a 
country with an emission-reduction or emis-
sion-limitation commitment under the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol (mostly high-income coun-
tries) to implement an emission-reduction 
project in developing countries. Such projects 
can earn saleable certifi ed emission reduction 
credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, 
which can be counted toward meeting Kyoto 
targets.
16.  Chile had the highest human development 
index of all South American countries in 
2010 (UNDP 2010).
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6Physical Capital: The Role of Infrastructure in Green Growth 
Strategies
Getting infrastructure “right” is at the heart of green growth. It is critical because infrastructure choices have 
long-lived and diffi cult-to-reverse impacts 
on the carbon, land, and water intensity 
of future patterns of development. Infra-
structure also offers substantial co-benefi ts: 
many investments needed for growth and 
improved living conditions are also good for 
the environment.
The challenges and opportunities of 
greening infrastructure in developing coun-
tries must be understood in the context of 
the huge unsatisfi ed needs that remain: the 
fact that much remains to be built creates 
an opportunity to build right; the fact that 
needs are so large implies important trade-
offs between “building right” and “build-
ing more.” While the additional costs of 
building green are relatively modest, they 
occur in a context of frequently binding 
fi nancing and fi scal constraints. Compli-
cating matters is the dramatic rise in popu-
lation and growing urbanization. As such, 
a framework for green infrastructure needs 
to offer strategies to minimize the potential 
for regrets and maximize short-term local 
benefits; and it must build on efforts to 
  133
Key Messages
Infrastructure policies are central to green • 
growth strategies, because of the huge poten-
tial for regret (given the massive infrastruc-
ture investments required and the inertia 
they create) and substantial potential for 
 co-benefi ts (given the current gap in infra-
structure service provision).
The infrastructure gap offers  opportunities to • 
“build right” and leapfrog; but huge unmet 
needs also can imply diffi cult trade-offs between 
“building right” and “building more,” particu-
larly given fi nancing and fi scal constraints.
A framework for green infrastructure must • 
build on efforts to address overall con-
straints on infrastructure finance (includ-
ing cost recovery issues) and must develop 
strategies to both minimize the potential for 
regrets and maximize short-term co-benefi ts 
to address social and political acceptability 
constraints.
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address overall constraints on infrastruc-
ture fi nance.
This chapter focuses on long-lived infra-
structure systems such as energy, water, sani-
tation and transport infrastructure, although 
it recognizes other  infrastructure—for exam-
ple, buildings—also play a key role in driving 
the demand for infrastructure services (irri-
gation is covered in chapter 5).
Infrastructure as the heart of 
green growth
Infrastructure policies are central to green 
growth strategies because of their unique 
characteristics, namely the large poten-
tial for regret (linked with the large inertia 
embodied in infrastructure investments) 
and the substantial potential for co-benefi ts 
(linked to the current gap in infrastructure 
service provision).
A massive potential for regret
Infrastructure decisions are long-lived (table 
6.1). They influence the purchase of con-
sumer durables and the location choices of 
households and fi rms. As such, they create 
substantial inertia in socioeconomic sys-
tems. Because the economic system reorgan-
izes itself around infrastructure, this inertia 
can even exceed the physical lifetime of spe-
cifi c infrastructure investments. A delay in 
greening investments may therefore prove 
extremely costly if it results in a lock-in into 
technologies that turn out to no longer be 
appropriate (because of their excessive car-
bon, land, or water intensity) or settlement 
patterns that prove vulnerable to chang-
ing climatic conditions. The infrastructure 
already in place now will raise global tem-
peratures by 1.3°C–1.7°C unless it is retro-
fi tted or retired before the end of its useful 
life (Davis and others 2010; Guivarch and 
 Hallegatte 2011).
Inertia is particularly evident in urban 
policies and the transport-related decisions 
that shape cities. The consequences of these 
decisions are illustrated by the contrast 
between Atlanta and Barcelona, two cit-
ies with roughly the same population and 
income but dramatically different densities 
and, hence, dramatically different options 
in terms of urban transportation and hous-
ing (fi gure 6.1). Once a city is developed, it 
is diffi cult to change its form. This irrevers-
ibility makes the idea of “growing dirty and 
cleaning up later” inapplicable in this domain 
(box 6.1).
The consequence of the inertia in infra-
structure development is an enormous 
potential for regret if decisions are made 
without adequate consideration of how 
 conditions—socioeconomic, environmental, 
and  technological—will change over time. 
The potential for regret has always been a 
challenge for infrastructure policy; it is made 
much more complex by climate change, 
which introduces deep uncertainty about 
future climatic conditions, technologies, and 
environmental standards and prices.
Uncertainty about future climatic con-
ditions. This complicates decision making, 
given the importance of weather and cli-
mate conditions for infrastructure design 
and performance (Hallegatte 2009). In 
the energy sector, weather directly affects 
demand (which varies with temperature) 
and supply. Water availability affects elec-
tricity production from hydropower and 
thermal plants (because of cooling needs), 
and wind and nebulosity determine wind 
and solar power. Electricity networks are 
also highly vulnerable to extreme events 
TABLE 6.1 Sectors in which inertia and sensitivity to climate 
conditions are great
Sector Example
Time scale 
(years)
Water Dams, reservoirs 30–200
Land-use planning New development in ﬂ ood plain 
or coastal areas
>100
Coastal and ﬂ ood defenses Dikes, sea walls >50
Building and housing Insulation, windows 30–150
Transportation Port infrastructure, bridge, roads, 
railways
30–200 
Urbanism Urban density, parks >100
Energy production Coal-ﬁ re plants 20–70 
Source: Hallegatte 2009.
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FIGURE 6.1 Urban densities determine cities’ options for greening
(built-up areas of Atlanta and Barcelona, represented at the same scale)
Source: Bertaud 2003.
(such as strong winds and snowstorms, as 
illustrated by the January 2008 snowstorm 
that left millions of people stranded across 
China or the repeated power outages caused 
by heavy snow in the United States). Trans-
port infrastructure, which affects urban 
development and land use, including in 
flood-prone areas, must also account for 
long-term climate changes.
Uncertainty about how technologies 
evolve. This has a particularly important 
effect on cities. With current technologies, 
low-density single-home suburban develop-
ments lead to high carbon emissions. But they 
may become sustainable in terms of emissions 
(albeit maybe not in terms of water and land 
consumption) with effi cient electric vehicles, 
decarbonized electricity production and low-
energy-consumption houses (box 6.2). Uncer-
tainty about the evolution of energy technol-
ogy costs complicates the design of energy 
policy (Kalkuhl and others 2011). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that uncertainty is also 
leading investors to postpone investments for 
fear of being stuck with an older and uncom-
petitive technology.
Uncertainty about environmental poli-
cies and prices for energy, oil, or carbon. 
Energy-intensive development may create 
deep vulnerabilities and loss of competitive-
ness in a future with high carbon or energy 
prices (Rozenberg and others 2010; World 
Bank 2010). Dense cities are less vulnerable 
to shocks in energy—hence transportation—
prices (Gusdorf and Hallegatte 2007).
The combination of sensitivity to uncer-
tain parameters and the high level of inertia 
creates a high risk of lock-ins into situations 
that will be undesirable in the future. Avoid-
ing these lock-ins—and the corresponding 
regret or retrofi tting costs—should be a pri-
ority for decision making on infrastructure 
(see chapter 7).
The vast potential for co-benefi ts
The second reason why infrastructure will 
play a key role in green growth strategy is that 
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BOX 6.1 The case for immediate action in the transport sector
Transport is a major contributor to CO2 emis-
sions. It is also one of the fastest-growing sources of 
emissions. Not surprisingly given the 1 billion cars 
already on the road, road transport accounts for 
about two-thirds of total transport emissions.
Developing countries, which still face a huge 
transport infrastructure gap, have the opportunity 
to choose their transport development path: low-
emission transport or car-dependent transport (box 
figure B6.1.1). Experience suggests that demand 
for car ownership increases dramatically at annual 
household incomes of $6,000–$8,000. If history 
repeats itself, an additional 2.3 billion cars will 
be added by 2050, mostly in developing countries, 
given expected economic growth and past patterns 
of motorization (Chamon and others 2008). With-
out policies to encourage high-density urbanization 
and public transport, high reliance on individual car 
transport will ensue.
If public transport is included as a major part 
of modal structure in urban transport, there is no 
conflict between a low emission transport sector 
and rapid growth or high income. In fact, economies 
with some of the lowest ratios of energy consump-
tion to gross domestic product (GDP) in the world—
including Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR, 
 China—have experienced extraordinary develop-
ment over the past few decades.
FIGURE B6.1.1 As income rises, will countries choose low energy consumption in road transport?
(relationship between per capita income and energy consumption from the road sector)
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BOX 6.2 The impact of technologies on transport policies—not enough?
Given the signifi cance of emissions from road trans-
port, the green growth path of transport depends on 
how rapidly vehicle technologies develop. If low- or 
zero-emission vehicles become available in the near 
future, relatively small changes in existing transport 
infrastructure stock would be required. People could 
continue relying on individual cars without harming 
the climate. But this may not be realistic.
Technical standards in transport can also help 
reduce emissions in the sector. Emissions per kilo-
meter of new cars have historically been reduced 
through better gasoline and diesel internal combus-
tion engines, better lighting and air conditioning, 
and better tires. The aviation fl eet has also reduced 
emissions in accord with international efficiency 
agreements. There is also an opportunity to reduce 
emissions levels through Intelligent Transport 
Systems—for instance, by allowing drivers to access 
timely traffic reports, identify available parking 
spots, and optimize routing.
But technical standards are unlikely to lead 
to massive reductions in emissions, so barring the 
rapid emergence and global adoption of low-carbon 
engine technologies, modal shifts will be needed. An 
average bus emits only half as much CO2 equivalent 
per passenger kilometer as a small car. For travel 
between distant cities, railways are even more eco-
friendly than buses: emissions from light-rail transit 
can be as much as half of average bus emissions. But 
the effi ciency and feasibility of modal shifts depend 
on urban forms, with mass transit requiring mini-
mum levels of density, and on tackling market struc-
ture and coordination failures.
Modal shifts will also imply addressing con-
sumer preferences, and here the “nudging” and 
social marketing campaigns discussed in chapter 
2 are an important complement to price incentives 
and supply-side interventions. In a world in which 
major automobile companies spent some $21 billion 
worldwide on advertising in 2009—an increasing 
percentage of which is aimed at emerging markets—
public transport agencies across Africa, Europe, 
and North and South America are beginning to 
apply to public transportation the same marketing 
approaches used by the auto industry to bolster sales 
to shift demand for public transportation (Weber 
and others 2011).
infrastructure is a domain in which substantial 
synergies exist between economic growth and 
the environment. Infrastructure systems are 
indeed designed to provide welfare- improving 
and productivity-enhancing services, which 
are critical for development, but they also 
often provide environmental benefi ts.
Providing service to the unserved—
who usually pay a higher price for water 
and energy than connected households— 
provides both social and environmental ben-
efi ts (box 6.3). Universal access to water and 
sanitation is good not only for welfare and 
economic growth—with impacts on health 
and human capital, especially for the poor—
but also for the environment. (For instance, 
providing sanitation services to the slums 
surrounding the Guarapiranga Lake helped 
slum dwellers but also preserved the water 
source of 25 percent of São Paulo’s 18 million 
inhabitants in the early 1990s.) This is also 
true for energy. When reliable network elec-
tricity is available, pollution is reduced and 
competitiveness increases, as fi rms no longer 
need to rely on expensive back-up diesel gen-
erators. Photovoltaic (PV) solar systems are 
optimal solutions for isolated, low-density 
areas; hydroelectricity is the cheapest and 
most reliable energy source for some coun-
tries (box 6.4). Better public urban transport 
reduces congestion and air pollution, with 
large economic and health impacts.1
An additional source of co-benefits is 
linked to distributional effects. Infrastructure 
consumption subsidies are both regressive and 
bad for the environment (Komives and oth-
ers 2005). Subsidies not only distort demand, 
with financial and environmental conse-
quences, they also often fail to reach the very 
poor they are supposed to help (see chapter 2). 
The poor do not own cars and often are not 
served by utilities; if they do, they consume 
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BOX 6.3 Benefi ts from using photovoltaic electricity in rural areas
Power grids in Africa are available only in cities and 
high-density areas. In most rural areas, kerosene 
and candles are the main source of lighting, while 
dry cell batteries are used to power radios. All are 
expensive (1 liter of kerosene can cost more than 
$0.80 and provides about 20 hours of light). PV 
systems are superior solutions. For example, a solar 
home system may be sized to power a refrigerator 
and television (costing $1,000); a large  television 
and three lamps (for $250); a small television, three 
lamps, and a radio (for $100); or a lamp, radio, and 
cell phone charger (for as low as $50—about the 
same cost as a cell phone).
Africa offers a huge market for modern, energy-
efficient lighting products. Although the market 
has a low profi t margin, its strength is in the high 
number of clients (if the right product for the right 
price can be offered). The GTZ-sponsored pico-PV 
program and the World Bank Group’s Lighting 
Africa are examples of two initiatives that aim to 
transform the lighting market from fuel-based prod-
ucts to clean, safe, and efficient modern lighting 
appliances.
Source: ESMAP 2009.
BOX 6.4 Hydropower as a green choice for lower-income countries
For lower-income countries, sustainable hydropower 
represents an important clean energy source—and 
one that will assume a larger share of the world’s 
energy production as these countries develop fur-
ther. Africa is exploiting only 7 percent of its hydro-
power potential; if the region developed it to the 
same extent that Canada has, its electricity supply 
would be multiplied by a factor of 8.
The reality, however, is that hydropower projects 
are complex—with impacts on agriculture, water 
management, irrigation, food production, climate 
change, and the sustainability of communities. They 
require detailed planning and studies before a shovel 
breaks the ground. Social and environmental impacts 
have to be assessed and addressed, consultations 
must be held, and regulations need to be developed. 
In some cases, new institutions have to be created 
and made viable. None of this is easy or cheap, but it 
is essential, because well-managed hydro projects can 
generate an array of benefi ts, including fl ood control, 
drought management, provision of water supply, and 
environmental benefi ts.
Storage facilities for hydropower are essential to 
adapt to changes in the hydrological cycle that are 
expected to occur as a result of climate change. With 
increasing water scarcity in some regions, there is a 
need to develop multiyear storage that is economi-
cally, environmentally, and socially feasible. Where 
the intensity and frequency of floods increases, 
storage is required to manage fl ows. Multipurpose 
storage facilities can also provide water services to 
agriculture, water supply, and environmental fl ows.
Box text contributed by Diego Rodriguez.
small quantities of water and electricity or 
transport fuel. The lion’s share of consump-
tion subsidies benefi ts wealthier segments of 
the population (Arze del Granado and others 
2010). The urban poor may enjoy some spill-
overs, but the rural poor seldom do.
There are also trade-offs between infra-
structure development and the environment. 
A fi rst trade-off is related to infrastructure’s 
direct environmental footprint. Building the 
infrastructure that is needed for develop-
ment will have detrimental impacts on natu-
ral areas, biodiversity, and the environment 
(Geneletti 2003). Another trade-off is linked 
to the fact that building better (cleaner, more 
resilient, or both) can be more expensive. This 
trade-off raises the fear that countries faced 
with severe fi nancing constraints may need 
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to chose between “building right” (which 
may make both economic and environmental 
sense) and “building more” (which may be 
what is required socially).
But the additional cost of building greener 
infrastructure should not be overstated. In 
some sectors, green infrastructure is more 
expensive—where electricity grids are present, 
solar or wind energy is more expensive than 
electricity produced from coal, for example. 
But thanks to innovation and economies of 
scale, the difference in cost is narrowing rap-
idly, and green energies are now competitive in 
some contexts (where the hydropower endow-
ment is large, where electricity is produced 
off-grid, or where carbon is priced). In the 
transport sector, providing public transport is 
more expensive than building roads, but pub-
lic and individual transports are imperfect 
substitutes: in highly congested cities, public 
transportation becomes necessary for eco-
nomic reasons, and the environmental ben-
efi ts can be reaped with no or little additional 
cost. In the construction sector, the additional 
cost to build lower-energy  buildings—thanks 
to better insulation and more effi cient  heating 
systems—may not exceed 5 percent, and this 
additional investment cost is rapidly recouped 
by reduced energy bills.
One case in which additional costs may 
 create trade-offs is the retrofi t of existing build-
ings. Indeed, retrofi tting the  lowest-effi ciency 
buildings into average-efficiency build-
ings costs €500 per square meter in France 
(Giraudet and others 2011). However, energy 
savings can pay back upfront costs in many 
instances. The main constraint is thus one of 
access to capital rather than fi nancial or eco-
nomic viability, as many green investments pay 
for themselves over the medium to long term.
Recognizing the need for 
effi  ciency: Meeting large 
unsatisfi ed infrastructure needs 
within tight fi scal constraints
Developing countries are characterized by 
large unsatisfi ed needs, including needs met 
by infrastructure such as drinking water 
and reliable electricity (table 6.2). The scale 
of unmet needs is particularly great in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where less than a third of 
households have access to electricity. Con-
nectivity also remains low in the developing 
world, particularly in rural areas, where only 
70 percent of the population has access to 
an all-weather road (33 percent in Africa). 
Access to water has increased, but 780 mil-
lion people still lack access to an improved 
water source (WHO-UNICEF 2012).
Globally, the challenge is greater for sani-
tation than for water supply. The percentage 
of the population with adequate access to 
potable water increased from 74 percent in 
1990 to 89 percent in 2010. Sanitation fi g-
ures are much lower, having increased from 
44 percent in 1990 to just 63 percent in 2010 
(WHO-UNICEF 2012). The difference partly 
refl ects the greater “public good” and “exter-
nality” element of sanitation and sewerage—
that is, individuals feel the  welfare impacts 
of inadequate access to water, whereas other 
sectors and members of society feel the effects 
of inadequate sanitation (through impacts 
on water quality and corresponding health 
and productivity impacts). Estimates of the 
costs of inadequate water and sanitation in 
the Middle East and North Africa are about 
1 percent of GDP in the Arab Republic of 
Egypt and 2.8 percent in the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran (Hussein 2007). With 2.5 billion 
people lacking access to improved sanitation, 
the achievement of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goal (MDG) on sanitation is unlikely.2
TABLE 6.2 Gaps in access to infrastructure in developing countries 
remain large, particularly in Africa
All developing 
countries Africa
Percentage of households with access to electricity 75 31
Improved water source 89 61
Improved sanitation facilities 63 31
Percentage of rural population with access to an 
all-weather road 70 33
Telecom: mobile and ﬁ xed lines per 100 inhabitants 85 46
Source: Roberts and others 2006 for roads; World Bank 2011d for telecom; IEA 2011 for electricity; 
and WHO-UNICEF 2012.
Note: Road access data are for 2005 or the latest year available up to that date; telecoms, for 2010; 
water and sanitation data are for 2010. Averages are weighted by country population. The road 
access indicator measures the share of the rural population that lives within 2 kilometers of an 
all-season road.
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Filling the infrastructure gaps in develop-
ing countries—to address household needs 
and expanding infrastructure so that fi rms 
have access to the kind of energy and trans-
port services they need to compete—will 
cost an estimated $1.0–$1.5 trillion a year, 
or 7 percent of developing-country GDP (Fay 
and others 2010).3 Developing countries are 
currently investing about half that amount, 
although the amount varies dramatically by 
region and income level. In Africa, infrastruc-
ture needs were projected to reach 15 percent 
of the region’s GDP in 2008, about twice 
the level actually spent (Foster and Brice-
ño-Garmendia 2010). Moreover, given the 
constraints on poor households’ budgets, 
increases in infrastructure services need to be 
provided in a way that is affordable.
In the energy sector, the challenge is to 
provide all people with modern energy to 
meet their basic needs at affordable costs 
while ensuring the sustainable growth path 
of energy consumption (through conserva-
tion and greater energy effi ciency) and mak-
ing energy sources more environmentally 
sustainable (box 6.5). Thus, the goals of the 
BOX 6.5 The energy challenge: Expanding access and increasing supply in an effi  cient, 
clean, and cost-eff ective manner
How will countries meet the goal of the United 
Nations Sustainable Energy for All initiative of pro-
viding universal energy access at affordable costs 
while ensuring environmental sustainability through 
improved effi ciency and an increased role for renew-
ables? The answer is through a portfolio of technol-
ogies (World Bank 2010).
To achieve universal access to electricity by 2030, 
countries need to develop not only grid systems 
but also off- and mini-grid power systems, at least 
as a transition solution. The International Energy 
Agency estimates that about 45 percent of electric-
ity will come from national grids, 36 percent from 
mini-grid solutions, and the remaining 20 percent 
from isolated off-grid solutions serving remote and 
low-density areas. Off- and mini-grid technologies 
can be complemented by other solutions at the end-
user level. For instance, the Lighting Africa initiative 
lowers entry barriers to the off-grid lighting mar-
ket by establishing quality standards, developing a 
good investment climate, and supporting product 
development while educating consumers on the ben-
efi ts of solar lighting products. In 2010, more than 
134,000 solar portable lamps that had passed Light-
ing Africa quality tests were sold in Africa, provid-
ing more than 672,000 people with cleaner, safer, 
better lighting and improved energy access.
Energy-effi ciency policies could potentially con-
tribute a quarter to a third of averted greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050 (World Bank 2010). Technologies 
that increase energy effi ciency are typically not costly 
or innovative: existing technologies alone could 
reduce energy consumption 30–40 percent across 
many sectors and countries. For instance, 70 percent 
of lighting (which consumes 20 percent of total global 
electricity consumption) can save 50 percent of energy 
use just by using current technologies alone. A prob-
lem is that the transaction costs for energy- effi ciency 
projects tend to be high, compared with their rela-
tively small amount of investment. Relatively long 
pay-back periods may still be a considerable barrier to 
fi nancing these projects (World Bank forthcoming). 
Among renewable sources of energy, large-scale 
hydropower tends to be the least expensive. It can 
be competitive with conventional thermal genera-
tion. Geothermal energy can also be cost competitive, 
making it another suitable candidate. Both types of 
energy involve large upfront costs and long lead-times 
for development, however. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, solar energy is more expensive, but it may 
still be the least-cost option in remote, isolated areas.
One challenge in developing renewables is the 
temporal variation in the availability of electricity. 
Demand for electricity varies continuously, with 
large fluctuations during the day and even larger 
variation from season to season. Rapid variability of 
some renewables can add to the challenge of main-
taining a balance between supply and demand at all 
times. A proper mix of generation technologies with 
varied output control characteristics (for example, 
hydropower with storage and fast-responding gas 
units), well-developed transmission systems, and 
improved forecast and grid operations capacity will 
help cushion the effects of variability.
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United Nations Sustainable Energy for All 
(UN SE4ALL) initiative are to achieve uni-
versal access to modern energy, doubling 
the global rate of improvement of energy 
effi ciency, and doubling the global share of 
renewable energy.
And providing modern energy services to 
all does not need to be done at the expense of 
the environment—in fact, the environmental 
impacts are likely to be modest to positive, 
even when using brown technologies. This is 
because the poor consume little even when 
they are connected to modern infrastructure 
services, particularly in comparison to the 
rich. For instance, the additional emissions 
produced by providing electricity using stan-
dard technologies to the 1.3 billion people 
who currently lack service could be offset 
by a switch of the U.S. vehicle fl eet to Euro-
pean standards (World Bank 2010). Green-
ing, infrastructure does not need to come 
at the expense of universal access—in fact, 
universal access is likely to be good for the 
environment.
In the water sector, developing countries 
will need to invest an estimated $72 billion a 
year to reach the MDG targets on improved 
water supply and sanitation, 75 percent of 
which is needed just to maintain existing 
facilities (Hutton and Bartram 2008). 
Meeting infrastructure needs, 
protecting the environment
Even with significant synergies between 
infrastructure service development and 
environmental consideration, greening 
growth will increase investment needs in 
the infrastructure sector. As an illustration, 
an analysis of mitigation scenarios from 
four models suggests that the global energy 
investment needed to achieve a greenhouse 
gas concentration of 450 ppm CO2-eq (parts 
per million CO2 equivalent) could amount 
to $350 billion–$1.1 trillion a year by 2030 
(fi gure 6.2). A 550 ppm target appears much 
easier to achieve, requiring $50–$200 billion 
of additional annual investments. (These fi g-
ures are gross investment costs; they do not 
take into account the benefi ts from higher 
energy efficiency and reduced operating 
costs.) These additional investment needs 
are significant, but they remain a small 
share of total world investments, at least for 
the 550 ppm target. They do not include the 
cost of adapting infrastructure to a changed 
climate, which could cost developing coun-
tries an additional $15–$30 billion a year by 
2050 (World Bank 2010).
Financing infrastructure: 
Effi  ciency and cost recovery to 
improve access and sustainability
Investment in infrastructure in the devel-
oping world is inadequate partly because 
infrastructure is expensive and “lumpy”—
capacity can be increased only in large incre-
ments, not through a continuous process. In 
addition, when investments require public 
funding, the fi nancing gap is linked to limits 
to the borrowing capacity. Even when a proj-
ect is economically benefi cial and will gen-
erate suffi cient tax revenues to pay back the 
upfront cost, it is diffi cult to mobilize private 
fi nance because of information asymmetry, 
long return on investments, and political 
risks. Doing so would require shifting the 
risk- adjusted return upward, by increasing 
returns or reducing risks, so that proposed 
projects can compete with other categories 
of investment.
Another reason for the insufficiency of 
investment in infrastructure is that economic 
and fiscal sustainability has long been a 
major challenge in the infrastructure sector. 
Full-cost pricing continues to be an elusive 
goal, and infrastructure often involves signif-
icant technical and nontechnical ineffi ciency. 
Colombia grappled with both issues success-
fully (box 6.6). In Africa, quasi-fi scal defi cits 
caused by underpricing, technical losses, and 
nonpayment amount to about 2 percent of 
GDP. Eliminating these problems could offset 
about a third of the fi nancing gap (Briceño-
Garmendia and others 2008). In South Asia, 
more than 20 percent of electricity produced 
is lost because of technical and nontechni-
cal reasons, including illegal connections 
(World Bank 2011d); 30–45 percent of water 
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FIGURE 6.2 Upfront investment costs for energy supply and 
greater energy effi  ciency could be substantial
(additional investment needs in the energy sector projected by four 
global models and for two climate objectives)
Source: Authors’ compilation based on following sources: MESSAGE: van Vliet and others 2012; 
REMIND: Luderer and others forthcoming; TIAM-World:  Loulou and Labriet 2008; IEA: IEA 2011.
Note: The targets 450 ppm and 550 ppm are in CO2-eq (parts per million CO2 equivalent) which 
measures the concentration of all greenhouse gases using the functionally equivalent amount or 
concentration of CO2 as the reference; 450 ppm CO2-eq is the concentration is needed to maintain a 
50 percent chance of not exceeding global warming of more than 2°C above preindustrial tempera-
tures. IEA 2011 does not provide estimates for a 550 ppm scenario.
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is leaked from the network or not accounted 
for (IBNET 2011).
What can be done? Addressing these 
inefficiencies would help improve both 
infrastructure coverage and the greening of 
infrastructure. Strengthening cost recovery 
would not only contribute to the fi nancial 
sustainability of energy sector develop-
ment, it would also encourage consumers 
to use energy wisely. Effi cient management 
of metering, billing, and collection would 
improve the fi nancial performance of service 
providers. New metering technologies based 
on information and communications tech-
nology are facilitating this activity in many 
places, including small, off-grid private serv-
ice providers and large publicly owned dis-
tribution utilities. And more effi cient man-
agement of utilities would eliminate waste 
and reduce environmental impacts.
In addition, incentive mechanisms should 
be tightened at the utility and end-user levels. 
The biggest hurdles to doing so are account-
ability and enforceability in implementing 
tariff setting and collection. The cost of 
energy imports and power generation can 
be volatile; it needs to be passed on to con-
sumer prices, although smoothing mecha-
nisms may be required. Adjusting tariffs will 
greatly improve the fi nancial sustainability 
of utilities. But utilities will also have to take 
measures against illegal connections and 
nonpayers.
Chapter 2 discusses the difficulties in 
eliminating subsidies to infrastructure serv-
ices. It suggests complementary actions to 
mitigate undesirable distributive impacts of 
these measures (such as connection subsidies 
or targeted cash transfers).
Another measure in the arsenal may 
be cross-country collaboration. Because 
infrastructure exhibits significant econo-
mies of scale and scope, cross-country 
 collaboration—for instance, through regional 
power pools—is generally helpful, particu-
larly for small countries.
In Africa, where many countries are too 
small to build national power plants at an 
efficient scale, $2 billion of energy invest-
ment could be saved if trade in power trade 
was fully exploited (Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia 2010). Regional power pools 
(for example, in West and East Africa) can 
help capture benefi ts from economies of scale 
and smooth the intermittency of solar and 
wind energy. Trade and cross-country coor-
dination also help countries manage natural 
resources (such as shared water resources) 
and improve reliability.
Hydro-meteorological services also benefi t 
from cross-country collaboration. An analy-
sis of South Eastern Europe estimates that 
the fi nancing needed to strengthen national 
hydro-meteorological services in seven coun-
tries without regional cooperation and coor-
dination would be about €90 million (ISDR 
and others 2011). With deeper cooperation, 
the cost would be 30 percent lower.
Managing demand
Improving the delivery of infrastruc-
ture services is critical. But in infrastruc-
ture, increased supply often translates into 
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BOX 6.6 Pairing cost recovery with deregulation in Colombia
In 1964, only 50 percent of people in Bogota 
and other large cities had access to electric-
ity, water, and sanitation. And coverage 
rates were even worse in smaller cities (about 
40 percent for water and electricity and 
20 percent for sanitation). Today, Colombia 
has almost universal access to basic services 
in cities of all sizes. But achieving  convergence 
took more than 40 years (box fi gure B6.6.1).
How did Colombia achieve near uni-
versal coverage? The key was a series of 
policy reforms in the 1990s that brought 
tariffs toward cost recovery levels. In the 
water sector, average residential tariffs per 
cubic meter were increased from $0.33 in 
1990 to $0.78 in 2001 (World Bank 2004). 
With almost 90 percent of households hav-
ing metered connections, the price increase 
triggered a decrease in household water 
consumption from 34 to 19 cubic meters 
per month over the same period—in the 
process reducing the need for major new 
infrastructure. But even with higher prices, 
water remains relatively affordable for the 
average household. The tariff structure 
allows the Colombian government to cross-
subsidize the poorest consumers from richer 
households and industrial users. As a result, 
the average poor household spends less than 
5 percent of its income on utility services.
In the electricity sector, in the 1990s the 
rules on who gets to generate and sell elec-
tricity were changed. After two major black-
out periods (1983 and 1992/93), the govern-
ment grappled with increasing capacity or 
increasing effi ciency. Given severe fi nancial 
constraints, increasing capacity was not an 
option. Deregulation was therefore under-
taken to improve the effi ciency of existing 
capacity (Larsen and others 2004). As part 
of the reforms, electricity was unbundled 
into generation, transmission, distribu-
tion, and commercialization. In the 1990s, 
the electricity sector represented a third of 
 Colombia’s public debt stock. By 2004, 
this had fallen to less than 5 percent and 
 Colombia had become a net exporter of 
electricity.
Box text contributed by Somik Lall.
FIGURE B6.6.1 Access to basic infrastructure services has 
risen dramatically in Colombia
(access to services, by city size, 1964–2005)
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increased demand, making a supply-side-only 
approach both costly and ineffective. For 
instance, building new roads is often ineffec-
tive in reducing congestion because it incen-
tivizes the use of individual vehicles, leav-
ing congestion unchanged. For this reason, 
action is also needed to manage demand. 
Policy makers can chose from an array of 
tools that includes price instruments, regula-
tion, and integrated planning of supply and 
demand.
Prices: Important but hampered 
by low elasticity
Price elasticity—that is, the percentage change 
in quantity demanded in response to a change 
in price—is relatively low in the transporta-
tion sector, at least in the short term. This 
is, in part, because consumers may be slow 
in responding to price signals. But it is also 
because the real cost of transport (sometimes 
referred to as the generalized cost) includes 
both the monetary cost of transport and the 
cost of the time spent in transportation. And 
sometimes the cost of time is larger than the 
monetary cost of transportation. Elasticity is 
greater in the long run, because individuals 
can adjust their choice of where to live, means 
of transportation, or lifestyle. For instance, 
the price elasticity of automobile fuel demand 
ranges from –0.1 to –0.4 in the short run and 
–0.6 to –1.1 in the long run (Chamon and 
others 2008).
This low elasticity explains why the 
rebound effect (whereby people may increase 
their driving when the cost of car use 
decreases as a result of improved effi ciency) 
is relatively limited, even though it may be 
greater at  lower income levels. Sorrel (2007) 
fi nds that this effect should remain below 30 
percent (that is, less than 30 percent of the 
gain in efficiency will be “taken back” by 
the increase in demand). Greene and others 
(1999) fi nd that the rebound effect for indi-
vidual transport in the United States is about 
20 percent.
Various price instruments have proven effi -
cient. Singapore’s Area Licensing Scheme—
the first-ever comprehensive road pricing 
scheme in the world—required drivers to 
pay an area license fee of S$3 ($1.25) a day 
to enter the central business district during 
peak hours. The number of vehicles entering 
the restricted zone declined by 73 percent, 
and average speeds increased by an estimated 
10–20 percent (Federal Highway Administra-
tion 2008). Modal shift can improve the effi -
ciency of such price-based transport policies 
and help mitigate their negative consequences 
(such as the signifi cant spatial inequality they 
can create) (see Gusdorf and others 2008). 
But it requires investments in public transport 
multimodal coordination (such as creating 
parking lots next to train stations), and urban 
planning (to maximize access to public tran-
sit and ensure that passenger density is high 
enough to justify the required investments).
In the water sector, different uses have 
different elasticities. Residential use has a 
low price elasticity, estimated at about –0.1 
to –0.3 (Nauges and van den Berg 2009; 
 Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989). Agricul-
tural use has a higher elasticity, and subsidies 
(whether to water or to the electricity needed 
for pumping) in this sector can thus create 
distorted incentives, favoring activities with 
high water consumption. And disincentives 
to water conservation are greatest where the 
resource is scarcest (Frederick and Schwarz 
2000). Removing subsidies and raising prices 
can thus be effi cient in this sector.
Demand-side actions, standards,
and regulations: Critical 
complements to prices
Price-based instruments can be made more 
effi cient if complemented with appropriate 
demand-management actions. Large quanti-
ties of water can be saved in India through 
better irrigation technologies, obviating 
the need to exploit new raw water sources. 
In China, industrial water reuse systems 
can save water, reducing the need to build 
expensive water conveyance systems. Many 
of the technologies that can make a differ-
ence already exist and are in use in devel-
oped countries. Further application needs to 
be supported by institutions and promoted 
by sector leaders. India’s Total Sanitation 
campaign is a successful example of using 
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noneconomic incentives to promote greener 
options (box 6.7).
Standards and regulations may also be 
useful where price elasticity is limited or the 
political economy of price reform is complex. 
Examples of such instruments include renew-
able portfolio standards, in which regulators 
require utilities to include a given percentage 
or an absolute quantity of renewable energy 
capacity in their energy mix.
In transport, fuel economy standards are 
common for new vehicles (see chapter 2). In 
1995, Japan introduced fuel economy stan-
dards to reduce new car fuel consumption 
by 19 percent, achieving the target by 2004. 
A new target, set in 2006, aims for another 
23.5 percent reduction (An and  others 2007). 
In Europe, improvements in fuel economy 
occurred largely as a side effect of air pol-
lutant regulations, although automobile 
 manufacturers agreed with the European 
Commission on a voluntary fleet average 
emission target of 140 grams of CO2 per kilo-
meter for new passenger cars. Governments 
can also create automobile restricted zones 
to limit passenger car traffi c in urban areas, 
as Denmark did in the city of Aalborg.
Promoting clean cooking and heating 
solutions is another case in which standards 
and public investments are likely to be more 
helpful than pricing instruments. Replac-
ing traditional three-stone cooking fires 
with advanced stoves could significantly 
reduce emissions and health risks (World 
Bank 2011b). Without drastic interventions, 
2.7  billion people may still lack clean cook-
ing facilities in 2030 (IEA 2011).
Integrated market development, includ-
ing technology standards, is needed to pro-
mote the use of clean and effi cient solutions 
at the household level. The Global Alliance 
for Clean Cookstoves, launched in September 
2010, aims to enable 100 million households 
to adopt clean and effi cient stoves and fuels 
by 2020. The alliance works with public, pri-
vate, and nonprofi t partners to help overcome 
the market barriers that impede the produc-
tion, deployment, and use of clean cookstoves 
in the developing world.
Green infrastructure requires 
planning and strong institutions
Because infrastructure is lumpy, infrastruc-
ture systems cannot be grown incremen-
tally and continuously, and they need to be 
planned in a holistic manner. A road or train 
line cannot be designed without considering 
other parts of the transport system, land use 
regulations, and urban planning.
Moreover, different infrastructure systems 
interact across sectors and cannot be designed 
in isolation. Water availability affects elec-
tricity generation, and electricity is critical in 
water management (for groundwater pump-
ing, for example). Transportation and energy 
interact closely: energy production often 
requires transport infrastructure, and dif-
ferent transport modes have different energy 
needs (from liquid fuel transport to electricity 
grids for electrifi ed cars). Smart use of infor-
mation and communication technologies can 
green the urban environment and improve 
the effi ciency of other infrastructure systems 
(box 6.8). Thus, much can be gained from 
BOX 6.7 Using noneconomic incentives to reduce the demand for water and sanitation
India’s Total Sanitation Campaign, launched in 
1999, focused on communication, education, com-
munity mobilization, and the provision of toilets in 
government schools, mother/child centers, and low-
income households (World Bank 2011c). There was 
little government contribution to the capital cost of 
sanitation facilities. Instead, the focus was on pri-
vate investment and private behavior change.
Part of the effort involved the Clean Village 
Award Program—awards to local councils that 
achieved the status of “Open-Defecation Free and 
Fully Sanitized Uni.” The awards—inspired by a pro-
gram initially introduced in Maharastra (the “Sant 
Gadge Baba”)—helped increase reported sanitation 
coverage from 21 percent in 2001 to 57  percent
 in 2008.
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a planning system that can integrate various 
objectives and infrastructure systems at both 
the country and regional level to signifi cantly 
reduce infrastructure costs.
Developing cities: Managing rapid 
expansion to tap the potential for 
effi  ciency gains
Rapid urbanization is both a driver and a 
feature of economic development, with seri-
ous consequences for infrastructure design 
(World Bank 2009). In many developing 
countries—particularly countries transition-
ing from low- to middle-income status—the 
next few decades will see a dramatic increase 
in the share of people living in cities. In 
fact, the number of people living in urban 
areas in developing countries is expected to 
double, from 2 billion to 4 billion, between 
2000 and 2030. And this massive increase is 
expected to triple the physical footprint of 
urbanized areas from 200,000 to 600,000 
square kilometers. The public policy and 
investment challenges of managing the 
social and environmental implications while 
promoting cities that are economic drivers 
of the economy are substantial. Fortunately, 
practical options exist to efficiently green 
the urbanization process.
The fi rst priority is designing policies and 
institutions that can help anticipate future 
urbanization. These policies should enable 
existing urban areas to be redeveloped and 
should prepare the peri-urban fringe to 
accommodate new settlements. For this to 
work, land markets need to be functional. 
Urban land markets mediate demand and 
supply and enable the effi cient use of land 
and optimal development of constructed 
fl oor area, both of which shape a city’s spa-
tial structure. Developed countries typically 
rely on market data from transactions and 
property attributes to reveal land and prop-
erty prices. In contrast, most developing 
countries lack the basic institutional machin-
ery to value and price land.
Higher land prices routinely lead to 
higher density—which enhances productiv-
ity spillovers, potentially increases the supply 
of affordable housing, and helps manage the 
demand for transport. But this mechanism is 
sometimes impaired by land regulations—in 
many Indian cities the fl oor-space index is 
limited to 1 (as opposed to 5–15 in other 
Asian cities). As a result, high land prices 
coexist with low density and sprawl, creat-
ing both housing affordability and transpor-
tation issues.
Also, when “official” land prices do not 
refl ect demand and are depressed at the urban 
periphery, it is likely that sprawl or subur-
banization will be excessive. How the peri-
urban expansion is managed will be a criti-
cal determinant of whether cities can harness 
agglomeration economies and induce effi cient 
BOX 6.8 Harnessing smart information and communication technologies to shape a 
green future
The smart application of information and commu-
nication technologies can facilitate green growth, 
both by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases 
and by creating new market opportunities, such as 
smart grids and Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS). 
To date, most of these mitigation opportunities have 
been applied in high- and middle-income countries. 
But it is arguably in the megacities of the developing 
world where the impact could be greatest. Applica-
tion of ITS in Bangkok or Manila, where there are 
few substitution opportunities for private road traf-
fi c in the form of mass-transit system, would have a 
much more benefi cial impact than in, say Hong Kong 
SAR, China, or Singapore. Asian countries commit-
ted to introducing ITS—such as electronic fare and 
road-user charging systems, transport control cen-
ters, and real-time user  information—in Goal 11 of 
the Bangkok Declaration on Sustainable Transport 
Goals for 2010–20.
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resource allocation. The absence of a func-
tioning land market creates a major urban 
governance challenge, as the scale at which 
urban and metropolitan economies now oper-
ate often does not coincide with their physical 
and administrative boundaries. The institu-
tional arrangements that can enhance coordi-
nation across these entities is likely to be con-
text specifi c, but signifi cant efforts are needed 
to make them emerge.
The second priority is redeveloping older, 
obsolescent areas to promote more effi cient 
development and achieve higher densities. 
Older areas typically share several common 
traits. Their network of streets and alleys is 
often irregular and highly  granular—limiting 
the ability of developers to build modern 
high-rise buildings. An alternative is to rede-
sign these areas to accommodate higher den-
sities. Doing so typically requires assembling 
small plots into larger and more effi cient par-
cels and ensuring that the redeveloped area 
has adequate infrastructure (particularly 
transport, water, electricity, broadband Inter-
net, and public services) to support higher 
population densities. These actions should 
be designed using consultations with the 
local population, to make sure they benefi t. 
For instance, rehabilitation projects need to 
account for the fact that slum dwellers often 
gain more from slum upgrading than from 
relocation (World Bank 2006).
The third priority is integrating land 
policy with urban mobility and transporta-
tion (Viguié and Hallegatte 2012). Options 
for urban transportation are closely tied to 
urban land development and can create both 
positive and negative externalities as cities 
grow. Problems arise when there are inconsis-
tencies between new developments and mass 
transit investment—as in Hanoi, where new 
dense urban development projects are not 
being located near the planned transit net-
work. This kind of planning creates a dou-
ble risk of having too few users of a public 
transit system, threatening the fi nancial and 
social return on investment, and increasing 
the number of cars on the roads, with conse-
quences on congestion and air pollution.
Urban transport is best addressed as 
part of integrated urban strategies that can 
address the interests of multiple user groups 
and anticipate long-term needs for which no 
one is yet advocating but that will become 
critical in the future. Although public trans-
port tends to be more sustainable than per-
sonal motor vehicles, it is often unviable in 
low-density agglomerations (table 6.3).
Although planning and developing public 
transit is likely to generate co-benefi ts for eco-
nomic integration and manage demand for 
private modes of motorized transport, these 
strategies should not come at the expense of 
allowing a wider range of transport options 
that can enhance the poor’s mobility. Sur-
veys show that many people cannot afford 
public transport. In Sub-Saharan African 
cities, walking represents between 5 percent 
(in Kigali) and 80 percent (in Conakry) of all 
urban trips, with public transportation rang-
ing from 10 percent to 90 percent (World 
Bank 2008). A signifi cant share of households 
TABLE 6.3 Eff ect of land use and density on use of public transport
Population density Typical region
Automobile use 
(km/person/yr)
Public 
transport 
use (trips/
person/yr)
Petrol consumption 
for transport 
(MJ/person/yr)
Motorized 
private
Public 
transport
Non-
motorized
Low (25 people per ha) North America 
and Australia
80 10 10 >10,000 <50 >55,000
Medium (50–100 
people per ha)
Europe 50 25 25 — — —
High (more than 
250 people per ha)
Asia 25 50 25 <5,000 >250 <15,000
Source: Gomez-Ibañez 2012.
Note: —=not available.
Modal model split (%)
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reports no public transport expenditure, but 
the average share of income spent in public 
transport ranges from 3 percent (in Addis 
Ababa) to 14 percent (in Lagos), reaching 
about $12–$16 a month in most cities. This 
implies that at low-income levels, the wider 
availability of different service levels and 
modes at different prices is a necessary strat-
egy for providing urban transport serv ices. In 
particular, improving sidewalks, streetlights, 
and other measures to protect pedestrian 
users should be parts of an urban transport 
strategy.
Urban transport also plays a key role in 
spatially integrating urban labor markets. As 
cities around the world expand their spatial 
footprints, the limited reach of walking trips 
may exacerbate slum formation, as many 
people trade off housing quality to be close 
to jobs. It can also severely limit labor mar-
ket opportunities for people who live farther 
away from economic centers. Bovenberg and 
Goulder (1996) suggest that higher commut-
ing costs can decrease labor supply. Graham 
(2005) fi nds that productive fi rms are located 
in accessible and densely populated places.
A fourth priority is integrating urban 
planning with natural risk management—
still rare, especially in low-income countries. 
In 2005, the global community adopted the 
Hyogo Framework for Action, a 10-year 
plan to make the world safe from natural 
disasters. To date, 70 percent of high-income 
countries are carrying out urban and land-
use planning under the framework, but only 
about 15 percent of low-income countries are 
doing so (fi gure 6.3). This low participation 
matters because cities are increasingly vul-
nerable to natural hazards, including fl oods 
that are becoming more destructive in many 
parts of the world. And considering the 
limited protection offered by dikes and sea 
walls, only risk-sensitive land-use planning 
can mitigate fl ood losses over the long term 
(Hallegatte 2011).
Given the role of urbanization in devel-
opment, a green policy able to develop cities 
without increasing risks and negative envi-
ronmental outcomes would help maintain 
or increase cities’ attractiveness and pro-
duce economic benefi ts (World Bank 2009). 
It is an open question as to how cities can 
FIGURE 6.3 Too few countries are implementing plans to mitigate against natural disasters
(percentage of countries that implemented risk management policies under the 2005 
UN Hyogo Framework for Action)
Source: UN 2011.
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accommodate the huge increase in urban 
population that is expected in many regions 
without experiencing a hike in disaster losses 
(World Bank 2010). That said, a recent World 
Bank study uses Alexandria, Casablanca, 
Rabat, and Tunis to illustrate how flood 
risks and climate change can be integrated in 
urban planning (World Bank 2011a). Trans-
portation infrastructure has a key role to play 
to make it possible for the population to live 
in safe locations while retaining access to jobs 
and services (Hallegatte 2011).
Infrastructure robustness and redundancy 
are critical to maintaining the functions of 
the economic system after disasters, especially 
in urban environments, where the failure of 
one component (such as electricity, trans-
port, water, or sanitation) can paralyze activ-
ity. In many cases, indirect disaster impacts 
caused by the loss of lifeline and essential 
infrastructure services are of similar mag-
nitude to direct disaster losses  (Hallegatte 
2008;  Tierney 1997). However, increasing 
robustness and redundancy is costly, creat-
ing  trade-offs between the resilience of the 
economic system and its effi ciency in normal 
conditions (Henriet and others 2012).
Minimizing the potential for 
regrets and maximizing 
short-term benefi ts
Some infrastructure investments that are 
required from a development and economic 
perspective and useful from an environmen-
tal point of view cannot be implemented 
because of fi nancial, institutional, or plan-
ning constraints. Given these constraints, 
a green growth policy should seek to mini-
mize the risk from regret and maximize 
short-term benefi ts.
To do so, one needs first to identify 
what investments made today can lead 
to irreversibility that will cause regret in 
the future. An example is urban planning 
and urban form, which are being decided 
on now in many countries and cannot be 
easily reversed in the future. Next, one 
needs to identify what policies (such as 
removing subsidies or imposing an envi-
ronmental tax) or additional investments 
in infrastructure (such as sanitation sys-
tems) can yield large co-benefi ts and syner-
gies between economic and environmental 
objectives. An example is the provision of 
urban public transport in crowded cit-
ies with high congestion and air pollution 
levels, where public transport can increase 
economic effi ciency and improve environ-
mental conditions. Sometimes the synergy 
is between the environment and welfare, 
without being uniquely mediated by eco-
nomic effi ciency (an example is sanitation 
infrastructure, which improves water qual-
ity and thus population health).
Previous chapters have shown that many 
actions and policies can green growth and 
capture synergies between environmental 
protection and development. Designing a 
green growth strategy requires policy mak-
ers to choose among these options, based on 
what is most important and urgent. The next 
chapter proposes a methodology to identify 
priority actions, as a function of the iner-
tia and irreversibility they imply and of the 
trade-offs and synergies they create.
Notes
 1.  Transport externalities in the United States are 
estimated at $0.11 per mile (Parry and others 
2007). Traffi c congestion not only increases 
emissions, it also increases local pollutants 
and noise.
 2.  WHO-UNICEF (2012) projects that by 2015 
the share of people without improved water 
will have fallen to 8 percent, exceeding the tar-
get of 12 percent. In contrast, about 33 per-
cent of the world’s population is projected to 
lack access to improved sanitation, far from 
the 23 percent target.
 3.  Investment needs is a relative concept, as 
it depends on what the target level of cov-
erage and quality is. No fi rm data exist on 
how much countries invest in infrastructure, 
although efforts have been made to collect 
information for Africa and for private invest-
ments in infrastructure (see Fay and others 
2010; MDB Working Group on Infrastructure 
2011).
GG_133-152.indd   149 5/8/12   1:01:19 PM
1 5 0   I N C L U S I V E  G R E E N  G R O W T H :  T H E  P A T H W A Y  T O  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  
References
An, F., D. Gordon, H. He, D. Kodjak, and 
D. Rutherford. 2007. Passenger Vehicle 
Greenhouse Gas and Fuel Economy, 
Standards: A Global Update. Washington, 
DC: Internat ional Counci l  on Clean 
Transportation.
Arze del Granado, J. D. Coady, and R. 
Gillingham. 2010. “The Unequal Benefits 
of Fuel Subsidies: A Review of Evidence for 
Developing Countries.” IMF working paper 
WP/10/02, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.
Bertaud, A. 2003. “Clearing the Air in Atlanta: 
Transit and Smart Growth or Conventional 
Economics?” Journal of Urban Economics 54 
(3): 379–400.
Bovenberg, A. L., and L. H. Goulder. 1996. 
“Optimal Environmental Taxation in the 
Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium 
Analysis.” American Economic Review 86 (4): 
985–1000.
Briceño-Garmendia, C., K. Smits, V. Foster. 
2008. “Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Patterns and Emerging Issues.” 
Background Paper 15. Africa Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic, World Bank, Washington, 
DC.
Chamon, M., P. Mauro, and Y. Okawa. 2008. 
“Mass Car Ownership in the Emerging Market 
Giants.” Economic Policy 23 (54): 243–96.
Davis, S. J., K. Caldeira, and H. D. Matthews. 
2010. “Future CO2 Emissions and Climate 
Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure.” 
Science 329 (5997): 1330–3.
ESMAP (Energy Sector Assistance Management 
Program). 2009. “Offgrid Technology and 
Lighting Africa”. Session 6 of the Africa 
Electrification Initiative Workshop. Maputo, 
Mozambique, May 9–12. http://www.esmap.
org/esmap/sites/esmap.org/fi les/Rpt_Senegal_
Morocco_Ecuador_AEI6.pdf.
Fay, M., M. Toman, D. Benitez, and S. Csordas. 
2010. “Infrastructure and Sustainable 
Development.” In Postcrisis Growth and 
Development: A Development Agenda 
for the G20, ed. S. Fardoust, Y. Kim, and 
C. Sepulveda. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Federal Highway Administrat ion. 2008. 
“Lessons Learned from Internat ional 
Experience in Congestion Pricing.” Publication 
FHWA-HOP–08–047. Federal Highway 
Administration, Washington, DC.
Foster,  V. ,  and C.  Br iceño-Garmendia. 
2010. Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation. Paris: Agence Française 
de Dévelopment; Washington, DC: World 
Bank.
Frederick, K. D., and G. E. Schwarz. 2000. 
“Socioeconomic Impacts of Climate Variability 
and Change on U.S. Water Resources.” RFF 
Discussion Paper 00–21, Resources for the 
Future, Washington, DC.
Geneletti, D. 2003. “Biodiversity Impact 
Assessment of Roads: An Approach Based on 
Ecosystem Rarity.” Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review 23 (3): 343–65.
Giraudet, L.-G., C. Givarch, and P. Quirion. 
2011. “Exploring the Potential for Energy 
Conservation in French Households through 
Hybrid Modeling.” Energy Economics 34 (2): 
426–45.
Gomez-Ibañez, J. A. 2012. “Urban Transportation 
and Green Growth.” Paper prepared for the 
Green Growth Knowledge Platform inaugural 
conference, Mexico City, January 12–13.
Graham, D. 2005. “Wider Economic Benefits 
of Transport Improvements: Link between 
Agglomeration and Productivity”. Report to 
Department of Transport, London. 
Greene, D. L., J. R. Kahn, and R. C. Gibson. 
1999. “Fuel Economy Rebound Effect for US 
Household Vehicles.” Energy Journal 20 (3): 
1–31.
Guivarch C., and S. Hallegatte. 2011. “Existing 
Infrastructure and the 2°C Target.” Climatic 
Change Letters 109 (3): 801–5.
Gusdorf, F., and S. Hallegatte. 2007. “Compact or 
Spread-Out Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, 
and the Vulnerability to Transportation 
Shocks.” Energy Policy 35 (10): 4826–38. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.04.017.
Gusdorf, F., S. Hallegatte, and A. Lahellec. 
2008. “Time and Space Matter: How Urban 
Transitions Create Inequality.” Global 
Environment Change 18 (4): 708–19. 
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.06.005.
Hallegatte, S. 2008. “An Adaptive Regional 
Input-Output Model and Its Application to the 
Assessment of the Economic Cost of Katrina.” 
Risk Analysis 28 (3): 779–99.
———.    2009. “Strategies to Adapt to an Uncertain 
Climate Change.” Global Environmental 
Change 19 (2): 240–7.
———. 2011. “How Economic Growth and 
Rational Decisions Can Make Disaster Losses 
Grow Faster than Wealth.” Policy Research 
GG_133-152.indd   150 5/8/12   1:01:19 PM
 P H Y S I C A L  C A P I T A L   1 5 1
Working Paper 5617, World Bank, Washington, 
DC.
Henriet F., S. Hallegatte, and L. Tabourier. 2012. 
“Firm-Network Characteristics and Economic 
Robustness to Natural Disasters.” Journal 
of Economic Dynamics and Control 36 (1): 
150–67.
Hussein, M. A. 2007. “Cost of Environmental 
Degradation: An Analysis in the Middle East 
and North Africa Region.” Management of 
Environmental Quality 19 (3): 305–7.
Hutton, G., J. Bartram. 2008. “Global Costs of 
Attaining the Millennium Development Goal 
for Water Supply and Sanitation.” Bulletin of 
the World Health Organization 86 (1): 13–19.
IBNET. 2011. The IBNET Water Supply and 
Sanitation Performance Blue Book. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2011. World 
Energy Outlook 2011. Paris: IEA.
ISDR (International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction), World Bank, World Meteorological 
Organization, International Monetary Fund. 
2011. Strengthening the Hydro-Meteorological 
Services in South Eastern Europe. http://www
.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/7650.
Kalkuhl, M., O. Edenhofer, and K. Lessmann. 2011. 
“Learning or Lock-In: Optimal Technology 
Policies to Support Mitigation.” Resource and 
Energy Economics 34 (1): 1–23.
Komives, K., V. Foster, J. Halpern, and Q. Wodon. 
2005. Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who 
Benefi ts from Utility Subsidies? Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Larsen, E. R., I. Dyner, L. Bedoya V, and C. J. 
Franco. 2004. “Lessons from Deregulation 
in Colombia: Successes, Failures and the Way 
Ahead.” Energy Policy 32 (15): 1767–80.
Loulou, R., and M. Labriet. 2008. “ETSAP-TIAM: 
The TIMES Integrated Assessment Model Part I: 
Model Structure.” Computational Management 
Science, Special Issue on Managing Energy and 
the Environment 5 (1): 7–40.
Luderer, G., R. Pietzcker, E. Kriegler, M. Haller, 
and N. Bauer. Forthcoming. “Asia’s Role in 
Mitigating Climate Change: A Technology and 
Sector Specific Analysis with ReMIND-R.” 
Preprint. 
MDB Working Group on Infrastructure. 2011. 
Infrastructure Action Plan, submission to the 
G20. 
Nauges, C., and C. Van Den Berg. 2009. “Demand 
for Piped and Non-Piped Water Supply 
Services: Evidence from Southwest Sri Lanka.” 
Environmental and Resource Economics 
42 (4): 535–49.
Nieswiadomy, M. L., and D. J. Molina. 1989. 
“Comparing Residential Water Demand 
Estimates under Decreasing and Increasing 
Block Rates Using Household Data.” Land 
Economics 65 (3): 280–9.
Parry, I.W.H., M. Walls, W. Harrington. 2007. 
“Automobile Externalities and Policies.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 45: 373–399.
Roberts, P, K. C. Shyam, and C. Rastogi. 2006. 
“Rural Access Index: A Key Development 
Indicator.” Transport Sector Board Technical 
Paper 10, World Bank, Washington DC.
Rozenberg, J., S. Hallegatte, A. Vogt-Schilb, O. 
Sassi, C. Guivarch, H. Waisman, and J. C. 
Hourcade. 2010. “Climate Policies as a Hedge 
against the Uncertainty on Future Oil Supply.” 
Climatic Change 101 (3–4): 663–8.
Sorrel, S. 2007. The Rebound Effect: An Assessment 
of the Evidence for Economy-Wide Energy 
Savings from Improved Energy Efficiency. 
London, UK: UK Energy Research Centre.
Tierney, K. J. 1997. “Business Impacts of 
the Northridge Earthquake.” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management 5 (2): 
87–97.
UN (United Nations). 2011. United Nations 
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk 
Reduction. New York: United Nations.
van Vliet, O., V. Krey, D. McCollum, S. Pachauri, 
Y. Nagai, S. Rao, and K. Riahi. 2012. 
“Synergies in the Asian Energy System: Climate 
Change, Energy Security, Energy Access and 
Air Pollution.” Energy Economics.
Viguie, V., and S. Hallegatte. 2012. “Trade-Offs 
and Synergies in Urban Climate Policies.” 
Nature Climate Change 2:334–7. doi: 10.1038
/nclimate 1434. 
Weber, E., E. Arpi, A. Carrigan. 2011. “From 
Here to There: A Creative Guide to Make 
Public Transport the Way to Go.” Embarq, the 
WRI Center for Sustainable Transport, World 
Resource Institute, Washington, DC. http://www
.embarq.org/sites/default/fi les/EMB2011_From_
Here_to_There_web.pdf.
WHO-UNICEF (World Health Organization; 
United Nations Children’s Fund) Joint 
Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and 
Sanitation. 2012. Progress on Drinking Water 
and Sanitation: 2012 Update. New York: 
UNICEF.
World Bank. 2004. Colombia: Recent Economic 
Developments in Infrastructure (REDI): 
GG_133-152.indd   151 5/8/12   1:01:19 PM
1 5 2   I N C L U S I V E  G R E E N  G R O W T H :  T H E  P A T H W A Y  T O  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  
Balancing Social and Productive Needs for 
Infrastructure. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2006. Morocco, Poverty and Social Impact 
Analysis of the National Slum Upgrading 
Program. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 2008. Stuck in Traffi c: Urban Transport in 
Africa. Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic 
Report, World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2009. World Development Report 2009: 
Reshaping Economic Geography. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
———. 2010. World Development Report 2010: 
Development and Climate Change. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
———. 2011a. Climate Change Adaptation and 
Natural Disasters Preparedness in the Coastal 
Cities of North Africa. Washington DC: World 
Bank. 
———. 2011b.  Household Cookstoves , 
Environment, Health, and Climate Change: A 
New Look at an Old Problem. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
———. 2011c. The Political Economy of Sanitation: 
How Can We Increase Investment and Improve 
Service for the Poor? Washington, DC: World 
Bank.
———. 2011d. World Development Indicators. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. Forthcoming. Maximizing Leverage of 
Public Funds to Unlock Commercial Financing 
for Clean Energy in East Asia. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
GG_133-152.indd   152 5/8/12   1:01:20 PM
7Crafting a Green Growth Strategy
A good green growth strategy can increase welfare by providing both environmental and economic ben-
efi ts. It is not a panacea to a country’s eco-
nomic ills: if economic growth is insuffi cient 
because of institutional or policy problems, 
green growth will not boost it in the absence 
of other structural changes.
Many green policies impose economic 
costs in the short term, such as higher invest-
ment or operational costs. But over the lon-
ger term, they are designed to yield economic 
benefi ts and contribute to long-term sustain-
able growth. Even so, short-term costs can 
create trade-offs between environmental pro-
tection and short-term economic growth.
For this reason, political and social accept-
ability require that green growth policies be 
designed with the specifi c goals of mitigating 
trade-offs across both space and time and 
offsetting costs by maximizing synergies and 
short-term economic benefits (such as job 
creation, poverty alleviation, and increased 
effi ciency).
Traditional economic analysis of policies 
and projects can be complemented with a 
screening exercise that helps design policies 
that provide short-term economic benefits 
  153
Key Messages
The design of green growth policies must • 
balance predictability against fl exibility and 
relevance against enforceability.
Step-by-step guidelines, including a checklist, • 
can help analysts and decision makers structure 
the process of crafting green growth strategies.
The suggested approach identifi es priorities • 
along two dimensions: synergy (the  existence 
of local and immediate co-benefits) and 
urgency (inertia and the risk of irreversibil-
ity and lock-in).
A green growth strategy needs to be designed • 
before individual projects are assessed and 
selected. Project assessments need to account 
for uncertainty and diverging world views.
WB_354_GG_CH07.indd   153 5/7/12   8:31:49 PM
1 5 4   I N C L U S I V E  G R E E N  G R O W T H :  T H E  P A T H W A Y  T O  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  
and are thus easier to implement. Not all 
green growth policies can yield such syner-
gies, and trade-offs will be unavoidable. It 
is nevertheless useful to scrutinize policy 
designs for opportunities to achieve more co-
benefi ts, if necessary by combining several 
policy interventions.
This chapter does not provide a one- size-
fi ts-all green strategy, because the appropri-
ate measures and policies are highly depen-
dent on the context, especially on the most 
pressing environmental and economic issues. 
Countries at different income levels will nec-
essarily have different priorities; the lowest-
income countries are more likely to delay the 
implementation of environmental policies 
that imply trade-offs with short-term produc-
tivity. Instead, this chapter provides a step-
by-step approach to designing a strategy that 
is appropriate in a given context.
The challenges of developing 
a green growth strategy
Much can be gained from framing environ-
mental policies as national strategies with 
positive long-term goals. Doing so increases 
the acceptability of immediate costs by the 
population and the private sector. It also 
improves consistency among policies and 
fosters policy certainty—which creates a 
friendlier climate for investments, making 
it more likely that private resources will be 
invested in long-term projects. But build-
ing a national strategy creates some chal-
lenges of its own, including the need for 
interagency coordination, private sector 
engagement, and the defi nition of relevant 
long-term goals and indicators.
Balancing predictability and fl exibility
Promoting a transition toward a more 
 environment-friendly growth pathway 
requires balancing the credibility and pre-
dictability of long-term objectives on the one 
hand and the fl exibility of the selected strat-
egy on the other. Credible and predictable 
long-term objectives are necessary to help 
coordinate economic actors and promote 
investments: businesses will not invest heav-
ily in research on low-energy or  water-saving 
technologies if they cannot be sure that 
a market will exist over the long term for 
innovations in these domains. Their will-
ingness to invest in green technologies and 
infrastructure depends on their trust in and 
projections of future environmental goals.
But environmental policies themselves 
need to evolve over time, in response to new 
information (such as technology or scien-
tifi c facts) and to the actions undertaken by 
other countries or regions. Thus, the ability 
to adjust course is essential—even if it can 
occur only at the expense of predictability.
Getting around the commitment prob-
lem. What factors might reduce predict-
ability? Certainly, changes in the political 
landscape, scientifi c uncertainty, and differ-
ences in interpretations of scientifi c results or 
future technological potentials will arise—as 
will questions about the government’s abil-
ity to commit (Dixit and Lambertini 2003; 
 Kydland and Prescott 1977). The fact that 
governments lack the ability (or credibility) 
to make long-term commitments has led to 
the transfer of monetary policy to indepen-
dent central banks in many countries. On 
the fi scal front, independent fi scal councils 
(such as the Offi ce of Management and Bud-
get in the United States) have been created 
to monitor government policies and inform 
policy makers from a technical and nonpar-
tisan perspective.
This commitment problem exists in the 
environmental domain as well. Innovative 
solutions will have to be found to combine 
political legitimacy with the ability to com-
mit. A process needs to be established that 
allows long-term objectives to be monitored 
by a body other than the government in 
place at a given point in time. There may be 
a role for an “independent environmental 
council” that monitors environmental poli-
cies for consistency with agreed-upon long-
term objectives.
Building consensus. How a national strat-
egy is developed and implemented strongly 
infl uences its sustainability, credibility, and 
predictability. National strategies help bring 
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together diverse groups of stakeholders (busi-
nesses, worker unions, and civil society) to 
build connections, exchange viewpoints, raise 
awareness, and build a sustained political 
commitment. This approach signals to soci-
ety that signifi cant and durable efforts will be 
dedicated to environmental protection.
Local authorities play a vital role, given 
that it is at the local level that citizens experi-
ence the destructive impact of environmental 
degradation (such as atmospheric pollution) 
and government is often empowered to take 
corrective action (through land-use planning 
or the regulation of economic activity). Local 
authorities have proved to be willing innova-
tors, offering opportunities to test policies 
and build consensus before scaling up.
Some countries, such as Brazil and France, 
have tried to build consensus through open 
and participatory approaches involving polit-
ical parties and civil society. Ahead of the 
preparation of its National Plan on Climate 
Change, Brazil created the Brazilian Forum 
on Climate Change, which brought together 
representatives from government, civil society, 
business, universities, and nongovernmental 
organizations to mobilize society around a 
climate plan of action. Public participation 
took the form of a national conference on the 
environment and sector dialogues.
Approaches that feature iterative, multi-
stakeholder involvement and extensive con-
sultation with the private sector and civil 
society create the transparency and politi-
cal buy-in to make commitments to green 
growth sustainable. Extensive consultation 
can also help address some of the governance 
risks inherent in climate change—which is 
characterized by complexity, uncertainty, 
and asymmetries in information. It is par-
ticularly important to ensure opportunities 
for the indigenous and poor communities to 
voice their concerns and priorities (Transpar-
ency International 2011).
Jointly setting economic and environ-
mental goals. At the strategic level, integrat-
ing environmental concerns with broader 
government activity involves systematically 
evaluating government policies through 
an environmental lens and creating new 
coordinating mechanisms to ensure that 
environmental concerns are mainstreamed 
in government activity. Poverty reduction 
strategies, economic development plans, 
disaster risk reduction strategies, and cli-
mate strategies provide opportunities for 
this to happen.
Consider the case of climate strategies. 
One way for countries to balance climate 
policy and development objectives is through 
national climate plans and low-emission 
development strategies. Already, more than 
47 countries have low-emission development 
strategies supported by bilateral or multi-
lateral bodies; many more have issued cli-
mate change–related strategies on their own 
(World Bank 2011b).
For instance, India’s National Action Plan 
on Climate Change defines eight national 
“missions,” including policy programs for 
energy effi ciency, a sustainable habitat, and 
sustainable agriculture. Bangladesh’s 2009 
Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 
requires reviewing and revising existing gov-
ernment policies to ensure that they take cli-
mate change impacts into account. Climate 
change “focal points” within all line minis-
tries are to work in coordination with a cli-
mate change unit housed within the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests (Government 
of Bangladesh 2009). Other country strate-
gies outline a central interministerial body to 
coordinate climate activities, including with 
key economic ministries (table 7.1).
Another way to integrate economic and 
environmental goals is to require that the 
environment be brought into core govern-
ment operations. A logical place for this to 
occur is through the budget, as the budget 
process is the central means of ensuring that 
expenditures are aligned with policy goals 
and that proper consideration is given to the 
trade-offs involved when climate-related con-
cerns and growth objectives clash. For exam-
ple, carbon pricing schemes, subsidy reform, 
and energy and infrastructure investment 
decisions all affect the fi scal balance (as dis-
cussed in chapter 2). As a result, fi nance min-
istries and other core government and devel-
opment planning actors must be key players 
WB_354_GG_CH07.indd   155 5/7/12   8:31:50 PM
1 5 6   I N C L U S I V E  G R E E N  G R O W T H :  T H E  P A T H W A Y  T O  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  
in developing and implementing green poli-
cies. The Republic of Korea’s national green 
growth strategy (box 7.1) and many national 
climate strategies have already begun to 
refl ect this reality.
• The Indonesian Ministry of Finance has 
taken a leading role in national climate 
policy. In 2009, it issued a green paper 
outlining actions to support the country’s 
agenda on climate change (Government of 
Indonesia 2009). It was the lead national 
partner for a World Bank country study 
on low-carbon growth.
• Ministries of fi nance in Morocco and the 
Philippines, among others, are undertak-
ing climate change public expenditure 
reviews to help align spending with cli-
mate change and development objectives.
• As part of Niger’s participation in the 
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience—
which provides assistance for integrating 
climate resilience into national develop-
ment planning—the Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance will house a strategic 
unit to coordinate actions taken under 
the country’s climate resilience program 
(PPCR 2010).
Balancing relevance and enforceability
Key dimensions of the needed balancing 
act between relevance and enforceability of 
environmental objectives include the choice 
of indicators with which to measure prog-
ress toward objectives; the time horizon over 
which environmental objectives should be 
selected; and the scale (national, local, or 
sectoral) at which environmental objectives 
are set.1
The choice of indicators. Potentially 
accurate indicators may be diffi cult to set or 
enforce, and easier-to-implement indicators 
may be less relevant. For climate change, a 
natural indicator for measuring mitigation 
is a “long-term carbon budget,” which mea-
sures global carbon emissions over the course 
of a given period of time, say, a century 
 (Matthews and others 2009;  Meinshausen 
and others 2009). But carbon budget commit-
ments are diffi cult to introduce and enforce. 
Indeed, there is an incentive for decision mak-
ers to delay investments and efforts beyond 
their mandate.
Another possibility is to defi ne emission 
targets at one or several points in time—
such as the European objective of reducing 
TABLE 7.1 Inter-ministerial arrangements for coordinating on climate change strategy in selected countries
Country Arrangement
Bangladesh National Steering Committee on Climate Change headed by the Minister of Environment and Forests 
oversees the work of the Ministry of Environment and Forests’ climate change unit, which works with climate 
change focal points in each line ministry.
Brazil Inter-ministerial Commission on Climate Change is chaired by Ministry of Science and Technology and 
includes the Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management, and the Ministry of Finance, among others.
India Advisory Council on Climate Change, led by the prime minister, oversees climate policy. Coordinating unit 
within the Ministry of Environment and Forests implements the National Action Plan on Climate Change. Ad 
hoc inter-ministerial commissions will address the eight national “missions” identiﬁ ed in the National Action 
Plan.
Indonesia National Committee for Climate Change includes representatives of all departments with responsibilities 
related to mitigation or adaptation.
Mexico Inter-secretarial Commission on Climate Change, led by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources 
and including the Secretary of the Economy as well as other line ministries and agencies, is charged with 
promoting and coordinating the national plan and associated activities.
South Africa Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change coordinates government climate change actions and aligns 
climate policy with existing legislation and policy.
Vietnam National Steering Committee headed by the prime minister and representing all major line ministries 
oversees the work of a unit within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment that is to coordinate 
implementation of the National Target Program to Respond to Climate Change.
Source: Governments of Bangladesh 2009; Brazil 2010; India 2008; Indonesia 2009; Mexico 2009; South Africa 2010; and Vietnam 2008.
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BOX 7.1 Implementing a green growth strategy in the Republic of Korea
Korea has moved assertively to become a leader in 
implementing green growth policies and defining 
a global green growth agenda. Its two-tier strat-
egy focuses on a short-term response to the current 
global economic crisis and a long-term transition 
toward green growth through export-focused green-
tech research and development. In acting as a res-
olute fi rst mover, Korea has exposed itself to both 
risks and potentially high payoffs.
Policy makers in Korea are seeking transforma-
tion, not marginal adjustment, of the economy, 
seeking to move it away from its current heavy reli-
ance on energy-intensive industries (which doubled 
its greenhouse gas emissions during the 1990s) and 
massive energy imports (which account for two-
thirds of imports). In pursuing green growth, they 
are combining three complementary and mutually 
reinforcing objectives: responding to the economic 
crisis, reducing the country’s energy dependency, 
and rebalancing the economy toward green sectors 
over the long term.
Korea’s $30.7 billion stimulus package, adopted in 
2009, was the greenest of any country, with 80 per-
cent of all funds going toward environment-friendly 
projects (World Bank 2010). Investments initially 
targeted infrastructure as a short-term response to 
the crisis. Projects funded included the development 
of renewable energy sources, energy-effi cient build-
ings, and low-carbon vehicles; the expansion of rail-
ways; and the management of water and waste. Most 
of the green investment funded three initiatives: river 
restoration, expansion of mass transit and railroads, 
and energy conservation in villages and schools. 
Together, the three projects were projected to create 
500,000 jobs (World Bank 2010).
Source: http://www.greengrowth.go.kr.
greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent 
by 2020. This type of objective is easier to 
enforce, but setting an objective for a par-
ticular point in time removes some fl exibil-
ity as to when and how to act, leading to 
higher costs.
The time horizon over which environ-
mental objectives are set. Relevance would 
favor setting very long-term objectives, but 
doing so risks encouraging policy mak-
ers and economic actors to delay action. 
Shorter-term goals are needed to ensure that 
action is taken. Shorter-term milestones are 
also useful because there is less uncertainty 
surrounding technologies and economic con-
ditions over the short term, making it easier 
to defi ne relevant targets. It thus makes sense 
to combine a long-term objective (such as 
limiting global warming to less than 2°C) 
with shorter-term objectives (such as reduc-
ing emissions by 20 percent by 2020).
Short-term goals complement rather than 
replace long-term goals. If a short-term 
goal is an end in itself, it may make sense to 
implement the least expensive solution. But 
in this case, there is a risk that the solutions 
selected to meet the short-term goal may lock 
in technology and infrastructure, making it 
impossible to reach longer-term objectives 
(Vogt-Shilb and Hallegatte 2011). To meet an 
ambitious long-term objective, a short-term 
target may need to be achieved by imple-
menting options that have greater potential 
(or suffer from greater risks of lock-in or 
irreversibility). Urban policies such as land 
use planning or mass transportation may not 
be required to reach short-term targets (for 
instance, in terms of emissions by 2020). But 
considering the timescale of such policies, 
they need to be implemented without delay 
if longer-term (2050), more ambitious targets 
are to be met. 
The scale (national, local, or sectoral) 
at which environmental objectives are set. 
Where objectives are economy wide (such as 
a carbon tax), the economic system has full 
flexibility to reach the objective by taking 
action where it is least expensive to do so. 
Given the information asymmetry between 
governments and economic agents, it makes 
sense to let market-based mechanisms deter-
mine where it is most cost-effective to act 
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(Laffont 1999). But the government cannot 
set credible and predictable signals over the 
very long term, and economic agents do not 
anticipate changes that occur over decades. 
As a result, there is underinvestment in 
land-use planning, resilient infrastructure, 
research, and other interventions critical to 
greening growth but whose benefits take 
time to materialize.
Given these constraints, action at the sec-
tor level may make sense in sectors with sig-
nifi cant potential for both lock-in and green 
impacts (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2011; 
chapter 3). Overlapping sectoral objectives—
such as the 20 percent renewable energy tar-
get in Europe, fuel-economy standards in the 
automobile industry, and changes in urban 
planning, building norms, and infrastructure 
design—may thus be part of an effi cient miti-
gation policy.
However, sectoral policies are vulnerable 
to regulation capture, rent seeking, and inef-
ficient micromanagement (Laffont 1996; 
Rodrik 2005). Rent-seeking behavior is 
likely to affect policies even in countries with 
strong institutional capacity and appropri-
ate checks and balances (Anthoff and Hahn 
2010; Helm 2010). Systematic appraisal of 
policies, using cost-benefit analysis where 
feasible, can mitigate these risks (see a dis-
cussion on such analysis below). It is also 
important for national authorities to ensure 
that sector policies are developed through a 
transparent process that provides opportuni-
ties for all stakeholders to contribute.
A step-by-step process 
for crafting a green growth 
strategy
How should policy makers design a green 
growth strategy that fi ts the country’s require-
ments? This section proposes a series of steps 
to follow. A key principle is that individual 
projects need to be assessed with respect 
to a strategy rather than in an abstract and 
isolated way. For instance, building coal-
powered electricity plants can be a useful 
short-term component of a strategy to green 
electricity over the long term, if doing so helps 
reduce reliance on diesel generators and is 
combined with demand-side action and meas-
ures to transition to cleaner sources of energy. 
Similarly, building coastal dikes can be part 
of a long-term land-use strategy to manage 
risks—although if it is not combined with 
appropriate maintenance and land use regu-
lations, it can increase vulnerability. Given 
these kinds of consequences, a green growth 
strategy needs to be designed before individ-
ual projects are evaluated and selected.
Step 1: Identify economic and social 
objectives and key obstacles
Step 1 is to identify the key economic and 
social objectives in terms of the growth and 
welfare channels noted in the green growth 
framework presented in chapter 1 (the fi rst 
three bullets relate to growth; the last two, 
to welfare):
• Increase production factors (human, 
 natural, and physical capital).
• Enhance effi ciency, by correcting market 
failures to move closer to the production 
function (the maximum production level 
possible with the available technology, 
physical capital, labor, and environment, 
assuming maximum effi ciency).
• Push out the production frontier, by cor-
recting innovation and dissemination 
market failures in order to be able to pro-
duce more with less.
• Increase economic resilience and reduce 
vulnerability to natural hazards and com-
modity price volatility.
• Increase the job content and poverty 
reduction of growth (that is, move toward 
“inclusive growth”).
In addition, policy makers need to take 
other important policy goals—such as main-
taining a balance in regional and local devel-
opment, which may also offer a potential 
source of synergy—into account.
Once the objectives have been identifi ed, 
the next step is to identify the market or 
institutional failures that retard growth and 
limit well-being (table 7.2). Hausmann and 
 others (2008) claim that different countries 
WB_354_GG_CH07.indd   158 5/7/12   8:31:51 PM
 C R A F T I N G  A  G R E E N  G R O W T H  S T R A T E G Y   1 5 9
face different obstacles to growth and that 
growth-enhancing policies need to be targeted 
to address the specifi c obstacles. A study by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD 2011a) proposes 
that green growth strategies be developed by 
fi rst identifying specifi c obstacles to growth.
Step 2: Identify environmental 
objectives and lock-in risks
Step 2 is to identify (1) the environmen-
tal improvements that are most likely to 
increase welfare and (2) the risks of irre-
versibility in both the environmental and 
economic domains. The idea is to focus on 
welfare-improving environmental objectives 
that preclude a “grow dirty, clean up later” 
pathway. Examples include improving water 
quality, reducing air pollution and flood 
losses, protecting soils, and avoiding irre-
versible destruction of coral reefs. Here (as 
in Step 1), the analysis should combine scien-
tifi c and economic information from reports, 
local knowledge, and widely agreed priori-
ties. It should rely on broad consultations to 
ensure consistency with population goals, 
objectives, and preferences and to avoid con-
fl icts between the green growth strategy and 
other planning initiatives.
Step 3: Consider six types of 
interventions and identify 
synergies
Step 3 is to determine which types of policy 
interventions would help a country reach its 
environmental goals while also improving 
economic growth and social welfare. This 
report singles out six types of interventions.
Pricing and fi scal policies: taxes, subsi-
dies, or subsidy removal (chapter 2).  Fiscal 
policies can be used to guide economic 
behavior and create environmental and eco-
nomic benefi ts. Governments need to assess 
fiscal policies as a whole, taking account 
of the trade-offs between alternative ways 
to source and apply funds. Reallocating 
resources from fuel subsidies to spending on 
education, health, and infrastructure will 
help reach environmental objectives and 
increase economic growth. Reallocating 
these funds to services that are accessible to 
the poor will also help reduce poverty. Oil 
TABLE 7.2 Channels through which green policies could contribute to growth
Channel Questions Possible priorities
Increase in production factors 
(human, natural, and physical capital)
Which categories of capital (physical, natural, 
human) are important in limiting economic 
growth or in reducing population welfare?
Increasing transportation (and export) 
capacity, improving secondary education 
and population health
Enhanced eﬃ  ciency (correcting 
market failures to move closer to the 
production frontier)
What are the greatest ineﬃ  ciencies in the 
economic systems?
Reducing urban congestion and energy 
costs, increasing energy supply reliability, 
increasing employment of young qualiﬁ ed 
workers
Outward movement in the 
production frontier (correcting 
innovation and dissemination market 
failures to be able to produce more 
with less)
What are the obstacles to innovation and to 
innovation adaptation and dissemination?
Improving worker skills and property 
right protection, reducing entry costs for 
innovative ﬁ rms, improving access to capital
Increases in economic resilience Is the economy particularly vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks such as commodity 
price volatility, natural disasters, 
or competitor innovations?
Diversifying the economy, reducing energy 
intensity and dependency on imported 
energy, reducing vulnerability to large-scale 
disasters, improving food security
Increases in the job content and 
poverty reduction of growth 
(moving toward “inclusive growth”)
What are the major problems in the labor 
market and poverty reduction, and 
why have they persisted up to now?
Reducing rural or urban poverty, mitigating 
ethnic segregation, ﬁ ghting poverty traps, 
improving access to capital for the poor
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dependency, and thus vulnerability to oil 
price volatility, can be mitigated by impos-
ing an energy tax, to favor energy-effi cient 
technologies and equipments. Such policies 
would provide environmental benefi ts and 
enhance economic resilience.
Political economy considerations will play 
an important part in determining the feasi-
bility of a realignment of fi scal policies with 
green growth objectives. Interest groups will 
resist the withdrawal of subsidies and tax 
incentives. Nonetheless, as recent efforts by 
the Islamic Republic of Iran to reduce fuel 
subsidies illustrate, progress can be made. A 
phased approach supported by communica-
tion and complementary policies that real-
locate resources to the poor can help build 
constituencies for reforms. In some cases, 
resources may need to be allocated temporar-
ily to compensate losers, even if they are not 
the poor or needy. Building in sunset clauses 
to such compensatory programs may help 
prevent temporary relief becoming another 
permanent subsidy.
Institutions, norms and regulations, and 
behavior-based policies (chapter 2). Eco-
nomic incentives can be usefully comple-
mented with other types of instruments. For 
instance, where low building energy effi ciency 
contributes to high energy imports, introduc-
ing regulations or creating new mechanisms 
to make dwelling owners invest in insulation 
and effi cient appliances could yield a double 
dividend, strengthening the economy and 
protecting the environment.
Policy makers must consider how environ-
mental policies affect businesses and individu-
als, taking into account their decision- making 
biases and the noneconomic incentives that 
affect behaviors. A strategy that takes these 
aspects into account—by, for instance, fram-
ing policy changes within a positive collec-
tive project and providing individuals with 
feedback on how they behave with respect 
to the project—will be more efficient than 
one based on an economic argument alone. 
Information disclosure programs that require 
fi rms to publish their level of pollutant emis-
sions can be as efficient as and less costly 
than a norm.
Innovation and industrial policies 
 (chapter 3). The greening of the economy 
requires growing new industries, along with 
developing and disseminating new technolo-
gies. This process can be eased with specifi c 
policies that target (1) the development and 
dissemination of technologies and innova-
tions, by correcting the effect of a knowledge 
spillover, and (2) the development of new 
industries and sectors, by correcting the effect 
of nonenvironmental market failures (such 
as coordination failures and capital market 
imperfections).
Green industrial policies can help dissemi-
nate new technologies (especially when they 
have been tested and demonstrated in devel-
oped countries) and develop new competitive 
sectors. Examples of green industrial policies 
that have been used include feed-in tariffs for 
solar electricity, or subsidies to research and 
development (R&D) in renewable energy. 
Countries with a latent competitive advantage 
in renewable energy (such as North Africa with 
solar energy) may want to pursue this advan-
tage with the hope of creating  a viable and 
competitive industry. However, support must 
carefully balance market failures and govern-
ment failures given the risks of policy capture 
and rent-seeking, especially where institutions 
and civil society are weak (chapter 3).
Education and labor markets policies 
(chapter 4). Green transitions are likely to 
involve structural change away from some 
industries and toward new ones. Experience 
with trade liberalization offers valuable les-
sons as to how to reduce the cost and length 
of such structural changes. In particular, 
policies that facilitate the movement of work-
ers from one sector to another can accelerate 
the transition and reduce adjustment costs. 
Where such movement is impeded by skill 
issues, training programs can help—for 
example by training construction employees 
to effi ciently retrofi t buildings.
Natural capital, agriculture, and ecosys-
tem services management (chapter 5). An 
excellent way of greening agricultural pro-
duction is through conservation agriculture, 
which simultaneously yields environmental 
benefi ts (by reducing pollution of waterways 
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from nutrients and increasing carbon seques-
tration in soils); increases the efficiency of 
production (by reducing the use of energy 
inputs); increases resilience (by frequently 
rotating crops); and increases agricultural 
productivity in the long run (by reducing ero-
sion and enhancing soil structure).
But for this to work, there needs to be bet-
ter information underlying decision making 
and better access to this information. For 
example, greater access to weather and cli-
mate information services for farmers can 
improve resilience in the agricultural system 
and the overall value chain, including pro-
duction, post-harvesting, storage, and market 
access. It can also help innovations to succeed 
(such as in weather-based risk products).
Infrastructure, building, urbanism, trans-
port, and energy (chapter 6). Green sectoral 
interventions can help increase factors of 
production, push out the production fron-
tier, enhance effi ciency, improve resilience, 
create jobs, and reduce poverty. In some 
countries, urban congestion and the lack of 
efficient transportation reduce well-being 
and hold back economic growth, on top 
of causing negative environmental effects. 
Investments in public transit and changes 
in land-use plans to favor a more compact 
urban area could reduce air pollution and 
spur growth (thanks to the benefits from 
urbanization and concentration). Multiple 
benefi ts can also be reaped from multipur-
pose  infrastructure such as water reser-
voirs that produce hydroelectricity, mitigate 
fl oods, and ensure minimum river fl ow dur-
ing drought. And regional integration in 
infrastructure design and investments can 
improve the efficiency of the system, for 
instance by increasing the reliability of elec-
tricity generation and allowing for a greater 
penetration of renewable energy.
Step 4: Defi ne priorities
Policy makers face limitations in terms of the 
capacity and resources to design and imple-
ment reforms and the political and social 
capital to launch several reforms simultane-
ously. They therefore need to defi ne priori-
ties based on urgency (to avoid lock-in and 
irreversibility) and synergies (the existence of 
local and immediate benefi ts that will help 
diminish political and social resistance). 
Priorities can be defi ned by examining the 
policy options identifi ed in step 3 through the 
lens of political and social acceptability and 
lock-in risk, as done in table 7.3. Columns 
TABLE 7.3 Some guiding principles for establishing green growth strategies
Local and immediate benefi ts
LOWER
(Trade-off s exist between short-and 
long-term or local and global benefi ts)
HIGHER
(Policies provide local 
and immediate benefi ts)
In
er
ti
a 
an
d/
or
 ri
sk
 o
f l
oc
k-
in
 
an
d 
ir
re
ve
rs
ib
ili
ty
LOWER
(action is less urgent)
• Lower-carbon, higher-cost energy 
supply
• Carbon pricing
• Stricter wastewater regulation 
• Drinking water and sanitation, solid waste 
management
• Lower-carbon, lower-cost energy supply
• Loss reduction in electricity supply
• Energy demand management 
• Small-scale multipurpose water reservoirs
HIGHER
(action is urgent) • Reduced deforestation
• Coastal zone and natural area 
protection 
• Fisheries catch management
• Land use planning
• Public urban transport
• Family planning
• Sustainable intensiﬁ cation in agriculture
• Large-scale multipurpose water reservoirs
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organize policies for the extent of local and 
immediate benefi ts they offer. Some policies 
provide immediate synergies between the 
economy and the environment (such as reduc-
ing leaks in water networks), whereas others 
involve trade-offs, at least in the short term 
(restricting development in coastal areas, for 
example). Rows classify interventions for the 
extent to which they prevent irreversibility 
and lock-in. Policies may need to be imple-
mented more urgently even where they imply 
trade-offs, simply because acting later would 
be more costly or even impossible. Other pol-
icies can be postponed because they do not 
involve signifi cant inertia.
In designing a green growth strategy, pri-
ority should go to policies that are high in 
terms of local and immediate benefits and 
more urgent (such as public urban transport 
and sustainable intensifi cation in agriculture). 
Policies that provide local and immediate 
benefi ts, even if they are not urgent, can be 
implemented at any level of income.
It is more difficult to implement poli-
cies that are urgent but involve significant 
trade-offs (such as reduced deforestation). 
But these policies would be more costly—or 
even impossible—to implement later. For this 
reason, these policies require international 
 cooperation, especially when they affect 
global challenges, such as climate change.
Developing countries (especially low-
income countries) should focus on environ-
mental policies that have a negative or zero 
economic cost thanks to synergies with 
development (such as developing hydropower 
where appropriate, or implementing specifi c 
urban plans); have a positive economic cost 
but large direct welfare impacts, that is, when 
they target local environment goods such as 
local air pollution or natural risks; and whose 
cost can be offset with external resources 
(such as carbon trading).
Step 5: Conduct a systematic analysis of 
the policies and projects included in the 
green growth strategy
Step 5 is to thoroughly review each policy 
and project as a function of the selected 
priorities and strategic choices. Such a review 
should rely on a multicriteria analysis, given 
the limitations of cost-benefi t analysis.
The limitations of cost-benefi t analysis. 
The standard cost-benefi t analysis—which is 
commonly used to evaluate public policies or 
investment projects—is necessary but needs 
to be supplemented by other approaches for 
green growth policies. The reason is that 
cost-benefi t analysis encounters three major 
diffi culties when applied to environmental or 
green growth policies.
First, some of the benefits (or costs) are 
diffi cult to assess and measure. Environmen-
tal benefi ts are often problematic to quantify 
and value, beyond the assessment of health 
impacts. But some economic benefits, like 
innovation-related or resilience-related ones, 
are also diffi cult to assess and are thus often 
left out of the analysis. For instance, the 
innovation benefi t of a demonstration project 
cannot usually be quantifi ed. More generally, 
benefi t-cost ratios consider only one project 
at a time and often cannot take into account 
the integration within a broader, longer-term 
strategy and the consistency with priorities 
and strategic choices.
Second, different stakeholders often assign 
very different weights to different types of 
consequences, and differences in world views 
and priorities translate into different pref-
erences for design and targets of policies. 
Cost-benefit analysis requires agreeing on 
values—something that can be very diffi cult 
to achieve.
Third, many of the tools and policies that 
can be part of a green growth strategy involve 
signifi cant uncertainties. For instance, reduc-
ing vulnerability to oil shocks is a clear eco-
nomic benefi t, but is diffi cult to quantify in 
the absence of reliable probabilistic estimates 
of future oil volatility. This uncertainty arises 
from many sources, including technological 
change, climate change, and policy effi ciency 
and enforcement. Cost-benefi t analysis can 
capture uncertainty when it can be translated 
into probabilities for different outcomes. 
Where policies and projects involve deep 
uncertainty, however—as green growth poli-
cies often do—it is very diffi cult to estimate 
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probabilities or reconcile different stakehold-
ers’ world views.
Differing world views, diverging priori-
ties, and the use of multicriteria analysis. 
A green/wealth accounting system would 
allow the consequences of green policies 
to be aggregated and policies compared. 
However, as noted in chapter 2, aggrega-
tion is diffi cult, because many prices are 
missing; aggregation also raises ethical 
and philosophical issues on which there 
is little consensus. In the absence of such 
an accounting system, many policies 
will involve difficult trade-offs between 
improving the environment and tradition-
ally measured growth.2 Thus, it is useful 
to complement the cost-benefit analysis 
with decision-making methods that facili-
tate capturing—if only qualitatively—the 
full costs and benefi ts and the correspond-
ing uncertainty.
For these reasons, multicriteria analysis 
can be useful, at least as a fi rst screening tool. 
It does not provide an objective ranking of all 
possible actions, but it allows decision mak-
ers to include a full range of social, environ-
mental, technical, and economic criteria and 
policy goals in a balanced manner—mainly 
by quantifying and highlighting trade-offs 
between confl icting objectives that are diffi -
cult to compare directly and agree on.
Multicriteria analysis is widely applied 
to environmental issues, including disaster 
risk reduction and climate change adapta-
tion assessments. In the past several years, 
it has been applied to urban flood risk 
in France (Viguie and Hallegatte 2012) 
and Germany (Kubal and others 2009); 
to adaptation options for climate change 
in the  Netherlands (Brouwer and van Ek 
2004; De Bruin and others 2009); to cli-
mate change–related health risks (Ebi and 
Burton 2008); and to adaptation planning 
in Canada (Qin and others 2008). Older 
examples include identifying vulnerabil-
ity in the agricultural sector and assess-
ing alternative crop options (Julius and 
 Scheraga 2000), and prioritizing climate 
change adaptation options in Africa (Smith 
and Lenhart 1996).
In 2002, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change developed 
guidelines for using the adaptation assess-
ment process in low-income countries. 
The guidelines suggest using multicriteria 
analysis to prioritize adaptation measures 
(UNFCCC 2002).3 In 2011, the United 
Nations Environment Programme proposed 
a multicriteria decision-making tool for cli-
mate policies in its Multi-Criteria Analy-
sis for Climate (MCA4Climate) project 
(box 7.2). The project lists the various ben-
efits, co-benefits, costs, and co-costs of a 
set of environmental policies to ensure that 
coeffects are included.
This multicriteria approach is particu-
larly appropriate for green growth, because 
it allows analysts to identify trade-offs and 
synergies and present decision makers with 
the information they need to capture the 
potential for co-benefits from green poli-
cies. A variety of indicators can be used to 
measure the potential benefits from green 
growth policies. Each of the channels shown 
in table 7.4 could be further broken down 
(for example, improved environment could 
be split into biodiversity, air pollution, and 
climate). Many institutions—including the 
OECD (2011b), World Bank (2011a), and 
the United Nations Statistical Division that 
created the System of Environmental and 
Economic Accounting—have proposed indi-
cators for this purpose.
Applying such a process would ensure 
that the real motives for implementing a 
project are taken into account. For exam-
ple, a demonstration of new technology 
that depends on economies of scale to be 
effi cient would not be expected to pass a 
cost-benefi t analysis (or to reach the clas-
sically required return on investment) that 
does not take this demonstrator status 
into account. These benefi ts can be made 
explicit by simply identifying the projects’ 
contribution to a set of policy objectives, 
as Morocco did for a solar power project 
(box 7.3).
Of course, no methodology provides 
a purely objective way of making deci-
sions; it can communicate only  trade-offs 
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BOX 7.2 MCA4Climate: A practical framework for planning pro-development climate 
policies
Climate change is a pervasive and complex prob-
lem, with uncertainty surrounding its multifaceted 
impacts. Setting priorities is hampered by the lack 
of a systematic and comprehensive description of 
the issues concerned, the links among them, and the 
trade-offs involved. Structured guidance is needed 
to underpin long-term policy planning in this area—
guidance that systematically considers the direct and 
indirect economic, social, environmental, and insti-
tutional costs and impacts.
The goal of the MCA4Climate initiative is to help 
fi ll this gap by developing practical guidance that 
enables governments to identify low-cost, environ-
mentally effective, and pro-poor climate mitigation 
and adaptation policy choices. The multicriteria 
framework offers a useful planning tool for prioritiz-
ing and populating with concrete measures, includ-
ing Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, 
National Adaptation Programs of Action, and other 
broad, economy-wide climate strategies.
MCA4Climate rests on three main principles:
• Climate change policy has multidimensional 
implications for human societies and the environ-
ment, affecting multiple interests and a wide range 
of values and priorities.
• If formulated appropriately, policy responses to 
climate change can help meet country-specific 
development objectives.
• Nonmonetary values, uncertainty, and the long-
term dynamics of environmental, socioeconomic, 
and technological systems are inherent to climate 
change. They should be considered in the develop-
ment of any policy response to it.
Source: UNEP 2011.
TABLE 7.4 Framework for measuring potential benefi ts from green growth policies
Type of benefi t Channels Examples of indicators
Environmental Improved environment Indicators speciﬁ cally developed for the domain in 
question (for example, reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions, natural area protected from development, 
air or water quality)
Economic Increase in factors of production (physical capital, 
human capital, and natural capital)
Measured by the additional production from 
increased capital (potentially measured by the value 
of ecosystems or renewable resources), or by the 
value of additional capital
Accelerated innovation, through correction of 
market failures in knowledge
Measured by productivity indicators (for example, 
eﬃ  ciency of photovoltaic panels used to produce 
electricity) or dissemination indicators (for example, 
the fraction of the population with access to 
photovoltaic electricity)
Enhanced eﬃ  ciency, through correction of non-
environmental market failures
Measured by indicators for resource eﬃ  ciency 
(for example, the material or energy intensity of 
production, reduction in the value of time lost from 
congestion), or by additional production
Social Increased resilience to natural disasters, 
commodity price volatility, and economic crises
Measured by metrics related to the project, from 
avoided disaster losses (in monetary terms) or 
number of people at risk from ﬂ oods to a measure of 
the vulnerability to oil price volatility
Job creation and poverty reduction Measured by the number of jobs created or an 
indicator of the impact on the poor (for example, 
reduction in the number of people without access to 
drinking water and sanitation)
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to decision makers. For instance , a 
 cost- benefi t analysis will provide different 
answers if different aggregation methods 
are used (how to aggregate losers and win-
ners) or if different valuation methods are 
used (how to measure ecosystem losses in 
monetary terms).
Uncertainty and the need for 
robust decision making
Assessing the costs and benefi ts of a green 
growth strategy is extremely diffi cult, espe-
cially when the future is diffi cult to project 
or even describe using probabilities.4
BOX 7.3 Using a policy framework to analyze the benefi ts of Morocco’s Ouarzazate 
concentrated solar power project
Through a public-private partnership, the World 
Bank is helping fi nance the fi rst phase of a 500 meg-
awatt Ouarzazate solar power plant in Morocco. 
The project’s goal is to increase power generation 
from solar power, along with mitigating greenhouse 
gas emissions and the deleterious effects of power 
production on the local environment.
The project illustrates the limits of a cost-benefi t 
analysis when a project has nonmonetary objec-
tives and is part of a broader national strategy. Both 
cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefi t analysis 
indicate that the project is not economically justifi ed 
under prevailing economic conditions. However, a 
simple listing of policy objectives and the project’s 
contributions to these goals can help identify co-
benefi ts that would otherwise be ignored.
• The project seeks to help develop a globally avail-
able noncarbon power generation technology and 
to reduce the cost of concentrated solar power 
worldwide (a global public goods benefi t).
• It will contribute to Morocco’s energy and cli-
mate change objectives of security of supply, 
energy diversification, and reductions in CO2 
emissions, as well as other economic and social 
objectives, such as helping start a new green 
industry, developing interior regions of the coun-
try, and creating jobs.
• It will test the use of storage technology in con-
centrated solar plants, create a precedent for the 
use of the public-private partnership business 
model to develop concentrated solar power plants 
in Morocco and elsewhere, and contribute to 
regional integration of the electricity market in the 
Mediterranean.
These co-benefi ts can be identifi ed using the six 
rubrics shown in table B7.3.1. The multicriteria anal-
ysis is thus useful for decision makers, even though 
it should not replace the cost-benefi t analysis, which 
provides invaluable information.
TABLE B7.3.1 Co-benefi ts of the Ouarzazate concentrated solar power project
Type of benefi t Channels Examples of indicators
Environmental Climate change mitigation Reduced greenhouse gas emissions
Economic Increase in factors of production (physical capital, 
human capital, and natural capital)
Added electricity production capacity
Local learning on solar technologies
Accelerated innovation, through correction of 
market failures in knowledge
Demonstrate technology that has market potential in region, 
given likely latent competitive advantage and capacity to 
export solar resources to Europe
Institutional innovation through the development of PPP
Reduce cost of concentrated solar power globally
Enhanced eﬃ  ciency, through correction of non-
environmental market failures
None
Social Increased resilience to natural disasters, 
commodity price volatility, and economic crises
Diversifying energy in Morocco
Job creation and poverty reduction Creating jobs and new industries 
Spurring economic activity in interior regions of the country
Source: Based on the “Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power Project for Morocco” Project Appraisal Document.
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Uncertainty surrounding green growth 
strategies stems from at least three sources:
• Many factors of success are not controlled 
by national decision makers. Such factors 
include the availability of technologies 
from abroad; the price of internationally 
traded goods such as oil, minerals, and 
food; economic growth and imports and 
exports from other countries; and green 
or trade policies in other countries.
• There are many implementation obstacles, 
and it is diffi cult to predict how  effi cient 
innovation policies will be or how quickly 
production costs will fall when produc-
tion volumes increase.
• Scientifi c uncertainty is high. No one can 
project future changes in local climates 
with certainty, complicating decisions 
about land-use planning, water manage-
ment, and electricity production.
Green growth strategies need to be robust 
with respect to these uncertainties. Kalkulh 
and others (2012) highlight how the optimal 
policy in the presence of perfect knowledge 
on technology potentials and market failures 
differs from the optimal policy in the pres-
ence of deep uncertainty. Disregarding uncer-
tainty and basing actions on the most likely 
scenario is dangerous and may lead to unde-
sirable outcomes (box 7.4).
Cost-benefi t analyses can be extended to 
consider multiple states, each with a prob-
ability of occurrence. These probabilities are 
sometimes determined by a frequency-based 
method (How often did the event occur in 
the past?) or by belief-based analysis, such as 
BOX 7.4 Incorporating uncertainty in protecting Ho Chi Minh City
Ho Chi Minh City already experiences extensive 
routine fl ooding; increased precipitation and rising 
sea levels in the coming decades could permanently 
inundate a large portion of the city, placing the poor 
at particular risk and threatening new economic 
development in low-lying areas.
In response to these challenges, Ho Chi Minh 
City has developed plans for, and started implement-
ing numerous infrastructure projects to mitigate 
fl ood risks. Over the years, its multibillion dollar 
investment plans in sewerage and drainage infra-
structure have included 6,000 kilometers of canals 
and pipes covering 650 square kilometers in the 
city to upgrade the discharge capacity of the storm 
sewer system and address land up-fi lling; roughly 
172 kilometers of dikes and river barriers, mainly 
to control tides; and a tide control plan that uses at 
least 12 gates and 170 kilometers of dikes to create 
a polder system.
These plans were based on the best predictions 
of future climate and development available at the 
time they were made. Recent analysis suggests, how-
ever, that climate change and urbanization will be 
greater than expected. In fact, some variables already 
exceed the maximum values considered in the design 
phase. These surprises require significant revisions 
to the plans. The canals and pipes built principally 
to upgrade the discharge capacity of the storm sewer 
system and address land up-fi lling may not be able 
to handle increased fl ows. Increases in precipitation 
and tide levels observed over the past decade already 
exceed those projected and may top dikes and barriers. 
Future saline intrusion and rainfall intensity may be 
more severe than anticipated, potentially rendering the 
poldering plans obsolete before they are approved.
In addition, unforeseen effects may cause signifi -
cant harm and increase risk in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Since the plan was created, the city has experienced 
unprojected urbanization in low-density areas, per-
haps because of the illusion of safety associated with 
the presence of fl ood prevention infrastructure there. 
The city’s Steering Committee for Flood Control is 
concerned that the insuffi ciency of the planned infra-
structure may exacerbate fl ooding in some areas. If 
it does, the legacy of the intervention will have been 
to increase vulnerability.
The Steering Committee is now preparing an 
integrated fl ood management strategy to harmonize 
(continued next page)
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Bayesian analysis (What are the odds of the 
event? How much do I trust my model?).
But as uncertainty grows, it becomes more 
diffi cult to characterize the probability of an 
event’s occurrence, particularly when mul-
tiple stakeholders with differing values and 
expectations are involved. In such a situation, 
the optimal solution may be designed for a 
world whose existence is uncertain; that solu-
tion may perform poorly in other plausible, 
yet unanalyzed, worlds. In such a context, 
solutions should be adopted that are more 
robust—often achieved by making them fl ex-
ible and allowing for adjustment over time, as 
new information becomes available. Learn-
ing and action are thus conducted in paral-
lel, in an iterative process that includes learn-
ing and monitoring as a major component 
(fi gure 7.1). “Waiting for more information” 
is never an option: information has to be cre-
ated, through experimentation, monitoring, 
and analysis. If information is not suffi cient 
to make an investment decision, a learning 
plan is required.
The robust decision-making approach 
helps design strategies able to cope with deep 
uncertainty (Lempert and others 2003). It 
starts with analyzing a candidate strategy 
to determine its vulnerability to surprise 
and uncertainty. It then tries to reduce this 
vulnerability, thereby increasing the overall 
resilience of the strategy. In practice, this 
is done through a stakeholder consultation 
process that identifi es the available strate-
gies or “policy levers,” then determines the 
criteria for appraising these strategies and 
the range of uncertainties to consider. Next, 
decision makers proceed through an itera-
tive process, identifying the vulnerabilities 
that different scenarios expose and how 
these can be addressed until the vulner-
abilities are reduced to an appropriate level. 
This robust decision-making approach can 
be managed through a consultative process 
or supported by sophisticated modeling 
(box 7.5).
This approach is particularly relevant 
when multiple policy goals and world views 
coexist, because it allows for a fl exible defi -
nition of success and failure. A cost-benefi t 
analysis requires a consensual objective 
function that is able to rank all potential 
outcomes. In contrast, the robust decision-
BOX 7.4 (continued)
the master plans for the storm sewer system, fl ood 
control system, and urban development. Aware of 
the consequences of underestimating uncertainty, 
they have chosen a robust approach to address con-
cerns that their earlier approaches to planning con-
sistently under- or misestimated uncertainties; that 
plans proved brittle to assumptions that proved 
inaccurate, leading to costly realignment; and that it 
was often diffi cult to reach consensus among diverse 
actors and agendas. Through an integrated, robust 
approach, the Steering Committee is accepting the 
role of persistent, deep uncertainties as a new com-
ponent in its planning process.
Maximizing the robustness of strategies may 
require changes in decision-making approaches. Tra-
ditional decision-making processes address quantifi a-
ble uncertainty (risk) by predicting a future state and 
designing a plan or project for the conditions of that 
state. This approach produces optimal results for the 
intended future, but its application may be increas-
ingly limited when faced with larger uncertainties.
Source: Hallegatte and others 2012.
learn act learn
revise
FIGURE 7.1 Schematic for crafting solutions in the presence of 
deep uncertainty
Source: Hallegatte and others 2012.
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BOX 7.5 Using robust decision making in water planning in southern California water
Planners have traditionally used historical stream 
flow data and weather patterns to develop sea-
sonal water forecasts. But because climate change is 
expected to change weather patterns, air tempera-
ture, and precipitation patterns in an as yet unpre-
dictable fashion at the local scale, planners are now 
seeking methods to incorporate the impacts of cli-
mate change into their planning processes.
In 2006, the RAND Corporation worked with the 
Inland Empire Utility Agency (IEUA), in Chino Hills, 
California, to test its robust decision-making frame-
work. In 2005, IEUA released its Regional Urban 
Water Management Plan (UWMP), in response to 
a projected population increase of 800,000 to 1.2 
 million people by 2030. The document outlined a 
plan to meet future water demands by improving 
water use effi ciency and developing local resources.
The robust decision-making analysis took the 
UWMP as its initial strategy, used climate infor-
mation from the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research, and employed a planning system from the 
Stockholm Environment Institute to assess how dif-
ferent policy levers would perform under a variety of 
possible futures.
The fi rst run of the model evaluated the proposed 
management plan under four climate scenarios. Its 
fi ndings generally indicated that if the impacts of cli-
mate change were minimal, the UWMP would meet 
its supply goals for 2030. However, if climate change 
were to cause signifi cant warming and drying, the 
UWMP could perform poorly and miss many of its 
goals, causing economic losses.
Additional runs of the model, using more than 
200 scenarios and 8 additional management strat-
egies, were then performed. In 120 of the scenar-
ios, cost was 20 percent higher than expected. The 
analysis revealed that UWMP was particularly vul-
nerable when future conditions were drier, access 
to imported water more limited, and natural per-
colation of the groundwater basin lower. Strategies 
ranged from increasing water use effi ciency, recy-
cling storm water to replenish groundwater, and 
developing the region’s water recycling program. In 
all cases, augmenting the UWMP with additional 
management strategies reduced both costs and 
vulnerability.
The analysis concluded that local solutions should 
not be overlooked when developing ways to mitigate 
the impacts of climate change. Local policies and 
management opportunities may be more cost effec-
tive, reliable, and feasible than other options.
Under the robust decision-making analysis, the 
best management plan was found to be adaptive 
and to include near-term implementation of more 
water use effi ciency techniques. Presented with these 
results, water managers expressed increased confi -
dence that they could plan for the effects of climate 
change despite the uncertainty of forecasts.
Source: For more information, see http://www.cakex.org/case-studies/1029. 
making approach makes it possible to com-
bine different performance criteria. It is thus 
useful for the design of green growth policies, 
which are based largely on the identifi cation 
of synergies across policy goals.
Both robust and optimal techniques are 
necessary elements in a decision-making pro-
cess involving signifi cant uncertainties. Anal-
yses focused on optimality are vulnerable to 
overconfi dence bias. Robust approaches dwell 
on consequences and eschew risky behavior. 
Managed risk-taking, however, is an essential 
part of development and inseparable from 
innovation.
One critique of robust approaches is their 
sensitivity to the worst-case scenario. This 
tendency is not an artifact of the method-
ology; rather, it refl ects the reality of some 
choices; in other cases, decision makers 
can judge that hedging about a worst-case 
scenario is too expensive and not worth 
it. Robust processes deal with this issue 
through stakeholder participation and 
exchanges with experts. The choice of the 
worst-case scenario is thus a negotiated, 
participatory process that plays a key role in 
determining which policy options will even-
tually be implemented.
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This type of approach is particularly 
appropriate in the context of green growth, 
because it allows analysts to identify the 
policies and measures that are necessary to 
avoid getting locked into patterns that will 
be extremely diffi cult to change in the future. 
Robust decision making thus helps identify 
measures that are needed over both the short 
and medium terms.
Moreover, the deep uncertainty surround-
ing environmental issues affects the type of 
solutions that need to be implemented. As 
any good solution must be context specifi c, 
the application of “best practices” is diffi cult. 
Two general rules can be proffered, however. 
First, solutions that allow greater flexibil-
ity should be favored over those that create 
lock-in; and where choices that could lead 
to irreversible consequences must be consid-
ered, they should be evaluated very carefully 
 (Hallegatte 2009). Second, given the dif-
fi culty in projecting the consequences of all 
policies, implementation should be based on 
experimentation, monitoring, and generaliza-
tion of successful methods.
Developing green growth strategies 
and responding to climate change entail 
an investment in planning. One option is 
for governments to develop specifi c green 
growth strategies alongside their core plan-
ning instruments. An alternative—possibly 
more in line with the goals of integrating cli-
mate change, growth, and poverty reduction 
policy objectives—is to incorporate green 
growth strategies in core planning instru-
ments (such as national development plans). 
This approach highlights the trade-offs that 
governments will have to weigh: between 
predictability and fl exibility, between rel-
evance and enforceability, and among the 
various policy objectives. The step-by-step 
process proposed here helps them resolve 
these trade-offs, identify synergies and co-
benefits, and formulate a comprehensive 
green growth strategy that incorporates 
the range of policies available, while tak-
ing into account the deep uncertainty that 
characterizes climate change. The process 
is equally applicable at the national, local, 
and sectoral levels.
Notes
 1.  This section draws heavily on Vogt-Schilb 
and Hallegatte (2011).
 2.  With widely accepted prices (and an agreed 
upon discount rate), all the components of 
future welfare can be summarized in a single 
number (which can be referred to as “wealth”). 
In this case, a policy is “good” (it increases 
wealth) or “bad” (it decreases wealth).
 3.  For an example of standardized multicriteria 
analysis scoring for a variety of adaptation 
actions, see Republic of Burundi (2007).
 4.  This section relies extensively on Hallegatte 
and others (2012). 
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As the global population heads toward 9 billion by 2050, 
decisions made today will lock countries into growth patterns 
that may or may not be sustainable in the future.  Care must be 
taken to ensure that cities and roads, factories and farms are 
designed, managed, and regulated as efficiently as possible 
to wisely use natural resources while supporting the robust 
growth developing countries still need. Economic development 
during the next two decades cannot mirror the previous two: 
poverty reduction remains urgent but growth and equity can 
be pursued without relying on policies and practices that foul 
the air, water, and land.
Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable 
Development makes the case that greening growth is 
necessary, efficient, and affordable. Yet spurring growth 
without ensuring equity will thwart efforts to reduce poverty 
and improve access to health, education, and infrastructure 
services. Countries must make strategic investments and 
farsighted policy changes that acknowledge natural resource 
constraints and enable the world’s poorest and most vulner-
able to benefit from efficient, clean, and resilient growth. Like 
other forms of capital, natural assets are limited and require 
accounting, investment, and maintenance in order to be 
properly harnessed and deployed. By maximizing co-benefits 
and avoiding lock-in, by promoting smarter decisions in 
industry and society, and by developing innovative financing 
tools for green investment, we can afford to do the things  
we must. 
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